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SOLIDARITY AND DIFFERENCE:
THE POLITICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT
IN THE AFTERMATH OF MODERNITY

The objective of this dissertation is to provide a critical
analysis of the debate between modernists and postmodernists.
This involves an analysis of the work of Juergen · Habermas
which focuses on the role that he has played in this debate.
I argue that there is an alternative to the dichotomy between
modernism and postmodernism. In presenting this alternative I
develop a conception of "the aftermath of modernity" which
takes

seriously

postmodern

critiques
,-

of

modernism

while

keeping intact certain key enlightenment ideals. I approach
this problem from the perspective of the idea of enlightenment
which I examine conceptually, sociologically and historical.
My

conclusion

is

enlightenment in
develop

an

that
th~

in

order

to

pursue

the

ideals

of

aftermath of modernity it necessary to

ethically based

notion

tolerant of radical difference.

of

solidarity that

is
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INTRODUCTION
In

a

social,

atmosphere

that

political,

is

either

cultural

succumbing

and
to,

theoretical
or

embracing

wholeheartedly, fragmentation, superficiality and disparity,
Juergen Habermas has consistently defended unity, depth, and
comprehensiveness. In short, Habermas has been, in the most
traditional sense, a philosopher par excellence at a time when
philosophy

itself

has

become

a

questionable

enterprise.

Another way of stating this would be to say that Habermas has
bucked recent theoretical trends--the refusal to systematize,
unify,

or

commit

to

positions--through

an

appeal

to

the

highest developments of 18th, 19th and 20th century thought
and their tendency to construct theoretical totalities. Yet
another way of putting this would be to say that Habermas has
thoroughly embraced the Kantian critical project at a time
when

it

has

become

popular

to

separate

it

into

its

constitutive parts and then pick and choose elements that
serve the ends of less ambitious endeavors. In short: Habermas
has risked being a theoretician--a critical theoretician--at
a juncture in intellectual history when being a theoretician
in the tradition of Hegel, Marx and Weber has fallen into ill
repute.
The antithesis to Habermas' grand theory project is most
clearly represented by writers that can be loosely organized
under

the

theoretical

banner

of

postmodernism.

off spring of

Nietzsche,

This
Freud,

includes
and

of

the

course

Heidegger. But who precisely falls into the postmodern camp is
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not

as

simple

as

it

may

seem.

Obvious

members

are

self

proclaimed postmodernists such as Lyotard and Baudrillard;
less obvious, and considerably more problematic, are thinkers
such as Derrida,

Foucault, and Levinas. While they clearly

share the same lineage as the straight forward postmodernists,
and likewise share their suspicions concerning unity, totality
and even depth, they also depart from the others in ways that
I consider to have important ramifications: philosophically
and politically.
My aim in setting up this somewhat contrived dichotomy is
to delve into the modernism/postmodernism debate--a debate
that

has

already

raged

on

for

quite

some

time--from

a

perspective that questions the initial terms of the debate.
Such

an

approach

obviously

owes

a

strategic

debt

to

postmodernism, regardless of how it is characterized. But it
also, as I will attempt to demonstrate, owes an equal, if not
greater,

debt to the tradition of critical social theory:

which is as modern as theory gets. My aim, then, is to provide
a

characterization

significance

of

what

of
I

the

theoretical

will

hereafter

and

refer

practical
to

as

the

aftermath of modernity. The purpose of developing this concept
is to depart from what I consider to be an often fruitless, at
times acrimonious, and at worst reactionary debate.

I will

attempt to show the futility of being theoretically paralyzed
for fear of being "metaphysical" and practically stilted for
fear of being "irrational." In a nutshell: I will pit Habermas
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and his "postmodern" enemies against one another, once again,
in a effort to survey somewhat different territory

than the

current debate is able to accommodate. Rather than defending
one

side or the other

I

will attempt to

look beyond the

modernity vs. postmodernity dichotomy.
This project, stated as such, goes beyond what
achieved in the following work.

In fact,

can be

I will attempt to

shed light on only one key issue in what I envision to be a
project that could go in a number of directions and could
broach a number of questions. The issue that I will pursue is
enlightenment:

a

topic

that

has

long been

Habermas'

pet

project. In doing so I reveal without hesitation an affinity
for his work. I would go so far as to say that Habermas raises
all the right questions and provides plausible answers to the
bulk of them. Having stated this, however, I want to be clear
from the outset that my support for Habermas is far
unqualified. In fact, he has tended to move in

from

disappointing

directions in his reproaches to thinkers he considers to be
postmodern.

These

responses

are

not

entirely

unfounded;

nonetheless, they are far from being fully supported either.
At the root of his positions and reactions with respect to the
questions of postmodernism is his stalwart defense of the
Enlightenment. As such, his work will be center stage in this
book.

With

Habermas

I

would

like

to

defend

enlightenment; against Habermas, however,

a

notion

of

I will attempt to

show the importance of constructing this notion outside of the
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parameters of the "unfinished project of modernity." Hence, I
will be approaching the question of enlightenment in a manner
that doesn't dismiss the valuable insights that have developed
in postmodern of theory.

In brief:

I will be exploring the

prospects for enlightenment in the aftermath of modernity. In
order

to

so

I

communicative

will

examine

Habermas'

action--including

normative

discourse

work

ethics--and

on
his

critical analyses of poststructuralism.
In recent years poststructuralism has replaced positivism
as the most formidable nemesis of critical social theory. A
great deal of Habermas' work in the 1980's focuses on the
philosophical backdrop and social-political repercussions of
poststructuralist criticisms of Western rationality. This was
initiated with an essay titled "Modernity vs.

Postmodern~ty"

(1981) in which Habermas makes the controversial claim that
the poststructuralist representatives of anti-modern thought
are

"young

conservatives

(1981,

13).

His

most

complete

evaluation of poststructuralism is found in The Philosophical
Discourse of Modernity (1987). Here Habermas concentrates on
how Modernity's counter discourses (such as romanticism and
Marxism) evolved into post-discourses that rely heavily upon
Nietzsche's analysis of modernity.
I will be discussing these issues in some detail in the
chapters that follow. Before describing the manner in which I
intend to proceed,
Habermas'

however,

it is useful to briefly review

characterization of the relationship between the
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terms modernity and postmodernity. The term modern, he notes,
has been used at various times in the history of the West. It
was first applied to the post-pagan Christian period that
emerged in the 5th century

c.

E. Other points at which the

term was widely used include the 12th and 17th centuries in
France as well as during the Italian and German Renaissance.
The common denominator between these periods

is that each

marks a break from an old era and signifies the expectations
of a new epoch. Habermas' main concern is with the concept of
modernity that is schematized in terms of the dissolution of
structures that were characteristic of the medieval epoch.
This, of course, involves a number of stages that span from as
early as the 14th century on into the 19th century. For all
practical

purposes,

however,

modernity

came

into

its

own

during the 16th and 17th centuries.
Initially the newness of the modern period meant a return
to the

"grand old days",

referring to the golden age of

antiquity. this is exemplified in the art and literature of
the Italian Renaissance. Later, as a consequence of the French
Enlightenment, modernity came to refer to a newness that was
independent

of

the past.

A spirit of

progress

determination was prompted by advancements
liberalization

in

spheres.

futuristic

This

conception

of

the

religious,

modernity

Habermas (1981, 3-4).

is

of

of

self-

in science and

political

orientation

and

and

the

particular

economic

enlightened

importance

to
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The term postmodern emerged in the late 1950's and was
used to

describe

anti-establishment

trends

in

art.

These

trends themselves are continuous with late modern phases such
as surrealism and dadaism. The term has enjoyed much wider
circulation

in

the

70's

and

80's.

Currently

talk

about

postmodern architecture, art, film, etc. is all the rage and
speculation on postmodern science, philosophy and politics is
increasing. While the term itself has a meaning that is as
fluid as the reality which it is used to characterize, the
common theme is that there is nothing new under the sun. The
"post" indicates that we are beyond the modern-enlightenment
myth

that

something

can

be

contrast, postmodern "things"

created

out

of

nothing.

In

(art, literature, philosophy,

etc. ) tend to patch together disparate objects, themes, ideas,
etc.

with the intent of breaking up the facade of unity,

coherence

and

progress

that

modernity

has

attempted

to

present.
Late in the 18th century, when modernity apparently was

in full swing, its first wave of critics appeared. For the
sake of convenience I will encapsulate this movement under the
general rubric of Romanticism and its offshoots. The concern
of romantic thinkers was that rationalization,

for all its

scientific and economic merits, generates dehumanizing side
effects; it excludes from the human experience such things as
imagination,

emotions,

spirituality,

and

aesthetic

sensibilities. Romantic modernists renounced the reverence for
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antiquity, replacing it with an idealized view of the middle
ages. Their intention was to revitalize what they perceived to
be a loss of the internal aspect of human experience. Habermas
claims that this resulted in a modern vision which extracted
itself from its own historical context. "In the course of the
19th century, there emerged out of this romantic spirit that
radicalized consciousness of modernity which freed itself from
all historical ties." The immediate ancestors of the romantics
Habermas

labels

"aesthetic

modernists";

they

in

turn

anticipate contemporary postmodern thought (1981, 4).
The

feature

that

defines

aesthetic

modernism

(from

Baudelaire to Dali) is its altered sense of historicity. The
past was portrayed as something to leap out of, rather than
build upon. "Avant-garde" became the theme which supplied the
prescriptive

force

for

an

engaged

approach

to

life

that

proceeds toward an undefined, indeterminate, but utterly new
future. This extreme effort to break from the continuity and
progress that marked status quo modernism was the reactive
product

of

an

increased

awareness

of

the

limitations

established by traditional norms. According to Habermas, the
attitude that accompanied this vision was that of a naughty
child. Aesthetic modernism fed upon the act of breaking rules,
resulting

in

its

politic al substance.
avant-garde

inability

to

establish

anything

This is most evident in the

movements

of

the

middle

20th

with

"failed"

century.

The

surrounding questions are concerned with whether the creative
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energy of modernity is spent. If so, is this a consequence of
the infiltration of system into lifeworld which results in the
lifeworld being "colonized"

and exploited for the sake of

system imperatives? This in turn raises a further question. As
Habermas puts it: "Thinking more generally, does the existence
of a

post-avant-garde mean there is

a

transition to

that

broader phenomena called postmodernity?" (1981, 4-6).
The immediate consequence of the crisis produced by this
historical

juncture

is

"nee-conservatism":

a

return

to

religious and traditional values that supposedly will resupply
the meaning that has been swept away during the evolution of
modernity.

Habermas

notes

several

ways

in

which

this

is

problematic. Conservative critics of modernity have no way of
accounting for social and economic advancements that have been
made. This is because their analysis fails to grasp the extent
to which negative cultural phenomena are tied to the mode of
production. The cultural crises that they identify are a sign
of

a

much

deeper

problem

that

falls

from

constitutional

incongruities in the modern lifeworld. "I would describe this
subordination of the life world under system imperatives as a
matter

of

disturbing

the

communicative

infrastructure

of

everyday life." Habermas' point is that the central problem of
the

late

phase

communicative
mode.

of

the

modern

epoch

is

a

disruption

of

rationality caused by the modern productive

It is not repressive norms that have stilted modern

creativity; on the contrary, the breakdown in the structures

9

of the lifeworld has inhibited the production and transmission
of values and norms that are essential to maintaining the
modern vision.

As

such,

Habermas

contends,

the

ideals

of

enlightened modernity need to be reappropriated and applied
critically to the prevailing conditions that have brought
about all the talk of postmodernity.
The feature of modernity that is central to Habermas'
modernism

falls

from the

differentiation

of

the

rational

substance of traditional religion and metaphysics into three
distinct
spheres

spheres:
correspond

science,
to

the

morality and

art.

three

of

types

These

three

validity

that

Habermas identifies as being raised in a formal discourse:
truth, rightness, and truthfulness. Rational differentiation
(which takes place within the modern lifeworld) gives rise to
discourses that pertain to knowledge, justice and taste. The
ideal

espoused

by

Enlightenment

thinkers

was

that

these

discourses could be institutionalized in such a way that they
would

provide

the

foundation

for

a

rational

society.

Unfortunately this has not taken place. The three spheres have
come under the control of experts who administer knowledge
based power

independent of the general public. Rather than

symmetrical

public

discourse

we

have

experts

producing

monologues that shape our thinking on the issues which they
address. Contrary to the neo-conservatives, however, Habermas
refuses to see this phenomenon as an inherent repercussion of
modernity.

Rather,

he

claims,

it

is

a

function

of
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communicative

distortions

that

are

associated

with

the

capitalist economic mode. The normative content of modernity
need not be renounced simply because it is distorted by a
contingent productive mechanism. Hence, the solution to the
crises of late modernity is to be found in the structures
which constitute the modern lifeworld, not some indeterminate
postmodern future (1981, 8-9).
Habermas develops his case by filling out the critique of
aesthetic modernism. Rather than pursuing the Enlightenment
goal of integrating art into public life, art movements, due
to the outlandishness of their product, have become more and
more detached. As such, art is negated as a distinct component
of cultural life, rendering it impotent. When the boundaries
separating the discursive spheres that constitute the modern
lifeworld

are

obliterated,

when

moral

and

scientific

discourses are renounced in favor of the expressive discourse
of art, the potential for collective transformation of society
is eliminated. In response, Habermas offers this proposal:
I think that instead of giving up modernity and its
project as a lost cause, we should learn from the
mistakes of those extravagant programs which have tried
to negate modernity. Perhaps the types of reception of
art may off er an example which at least indicates the
direction of a way out (1981, 11).
Enactment of this proposal requires that language games be
established which center on art. Art can then be reintegrated
into the lifeworld, making it once again publicly accessible.
Discourses that are concerned with expressive validity claims
will set a precedent for reintegrating discourses concerning
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knowledge and justice. As such, art can pave the way toward a
reactivation of the normative content that is stored in the
modern lifeworld.
While an interesting proposal on a strictly theoretical
level, Habermas recognizes that it falters practically. "If I
am not mistaken, the chances for this today are not very good.
More or

less

in the

entire Western world,

a

climate has

developed that furthers capitalist modernization processes as
well

as

trends

critical

of

cultural

modernism.

The

disillusionment with the very failures of those programs that
called for the negation of art and philosophy has come to
serve as a pretense for conservative positions"

(1981, 13).

Habermas' pessimism on this count is underscored by his own
analysis of the conditions that prevail in advanced modern
societies. In a sense, then, his philosophical and political
commitments to modernity begin from a position of frustration
if not futility. The sorts of normative discourses that are
necessary

to

break

the

strangle

hold

of

capitalism

are

fundamentally precluded by that very set of limitations.
The position that I will attempt to develop is that two
intertwined levels of normativity have developed during the
modern epoch: the level that Habermas refers to which ensures
that validity claims are addressed rationally and fairly, and
the

level

which

enables

activities

to

be

conducted

by

individuals and collectives that are strategically positioned
within the power /knowledge configurations which constitute
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advanced capitalist societies--preserving the communicative
asymmetries that maintain their advantages. The fact that this
bilevel set of norms is formally contained in the structures
of the lifeworld serves as a smoke screen which cloaks a
communicative structure that is not so much distorted as it is
fine tuned to protect the interests of those whom have learned
and mastered the norms which ground modern action related to
political power and economic hegemony. So long as the illusion
that the way to generate change is to engage in discursive
practices

which

follow

the

letter modern

normativity

is

maintained, those individuals and groups that aspire to bring
about

change

in

accordance

with

these

rules

will

be

effectively subdued. They will be rendered impotent by system
imperatives that have

effectively cornered the lifeworld

which provides their foundation. One needs simply to look at
activist groups that are in existence today to confirm this.
While

participants

enjoy

rich

discourse

and

establish

solidarity among themselves, they rarely make an impact simply
through dialogue. By relying on the questionable normative
content of modernity to ground his theory, Habermas by his own
admission renders a complementary set of political practices
implausible.
This criticism is one that is fostered by Habermas' own
analysis of advanced capitalism. He is acutely aware of the
way that the communicative paradigm of capitalism has seeped
into all spheres of late modern life. He does not, however,
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proceed with an assessment of the discourses that enable this
to occur. On the contrary, he persistently returns to the type
of analysis that was first introduced in his earliest work. An
ideal model of healthy social and 'political communication is
used

as

a

patterns

standard

are

against

measured.

This

which

existing

facilitates

communicative

the

detection

of

distorted communication which is an initial step in a process
tailored toward bringing it under the regulation of agreed
upon standards of legitimacy.

If, however, the discourse is

already regulated by a set of norms which are inseparable from
modern

norms,

then

an

alternative

approach

to

discursive

practices that is less indebted to the "talking cure" needs to
be developed.
The points that I have sketched in this introduction will
be elaborated in the book that follows. My objective is to
take

one of

Habermas'

central

claims--that a

politics

of

emancipation is by necessity a politics of enlightenment--and
explore

the

conditions

of

its

development

such

that

the

dubious status of modern normativity is rigorously questioned.
My aim is to think through the problems of such a politics in
lieu of a waning modernity.

In doing so I

thorough critical analysis of Habermas'

will provide a

conception of the

relationship between the ideals of the Enlightenment and the
development of modern societies. I will argue that Habermas
unnecessarily links the concept of enlightenment to modern
social,

political

and

economic

developments.

This

is

an
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important issue if, as postmodernists have contended, some of
the

basic

structures

of

modernity

have

fallen

into

dissolution. While I am not prepared to embrace postmodernism,
a number of issues raised by critics such as Jean-Francois
Lyotard

and

Fredric

Jameson

need

to

be

taken

into

consideration. In my analysis of these figures--with respect
to

the

question

of

enlightenment

as

well

as

Habermas'

modernism--! will argue for a middle position which will be
characterized

as

characterization

the
will

"aftermath
enable

a

of

modernity."

critique

of

This

Habermas'

Enlightenment positions with respect to several key political,
cultural, and theoretical debates. These are loosely organized
under the banner of

neo-conservatism.

In response to

his

modernist approach, I will consider the preliminary features
of a politics of enlightenment which is compatible with the
aftermath of modernity. In doing so I will appeal to several
recent French philosophers (primarily Foucault, Derrida and
Levinas)

who,

dichotomy.

My

I
aim

believe,

avoid

will

to

be

the

modern/postmodern

preserve

a

conception

of

normativity and a strong sense of emancipation, along with
Habermas' commitment to the Kantian ethical project. I will
contend

that

in

order

to

keep

these

concepts

both

theoretically and politically viable it is necessary to move
beyond the limits of Habermas' conception of modernity.
In the first chapter I will situate my project in terms
of a dialectic of enlightenment that has been developing for
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over 200 years. The point of departure for this discussion is
Kant's famous essay,
this,

as

writings,

well

as

"What is Enlightenment." I
several

provides a

other

of

Kant's

argue that
"occasional"

firm philosophical basis for further

discussion of the question of enlightenment. This question
will be followed historically through the 19th century and
proceed to the seminal work by Max Horkheimer and Theodor
Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment. In this work I identify
two

strains

of

enlightenment

thought:

one

which

is

more

compatible with Habermas' vision and another that points in
the direction of a form of enlightenment that moves beyond the
parameters of modernity.

I

will proceed to show how this

alternative to the traditional,

Habermasian,

enlightenment is both plausible and,
compatible with Habermas'
societies.

to a

conception of

certain extent,

own analysis of advanced modern

This chapter concludes with an analysis of the

political possibilities that emerge in the wake of modernity.
Chapter two

deals extensively with issues surrounding

the modernism/postmodernism debate.
Habermas

views

on

the

development

I

begin by detailing
of

modern

societies.

Particular attention is paid here to the way that Habermas
characterizes the normative content of such societies. As a
foil to this I discuss the work of Lyotard and Jameson. In the
course of doing so I distinguish between what will be ref erred
to as descriptive postmodernism and "normative" postmodernism.
This

enables

a

fuller

characterization

of

the

political
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possibilities
dichotomy. I

that

lie

outside

of

the

modern/postmodern

conclude the chapter by arguing that both the

modernist and postmodernist views miss something crucial about
the current historical-political climate and why it is more
relevant to ref er to this

atmosphere as the aftermath of

modernity.
In chapter three I

take up Habermas'

version of the

politics of enlightenment: his theory of cornrnunicati ve action.
Here I argue that the normative aspirations of this theory, in
their most abstract form,

can indeed be separated from the

capitalist mode of production. When the theory becomes more
concrete, however, particularly with respect to law, morality
and emancipation, This separation falters. My contention is
that philosophical distinctions between what could be called,
in conventional marxian terms, base and superstructure, run
the political risk of integrating into a normative theory the
very distortions
against.
going

that the theory

is

designed to mitigate

I conclude with a discussion of the prospects for

beyond

foundationalism

in

the

direction

of

a

historically fortified materialism.
Chapter four addresses specific examples of the politics
of enlightenment that Habermas forwards,

arguing that when

examined in the context of real political action it tends
toward

fortifying

a

quasi-liberal

status

quo.

This

is

exemplified in several debates that Habermas has participated
in concerning the issue of neo-conservatism. Beyond this I

17

attempt

to

gauge

the

way that

a

Habermasian politics

of

enlightenment would pertain to watershed political events of
contemporary relevance.
In the final chapter I develop my own position on the
politics of enlightenment.

I

argue that the key to such a

politics is to be found in Habermas' theory of the lifeworld.
My claim is that this theory is incompatible with his version
of communicative action. I suggest an alternative to this that
opens further political possibilities. In conclusion I argue
for a radically egalitarian form of communicative action that
is based on Habermas'
philosophy.

discourse

ethics

and

recent French

CHAPTER I
DIALECTIC OF DIFFERENCE:
ENLIGHTENMENT AND ITS OTHER
Enlightenment,

whether

considered

as

an

historical

process or a philosophical concept, has sparked a great deal
of debate in contemporary social theory. Numerous events have
occurred in the 20th century--the rise of Nazism, the war that
didn't end all wars, the development and deployment of nuclear
weapons, the flagrant exploitation of "third world" nations,
and the rise and fall of "communism" just to name a few--that
have prompted questions as to whether the objectives stated by
Kant in 1784 have been, or are being realized:
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed
immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's
understanding without guidance from another. This
immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in
lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage
to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude!
"Have courage to use your own understanding!"--that is
the motto of enlightenment.
The all important question for social theorists is whether the
atrocities of the current century are a sign of immaturity or
a

function

of

the very maturation process

that

Kant

so

enthusiastically lauds. If the former is true, and further
enlightenment is the solution, then enlightenment must be a
basic tenet of any social theory. If the latter is the case,
then social theory must cut against the grain that has been
constituted by "enlightened" thought.
18
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The poles that I have characterized, although
a

bit

too

simplistically,

represent,

in

a

~onstrued

sense,

the

theoretical presuppositions of two prominent schools of social
thought:

critical

theorists

feel

continued

by

theory

and

poststructuralism.

that the project
reconceptualizing

Critical

of Enlightenment must be
it

in

a

manner

that

is

compatible with existing conditions. Poststructuralists, in
contrast, are less willing to accept the traditional concept
of Enlightenment in any form. Oddly enough, both schools are
committed,

in one way or another,

to working through this

problem by rethinking the Kantian critical project.
The publication in 1982 of the notes which were to be the
third and final volume of Hannah Arendt's The Life of the
Mind 1 issued in the poststructuralist wave of scholarship on
Kant's "political philosophy." This work focuses not so much
on his more explicitly political writings, but rather on the
Third

Critique.

The

neo-neo-Kantianism

to

which

Arendt's

Lectures gave rise developed what could be ref erred to as the
politics of judgement. 2 In these fragments Arendt attempts to
dismiss Kant's 'less than serious' dabblings in philosophical
journalism in order to ferret out the political philosophy
that he never quite wrote. She bases her analysis primarily on
1

Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy,
Ronald Beiner Ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
2George

A. Trey, "Rethinking th~ Public Sphere: Arendt's
Shift from the Polis to the Politics of Judgment," Presented
at the 1991 meeting of The Society for Social and Political
Philosophy.
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the notion of judgment developed in the third volume of the
critical

trilogy.

This

·focus

locates

philosophy in a rather paradoxical way.

Kant's

political

It would be hard to

imagine a thinker more distinctively modern than Kant; yet the
politics of

judgment that Arendt gives

impetus

to

in her

lectures has taken on a surprisingly postmodern character. 3
The expression of this is most notably found in the writings
of Jean-Francois Lyotard.
The main alternative to the postmodern Kant that the neoneo-Kantians
Kantianism
Juergen

have

manufactured

developed

Habermas.

is

the

by

thinkers

such

Their

attempts

to

more
as

write

conventional

John

Rawls

Kant's

and

"fourth

critique" concentrate on the second increment to the critical
trilogy. In doing so they remain firmly within the modernist
tradition

that

Kant,

in

a

sense,

initiated.

While

my

sympathies lie with the ethical content of this more likely
approach
tendency,

to

a

Kantian

political

in my estimation,

philosophy,

there

is

a

to ignore important structural

changes that challenge some of modernism's most cherished
principles. This is most clearly evident in Habermas' work. In
his efforts to revive the ethical-political content of the
modernist tradition, he tends to dismiss the "realities" of
the postmodern condition.

While I am not wiiling to fully

embrace either the descriptive or normative dimensions

3 see

David Ingram,
and Lyotard."

of

"The Postmodern Kantianism of Arendt
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postmodernism,

I

do

think

that

it

is

necessary--both

philosophically and politically--to query with seriousness
its threat to the tradition of enlightenment thought. In doing
so I will take up several of Kant's writings which Arendt,
citing Schopenhauer favorably, claims do not seem to be

"the

work of this great man, but the product of an ordinary common
man" (Arendt, page 8). My aim is to trace a line from Kant to
Habermas

that

explores

the

territory

between

nostalgic

modernism and cynical postmodernism.
The pivotal work in my analysis will Theodor Adorno' s and
Max Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment. This remarkable
book provides, in a number of ways, a context for

the debate

between the modernists and postmodernists on the question of
enlightenment.

I will explore this further by taking into

consideration Michel Foucault's reflections on the question of
enlightenment. My argument will be that enlightenment per se
is not what Foucault is opposed to but rather a specifically
modern, humanist conception of enlightenment that lends itself
to a particular type of immaturity. This situates Foucault as
one

of

those

key

figures

modern/postmodern dichotomy.

whose

work

lies

between

the

From there I will proceed to

argue that Habermas' most recent assessment of late-modern
society comes to conclusions that are not incommensurate with
Foucault's views. My aim in doing so is to provide a framework
for discussions in subsequent chapters which will show that
while late modern (advanced-capitalist or post-industrial)
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societies are in concrete terms not postmodern, a theory of
enlightenment that is sensitive to the conditions of late
modernity

must

take

into

consideration

counter-modern

critiques. In doing so I will attempt to thematize the basic
issues

that

are

relevant

to

a

politics

of

enlightenment

appropriate to the aftermath of modernity.
THE POLITICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT: PHASE 1
In this section I will discuss three of Kant's essays
which raise important issues concerning the conditions for a
politics
conception

of

enlightenment. 4

that

I

will

These

develop

writings

later.

Kant

inform

the

attacked

the

question of enlightenment most directly in his famous essay,
"An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?". 5 In this
short, but pithy, treatise,he develops a compelling case for
the significant role that autonomy must play in a theory of
enlightenment. Stating Kant's thesis once again:

4

As
Kenneth Baynes
indicates,
the politics
of
enlightenment, which draws out the political implications of
Kant's moral philosophy, is not unequivocally supported by
Kant's texts. "This claim concerning the unity of
Kant's
practical philosophy may seem suspect to those already
familiar with his political theory. After all, Kant not only
drew a sharp distinction between the realm of legality and the
realm of morality, he also claimed that progress in the former
does not insure any improvement in the latter." Kenneth
Baynes, The Normative Grounds of Critical Theory: Kant, Rawls,
Habermas, New York: SUNY Press, 1992 (page 12). In order to
sustain the reading that I am forwarding it is necessary to
highlight the "dialectical" side of Kant.
5

Emmanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question:
Enlightenment,"
Perpetual
Peace
and
Other
Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1983 (pp. 41-48).

What is
Essays,
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Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed
immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's
understanding without guidance from another.
This
immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in
lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage
to use it without guidance (41).
While on the surface this might appear to be a

radically

individualistic view of autonomy, a closer look shows that
Kant has a subtle understanding of the conditions that must
obtain in order for autonomy to be a viable possibility. He
thematizes this in terms of a strong principle of freedom--a
freedom that takes shape in the context of changes occurring
in both the political structures and the moral fabric of an
emerging modernity.

"But that the public should enlighten

itself is more likely; indeed, if it is only allowed freedom,
enlightenment is almost inevitable."
We

see

in

Kant's

thinking

the

development

dialectical conception of enlightenment.
autonomy

or

self-determination

of

a

On the one hand,

requires

a

substantive,

concrete form of freedom. One can surmise that for Kant this
involves secular authority, market economies, republican forms
of

government

and

a

separation

between

state

and

civil

society.

On the other hand, in order to see clearly what is

required

to

bring

about

a

substantive

subjects must already be autonomous.

form

of

freedom,

From an a-historical

point of view it would appear as though Kant's initiate theory
of

enlightenment

turns

into

a

dilemma.

But

from

the

perspective of developing forms of life, the dilemma dissolves
into a field of genuine social and political possibilities.
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These possibilities, which are dependent upon necessary a
priori conditions, find their conditions of sufficiency within
a newly emerging realm of political discourse.
However, insofar as this part of the machine also regards
himself as a member of the community as a whole, or even
of the world community, and as a consequence addresses
the public in the role of a scholar, in the proper sense
of that term, he can most certainly argue, without
thereby harming the affairs for which as a passive member
he is partly responsible (42).
As such, the dialectic of enlightenment is located within the
public sphere of bourgeois society. 6
Kant further historicizes his position by pointing out
how
one of the sure signs of enlightenment is the realization that
enlightenment is not a state to achieve, but rather a process
to participate in. This highlights the importance
attributes to public debate as

that he

a vehicle for generating

enlightenment. A vibrant public sphere seems, for Kant, to be
the most important structural constituent of the dialectic of
enlightenment: at the social and political level it provides
for a critical transformation of impediments to substantive
freedom; at the individual level it provides a forum in which
personal
6

integrity

and

mutual

respect

can

be

fostered.

Baynes notes that Kant draws an important distinction
between validity and genesis. Validity is an a-historical
criteria whereas genesis view the political moment in terms of
past development and future possibilities. For Kant, the
apparent development of a free and open public sphere plays an
important role in social-political genesis. I'm particularly
interested in the range of possibilities that this opens up.
Exploring these seem to overcome Kant's remarks about the
political viability of a race of devils.

25

Together these two aspects of the public sphere enable a
strong sense of solidarity as well as a contextualized model
of autonomy.
The

theory

principally

of

enlightenment

conceptual.

While

I

developed

have

thus

focused

far

upon

is

Kant's

appreciation of the historical embeddedness of the possibility
for

enlightenment,

contingencies

are

as

a

theory

of

underdeveloped.

.enlightenment,
In

order

to

these

see

more

clearly the philosophy of history that is in the backdrop of
this conceptual schema, it is useful to turn to Kant's sketch
in "Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Intent." 7
Here he develops a series of theses that serve to illustrate
the telos of enlightenment.

Kant introduces this essay by

bringing into play the noumenal/phenomenal distinction that is
so important to his epistemology and moral philosophy. In this
context he frames it in terms of the course of history in
relation to the autonomous subject. Humans don't plot out a
desirable course for history and then construct a plan of
action that will lead to the determined objective. Rather, the
natural

process

of

history,

in

conjunction

with

the

determinate aims of discrete communities of actors, moves in
the direction of fulfilling enlightenment ideals.
The spark for this process is conflict and antagonism,
followed
7

by

progressive

resolution;

it

is

fueled

by

the

Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History With a
Cosmopolitan Intent," Perpetual Peace and Other Essays,
Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1983 (pp. 29-40).
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transcendent rationality to which Kant continuously appeals.
Institutionally this process is objectified in political and
social structures which are repeatedly transformed as they
outlive their usefulness. Morally it builds toward a concept
of right that facilitates the flourishing of human freedom.
The ultimate
concept

of

logic of this,
internationalism

preserved by a

system of

Kant suggests,
based

universal

on

leads us

shared

law.

In

values
other

to a
and

words,

history moves toward a cosmopolitan state premised on general
conditions of toleration and cooperation. Hence, Kant provides
a philosophy of history that serves as the normative-empirical
foundation

for

a

strongly

emancipatory

theory

of

enlightenment.
The utopian aspirations of this theory are reflected on
more freely in "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch." 8
In this essay Kant develops a set of principles that focus on
the maintenance of peace between sovereign nations. Based on
the preceding discussion, as well as comments to that effect
in the present essay, it can be inferred that Kant sees the
ultimate

condition

of

enlightenment

to

be

harmonious

coexistence on a global scale. Before discussing several of
the key tenets of perpetual peace, it is important to note
that the more conservative side of Kant is on display in this
essay. He is suspicious of unlimited democratization; assumes
8

Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical
Sketch," Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, Indianapolis:
Hackett Press, 1983 (pp. 107-143).
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a very Hobbesian theory of human nature--one which doesn't do
service

to

his

relationship

own

rich

between

conception

the

of

noumenal

the

dialectical

and

phenomenal

constituitives of human being; and that coercion is necessary
if politics and morality are to be squared. 9 In spite of this,
Kant summarizes several of the most important features of his
theory of enlightenment in a provocative manner. The ones that
will

concern me

here deal

with

the

relationship between

universal morality and contingent political institutions.
Kant
opposing

sets
his

up

the

views

to

discussion
the

of

perpetual

"pragmatics"

of

peace

by

political

functionaries and their disdain for the visionary aspirations
of theorists. This situates the ideal of peaceful coexistence
in terms of the dialectic of enlightenment by pitting forces
of conservancy against the radical possibilities that contest
the

established

common

sense.

The

former

reduces

humane

existence to the determinations of the phenomenal realm; the
latter recognizes the need for noumenal transcendence, made
concrete in the political sphere, in order for conditions of
enlightenment to be secured.
The state of peace must therefore be established, for the
suspension of hostilities does not provide the security
of peace, and unless this security is pledged by one
neighbor to another (which can happen only in a state of
lawfulness), the latter, from whom such security has been
9

I say that Kant is being a reactionary in that he makes
concessions to the current power structure at the expense of
exploring more fruitful ideals. This clearly runs contrary to
his own definition of enlightenment, resorting to a cynicism
that fails to take the possibility for enlightenment serious.
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requested, can treat the former as an enemy (111).
Kant's point is that the impulses of self-preservation will
not suffice to sustain conditions of peace. Perpetual peace
requires the rule of law. This appeal to the transcendentaluniversal aspect of his moral theory illustrates the way in
which the ethical abstraction embodied in the categorical
imperative can be brought to bear in an institutional context.
While the specific status of the relationship between noumenal
ideals and phenomenal practices remains underdeveloped, it is
clear

that

he

sees

possibility

this

as

necessary

for

formulating a politics of enlightenment.
Kant attempts to specify more precisely the institutional
form that this would need to take. His two key points pertain
to the establishment of republican governments at the national
level and some type of international confederation of nations.
The

first

political

of

these

doesn't

imagination;

the

demonstrate
second,

a

great

however,

deal

points

of
to

important limitations of the nation state at the outset of its
development. In order to achieve peace at all, there must be
a

network

entities.

of

relations

established between

all

political

This addition marks an important development over

the Hobbesianism of his view of the social contract. Relations
between nations would have to be grounded in the concrete
political expression of the categorical imperative.
In summary I would like to stress the following points.
First, for Kant it seems

possible for one to uphold moral
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principles outside of the context of an enlightened society.
In fact,

the possibility for moral self-determination must

precede the setting up of just institutions. What is crucial
for Kant's dialectic of enlightenment is that the possibility
for

moral

self-determination begins

development
concrete

of

form

modern
of

political

autonomy

is

to

converge with

institutions.

needed

in

the

Second,

order

for

a

this

convergence to take place. In other words, the transcendental
moral subject must find her/his place in the phenomenal world.
Kant

situates

the

possibility

for

this

in

terms

of

a

philosophy of history which has as its end the achievement of
enlightened societal structures and relations. Finally, this
end can only be fulfilled within intersubjective networks that
are sustained in order to generate solidarity. Kant's appeal
to the public sphere and the importance of internationalism
specifies this need. While I recognize that my interpretation
of Kant is contestable, 10 I
radical

10

side

of

Kant

is

want to emphasize that if the
ferreted

out,

his

views

on

See for example Herbert Marcuse, "Philosophy and
Critical Theory," in Critical Theory: The Essential Readings,
David Ingram and Julia Simon-Ingram eds., New York: Paragon
House, 1992. Marcuse writes the following: "Kant had, of
course, written essays on universal history with cosmopolitan
intent, and on perpetual peace. But his transcendental
philosophy aroused the belief that the realization of reason
through
factual
transformation was
unnecessary,
since
individuals could become rational and free within the
established order" (page 7). If Marcuse' s point is simply that
Kant saw enlightenment to be attainable within the confines of
the bourgeois order that seems right. My analysis has
attempted to set up Kant's views in terms of their critical
potential for getting beyond that paradigm.
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enlightenment offer a wealth of resources.

THE POLITICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT: PHASE 2
My argument thus far has been that Kant,
develops a

in a sense,

notion of a dialectic of enlightenment that is

relevant to my present concerns.

His analysis,

however,

is

weak on a number of scores. The most flagrant of these is his
naivete concerning political-economy. For Kant, the economy
played no role in the normative structure of society.

His

focus is almost exclusively on civil society and the state.
Critical theorists after Kant, however, became increasingly
aware of the contradictions between an enlightened society and
the capitalist mode of production.

Hegel,

that the logic of capitalism entails a

for example,

saw

state of perpetual

unrest in that expansionism and fierce competition leads to
warfare. And of course Marx's contribution to this scarcely
needs to be mentioned. Where both Hegel and Marx uncritically
followed Kant concerned his teleological view of history. As
Kenneth Baynes puts it ...
Kant's predictions about the course of historical and
political events have not fared any better than Marx's.
Nature has produced neither just political orders nor a
condition of international perpetual peace. If Kant's
teleological conception of history is unjustified, what
consequences does this have for his assumptions about the
unity of practical philosophy? 11
It

is

11

12.

this

question

that

prompts

the

next

phase

of

the

Baynes, The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism, page
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politics of enlightenment.
When Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno wrote Dialectic of
Enlightenment 12 they

were

overwhelmed

with

the

phenomenal

events that seemed to undermine the viability of a politics
based on rationally grounded transcendental morality:

the

aforementioned developments which have left a black mark on
the record of 20th century "enlightened" societies. The way
that one interprets these events will largely determine how
one is disposed toward the question of enlightenment. If the
Enlightenment

leads

directly

to

these

atrocities,

then

critique must mitigate against Enlightenment norms; if, on the
contrary, these events are radical deviations from the norms
of the Enlightenment, then critique should attempt to defend
the validity of these norms and consider ways in which they
can be

brought to

bear

on

existing

social

and political

conditions. This is the set of problems that Horkheimer and
Adorno

attempt

to

analyze.

I

will

now

address

their

interpretation of the dialectic of enlightenment.
While critics of the Enlightenment can be found at nearly
every juncture of its development, the type of critique most
pertinent to the concerns of this book was first formulated by
Horkheimer and Adorno. They state the following thesis: "myth
is

already

mythology"
12

enlightenment;

and

enlightenment

reverts

to

(DOE, xvi). It is this proposition that prompted

Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of
Enlightenment, John Cumming trans. New York: Continuum, 1972
(hereafter DOE).
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to

them

radically

reformulate

the

project

of

critical

theory. 13 An important catalyst for this reformulation was
their observation that the process of social organization,
driven by the development and intensification of rationality,
so effectively subdues nature that humanity, being a natural
entity, falls victim to its own progress. This is exemplified
by the impulses of the Enlightenment:
For the Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the
rule of computation and utility is suspect. So long as it
can develop undisturbed by any outward repression, there
is no holding it. In the process, it treats its own ideas
of human rights exactly as it does the older universals.
Every spiritual resistance it encounters serves merely to
increase its strength (DOE, p. 6).
Enlightenment

turns

against

the

original

intention

of

rationally emancipating individuals from mythological world
views.

By

failing

to

reflect

critically

upon

its

own

historical development, the Enlightenment becomes encased in
a mythological fortress that protects it from the harsh truth
of its own reality: that it creates a technological despotism
which deprives individuals of their personal identity, linkage
13

See Helmut Dubiel' s Theory and Politics: Studies in the
development of Critical Theorv, Benjamin Gregg trans.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985 (pp. 69-81). Dubiel recognizes
three phases in the theoretical development of the Frankfurt
circle. The phase with which I am concerned he labels "the
critique of instrumental reason." This is distinguished from
the previous phases--the first of which focuses on formulating
Marxist materialism in light of early 20th century economic
conditions and the second which develops an interdisciplinary
approach to social studies--by distancing itself from question
of political-economy and developing a quasi structuralist
critique of Western rationality. The particular historical
events that most concerned Horkheimer and Adorno were the rise
of
fascism,
Stalinism,
and
the
vulnerability
to
authoritarianism that they detected in the allied countries.
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to nature, and spirituality.
In defense of these claims Horkheimer and Adorno provide
a comprehensive critique of the entire tradition of Western
rationality. 14 From the outset, Enlightenment, under any name,
has simply articulated the presiding myth via the language of
rationality. 15 As such, there are notable similarities between
mythological

and

enlightened thought.

Both,

to

a

certain

extent, attempt to provide a unified picture of reality; they
share the objective of mastering nature; and each structures
itself

on

the

Enlightenment
unknown,

basis
are

driving

of

both
each

power

hierarchies.

motivated
to

the

by

a

Mythology

deep

conclusion

fear

that

of

and
the

mysterious

elements of reality must be subdued through explanation.

It

was a specific type of explanation--scientif ic--that gave rise
to

the

historical

Enlightenment.

Horkheimer

and

Adorno

indicate a number of consequences that fall from this.

The

most important of these pertain to modes of communication and
14

Seyla Benhabib notes that this project results in a
paradox. "The critique of Enlightenment becomes as totalizing
as the false totality it seeks to criticize." Critique, Norm,
and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1986 (p. 168). Habermas, in
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,
echoes this
criticism. I tend to think that this problem has been over
emphasized. Horkheimer and Adorno don't explicitly renounce
the enlightenment tradition; rather they analyze its failure
to live up to its own normative standards. For a valuable
defense of their position see Larry Ray, "Foucault and the
Decomposition of the Historical Subject." Philosophy and
Social Criticism, Vol. 13, 1989, (pp. 69-110).
15

Horkheimer
and
Adorno
point
to
pre-socratic
cosmologies, as well as Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics,
as examples of this (DOE, p. 6).
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social organization (DOE, pp. 8-18).
Modes

of

communication

are

dependent

upon

forms

of

discursive language. In mythological discourse the language is

symbolic:

the

signifier

and

signified

are

united

in

the

symbol. Or, to put this in another way, processes of reference
are perceived to create a unified whole. This unity translates
into social unity as the meaning and truth objectified in
language plays an important role in corporate ritual practices
that

are

repeatedly

cohesion.

As

used

to

distinctions

create

between

a

sense

literal

of

communal

and

figural

discourse came to be drawn, the former, without recognition of
fictional residue,

was deemed the language of truth.

This

began in ancient Greek philosophy and reached its pinnacle in
enlightened positivism. The theme that is common to all phases
of

this

history

is

a

compulsion

to

assert

humanity's

superiority over nature. Consequently, discursive development
reflects

a

desire to describe,

understand,

and ultimately

dominate nature. Hence, the signifier ceases to provide social
coherence by representing a shared truth and meaning. Rather
than symbolizing the horizontally organized communality of
humanity and environment, it becomes a manipulative implement
which serves the compulsion to vertically administrate social
and natural reality (DOE, 17-18). 16
16

In contemporary semiotic theory this point would be
characterized in terms of the discrepancy between signifier
and signified. Insofar as the two never meet, there is no
sign. hence, there are merely chains of signification which
can have either a hierarchical or relational organization.
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As

I

mentioned, Horkheimer and Adorno contend that the

discourses
enlightened

of

rationalistic

science,

retain

philosophy,
a

number

of

and

later

of

characteristics

typically associated with their mythical antecedents. The most
significant remnants are the power associated with linguistic
mastery, the use of technical vocabulary to systematize and
totalize, and the development of linguistic apparatuses that
facilitate

the

hierarchical

ordering

of

subject

matter.

whereas in pre-rational societies the priest, as the possessor
of symbolic meaning, was the most powerful member, now the
scientist, whose discourse is laced with facts and figures,
reigns. While operating under the guise of neutrality,

the

ideology of scientific rationality permeates all spheres of
social existence. This is achieved, the authors claim, through
the proliferation and dissemination of scientific language.
Language itself gave what was asserted, the conditions of
domination, the universality that they had assumed as the
means of intercourse of a bourgeois society. The
metaphysical emphasis, and sanction by means of ideas and
norms, were no more than hypostatization of the rigidity
and exclusiveness which concepts more generally compelled
to assume wherever language united the community of
rulers with the giving of orders. As mere means of
reinforcing the social power of language, ideas became
all the more superfluous as this power grew, and the
language of science prepared the way for their ultimate
desuetude (DOE, p. 22).
To

summarize,

Horkheimer

and Adorno

claim the

following:

Horkheimer's and Adorno's point seems to be that the inability
to produce symbolic unity necessarily in hierarchical,
dominative structure. I would challenge this view by arguing
for a more communitarian form of disunity. This would involve
appealing to a historically fluid life world as the social
basis of discourse.
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mythical

discourse

precedes

and

influences

metaphysical

discourse, which precedes and influences scientific discourse.
While passionately seeking to purge itself of all mythical and
metaphysical characteristics,

enlightened science fails to

reflect on its own discursive evolution. As such, the remnants
that I mentioned above translate into a new social mythology
involving an
acceptance

unqualified

of

market

faith

relations,

in

reason,

and

an

an

uncritical

overenthusiastic

reception of full scale capitalism (DOE, p. 20-23). 17
Horkheimer

and

Adorno

go

on

to

claim

that

the

mythological foundation of enlightened modern society is a
dogmatic aversion for theory. Thinkers in the Enlightenment
tradition are, in a sense, non-thinkers. They no longer feel
compelled to theorize about the good or the nature of reality.
Now it is simply the matter of learning the laws of nature and
mathematics and applying them to the facts. This procedure,
according to Horkheimer and Adorno, is conducted under the
jurisdiction of a totalizing presupposition: that all of the
natural order can be systematically understood and exploited
for the "good" of humanity. As a result of rigid adherence to
this

presupposition,
17

negative

consequences

go undetected.

Horkheimer and Adorno are here playing on the Comtean
stages of human understanding. We first understand things
religiously or theologically, this develops into metaphysical
or philosophical understanding; then finally, once our mode of
understanding has sufficiently matured, we come to view things
scientifically. Horkheimer and Adorno are attempting to refute
the claim of progress that Comte wants to make. See selections
from Comte in Ideas of History vol. 2, Ronald Nash ed., New
York: E.P. Dutton and co. Inc., 1969, pp 8-10.
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"What appears to be the triumph of subjective rationality, the
subjection of all reality to logical formalism, is paid for by
the obedient subjection of reason to what is directly given"
( DOE , p . 2 6 ) ·
While the repercussions of this mind set for philosophy
and

science

Adorno,

the

conducted

are

significant,

influences

are

classification
phenomena are

on

the way

devastating.
and

according to

ordering

The

that

same

used

to

Horkheimer

everyday

rigorous

and

life

is

schemes

of

characterize

natural

implemented in manufacturing facilities

and

social institutions. Individuals become cogs in the capitalist
machinery. Conventions of expediency are enforced with such
proficiency that behavioral norms are rarely questioned. This
is

accomplished

by

carefully

monitoring

and

individual components of the collective unit,
smooth operation.

maintaining
ensuring its

The basic truth undergirding the modern

facade of individuality and freedom is that power rules. This,
according to Horkheimer and Adorno,

is

the dark mythical

undercurrent of Enlightenment (DOE, pp. 28-29).
The preceding analysis would appear to put asunder the
idea of a politics of enlightenment. Kant's dream of modern
progress seems to have turned into a postmodern nightmare.
Yet I would contend that the authors of Dialectic of
Enlightenment don't depart from Kant's most basic ideals.
They challenge the teleological view of progress by positing
an alternative interpretation to the idealist meta-
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narrative. 18 Likewise they root themselves in, and expand
upon, the classical critique of political economy. 19
Finally, they argue convincingly that the most important
feature of Kant's optimism concerning the prospect of an
enlightened society--that being the potential for human
autonomy--is virtually impossible within the parameters of
his analysis. This, however, does not amount to the
dismissal of Kant's ideals. In fact they repeatedly appeal
to principles such as self-determination, the need for
public discourse, and the basis for this that can only be
provided for within the context of a vital community. While
Horkheimer and Adorno are hesitant to frame this positively
in terms of a politics of enlightenment, their negative
appeal to these values clearly situates them within Kant's
set of questions.
All the same, the main essay of Dialectic of
Enlightenment leaves the reader somewhat confused as whether

18

As Adorno puts it: "Universal history must be construed
and denied. After the catastrophes that have happened, and in
view of the catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say
that a plan for a better world is manifested in history and
unites it. Not to be denied for that reason, however, is the
unity that cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered
moments and phases of history--the unity of the control of
nature, progressing to rule over, and finally to that over
men's inner nature. No universal history leads from sa~agery
to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the
slingshot to the megaton bomb." Negative Dialectics, New York:
Coontinuum, 1973 (page 320).
19

Much of Adorno's and Horkheimer's work prefigures and
surpasses Jean Baudrillard' s writings on the political economy
of the sign.
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western rationality and enlightenment are inherently bad or
simply misdirected. An Adornoesque pessimism certainly
prevails, giving the impression that reason and
enlightenment are fraught with deep conceptual problems
which translate into authoritarianism and domination.
Nevertheless, the critique pursued is of existing forms of
rationality and a specifically modern form of enlightenment.
While the seeds of these forms are traced, in almost
Heideggerian fashion, back to the golden days of ancient
Greece, the concrete examples are all linked to a distinctly
modern conception of science, as well as the modern mode of
production. Unlike Heidegger, however, the authors don't
clearly dismiss

rationality and enlightenment in general.

There is at the very least a restless ambiguity in the
text. 20 This is intensified in light of the different
attitudes expressed in the two excurses that follow. Given
that the excurses were independently authored, it can be
inf erred that the tension is explicable in terms of
differences between the individual views of Horkheimer and
Adorno. I will proceed under the assumption that this is the

20

This ambiguity is pointed out in most of the critical
literature. Helmut Dubiel sums the situation up as follows:
"This judgment--which might be classified in terms of
sociology of knowledge--about the conditions for the circles
own work is radicalized in the 1940's to the point of
nullifying itself self-referentially." Helmut Dubiel, Theory
and Politics, Benjamin Gregg trans. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985
(page 82).
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case. 21
THE POLITICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT: PHASE 3
As I mentioned above, during the course of this
analysis a model for critical-theoretical studies of society
is formulated. This model can be developed in two directions
that are relevant to the question of a politics of
enlightenment. These two directions are delimited by the
excurses that follow the main essay in Dialectic of
Enlightenment. The first, authored by Adorno, views
enlightened thought to be inherently suspect. The second,
authored by Horkheimer, indicates that it is not
enlightenment as such, but rather its perversion, that is
the source of modernity's rationality related problems. In
this section I will argue that Foucault develops Adorno's
thesis while Habermas elaborates Horkheimer's. 22
In the first excursus the author (Adorno) initiates his
interrogation of Western rationality with the stunning claim

21

The independent authorship of the excursuses is not
acknowledged by Horkheimer and Adorno. Seyla Benhabib points
this out in Critique, Norm, and Utopia (p. 20).
22

I am not claiming that there is an historical
connection that substantiates the relationships that I am
attempting to establish. The fact that there is an historical
connection between Habermas and Horkheimer and Adorno is not
pertinent to the argument that I am presenting. My claim is
simply that Dialectic of Enlightenment is a seminal work
concerning the question of enlightenment and rationality given
the circumstances of the 20th century, and that Foucault and
Habermas address these issues from different perspectives-both of which can be derived from Horkheimer's and Adorno's
analysis.
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that Homer's Odysseus is the prototypical bourgeois
individual. He proceeds by offering an interpretation of The
odyssey which contends that Odysseus' experiences initiated
a continuous history of instrumental rationality that
reaches full fruition in the Enlightenment. 23 This
unaltered model for rational cognition is established by the
cunning acts of the epic voyager. Odysseus faces a number of
mythical-natural obstacles during his trek. The strategy
that he develops for overcoming these impediments employs a
submissive yet manipulative form of rationality. Nature is
not confronted in a face to face struggle; it is
outmaneuvered and subdued from behind (DE, p. 58-60).
Adorno characterizes Odysseus' encounter with the
Sirens as the paradigm for all succeeding applications of
instrumental rationality.
It is impossible to hear the Sirens and not succumb to
them; therefore he does not try to defy their power.
Defiance and infatuation are one and the same thing,
and whoever defies them is thereby lost to the myth
against which he sets himself. Cunning, however, is
defiance in rational form (DE, pp. 58-59).
Odysseus gains the upper hand, but not without consequence.
In order to overcome the order of nature, he submits to
self-imposed bondage (by strapping himself to the mast of
the ship). For Adorno, this represents the inevitable
23

Instrumental rationality is the use of reason in a
strictly purposive fashion. The fundamental consequence of
this is that the "praxis" of reason hones in on its end
without considering the repercussion of its process. For a
detailed discussion of this see Benhabib (1986, pp. 149-163)
and Dubiel (1985, pp. 88-99).
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paradox of instrumental reason. In order to win, one has to
lose. It also provides a model for the type of human
behavior that flourishes under the capitalistic economic
structures of enlightened modern society. In order to get
ahead, one has to submit to self-sacrifice and must be
willing to sacrifice anyone that stands in the way. Adorno
concludes that Western rationality is inherently plagued
with this "negative dialectic." The historical Enlightenment
simply intensifies the irrationality that has always
infected reason, producing the above mentioned social
consequences (DE, pp. 55-60) . 24
Habermas makes the point that this critique of
enlightened thought is so comprehensive that it ultimately
denies its own critical foundation. From the very beginning,
Adorno claims, Western reason is tainted with the sinister
paradox faced by Odysseus. Likewise, the possibility that
rationality has any positive critical content is dismissed.
Yet, to use Habermas' phrase, he retains a "residual faith

24

Adorno writes the following: "Man's domination over
himself which grounds his selfhood, is almost always the
destruction of the subject in whose service it is undertaken;
for the substance which is dominated, suppressed, and
dissolved by virtue of self-preservation is none other than
that very life as functions of which the achievements of selfpreservation find their sole definition and determination: it
is, in fact, what is to be preserved. The irrationalism of
totalitarian capitalism, whose way of satisfying needs has an
objectified form determined by domination which makes the
satisfaction of needs impossible and tends ·toward the
extermination of mankind, has its prototype in the hero who
emerges from sacrifice by sacrificing himself" (DE, pp. 5455) •
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in a de-ranged reason (1987 b., p.186). As such, his
analysis, like the tradition he criticizes, is rooted in a
paradox: it uses the tools of Western rationality while
denying that they can have any positive application. While I
don't entirely endorse Habermas' assessment of Adorno, the
general dilemma that he identifies needs to be contended
with. If social theory is to take seriously Adorno's
critique while still maintaining--at least theoretically-its relationship to the ideal of collective emancipation,
this problem needs to be addressed. I think that Foucault
offers insight into how this might be accomplished. 25 While
not a direct understudy of Adorno's Foucault's entire corpus
of work represents a concern with the questions raised in
the first excursus of Dialectic of Enlightenment. 26 As
such, he can legitimately be characterized as picking up

25

David Ingram points this out in "Foucault and the
Frankfurt School: A Discourse on Nietzsche, Power and
Knowledge." Having discussed the theoretical similarities
between the position taken by Adorno and Horkheimer in
Dialectic of Enlightenment and the themes that dominate
Foucault's work, and with reference to the paradox that I have
alluded to, Ingram states the following: "Asserting the
prerogative of reason against itself or imputing a rational
authority to one's own declamations that are without absolute
foundation appear to be contradictions that Foucault has
sought to avoid." (1986, p.314).
26

Foucault's
first
important
work,
Madness
and
Civilization, initiates a series of reflections on the
c~nsequences
of the rationalization of people's everyday
lives. These ideas evolved and were refined throughout his
career and are represented in nearly all of his writings.
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where Adorno left off . 27
In "What is Enlightenment" (1984), Foucault takes up
the question addressed by Kant in the latter part of the
18th century and, in a sense, by Horkheimer and Adorno in
Dialectic of Enlightenment. He suggests that the question as
to the inherent goodness or baseness of the Enlightenment is
irrelevant. By focusing on the conceptual point that
tormented Adorno, and the question as to whether
enlightenment contains an "essential kernel of rationality,"
theory will be "blackmailed" by the Enlightenment (subdued
by the dialectic of liberation and domination). The
essential theoretical project is to identify the boundaries
that are established by the Enlightenment attitude and to
determine the points at which these limits are susceptible
to pressure. "The point, in brief, is to transform the
critique constituted in the form of necessary limitation
into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible
transgression" (WE, pp. 42-45).
27

While for the purposes of this discussion an actual
historical connection between Foucault and Adorno is not
necessary, Foucault does view his work to be conducted in the
spirit of critique that is characteristic of the Frankfurt
Circle. In light of the Kantian questioning of the nature of
enlightenment, which Foucault understands to be a questioning
of the present,
he states the following about his
methodological heritage:
"one can opt for a critical
philosophy of truth in general, or one can opt for a critical
thought which has the form of an ontology of ourselves, an
ontology of the present; it is this latter form of philosophy
which, from Hegel to the Frankfurt School by way of Nietzsche
and Max Weber, has founded a form of reflection within which
I have tried to work" (1986, p. 96).
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It is naive, in Foucault's judgment, to think that a
totalistic analysis of the repercussions of rationality on
social existence (such as that conducted by Adorno) is even
possible. Social theory should focus on grasping points at
which change is urgently needed and attempt to determine
tactics that are capable of achieving the desired
altercation. Such a strategy would dispense with Adorno's
sweeping generalizations while retaining the analytic acuity
that enabled him to identify specific instances which
confirm his hypothesis. Foucault describes this project as
being genealogical in design and archaeological in method.
"It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has
finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus,
as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of
freedom" (WE, p. 46). As such, the problematic element of
Adorno's critique (its totalistic dimension) can be
eliminated without sacrificing the critical wealth of his
analysis (WE, pp. 45-47) 28
In the second excursus of Dialectic of Enlightenment,
Horkheimer suggests that the undistorted "kernel of
rationality" that Adorno seems to think is nonexistent and
that Foucault is unconcerned with might be worth pursuing.

28

Foucault points out that there are some affinities
between his approach to social theory and the objectives of
the Enlightenment. For example, both insist that it is
~ecessary to push forward with and both share the objective of
increasing human freedom. Foucault contrasts rather sharply,
however, on questions of science, progress, and rationality.
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While concentrating on the negative dimensions of Western
reason, as manifest in Enlightenment morality, Horkheimer
implies that this isn't the necessary end of reason.
Horkheimer clearly rejects instrumental reason.
Rationality of this sort, he claims, is in line with the
Kantian conception of Enlightenment and reason. 29 The task
of reason here is to systematize and put things in their
proper order. This will ensure that humanity reaches
maturity and preserves itself as a species. Horkheimer
agrees with Adorno that this organizational fetish is the
most dangerous product of the Enlightenment, but suggests
that critique should be directed specifically at rationality
and enlightenment as conceived within capitalistic socioeconomic structures. It is the combination of a specific
type of reason and a specific mode of production that causes
the devastating consequences associated with the historical
Enlightenment. It doesn't necessarily follow from this that
reason is inherently. It is paradoxical, rather than
predictable, that the Enlightenment should result in its own
antithesis. This, for Horkheimer, occurred due to a fatal
practical flaw: Enlightenment thought failed to fully
incorporate the need for internal criticism. One can infer
29

Here I think that Horkheimer would have done well to
read Kant a bit more sympathetically. While there clearly is
a sort of fetish to compartmentalize in the second critique,
and even more so in the first, to limit an analysis of these
rich texts to that dimension is to do so at the expense of
appropriating the powerful moral content in a politically
radical manner.
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from this that Horkheimer would accept an adequate concept
of Enlightenment. By indicating that reason has assumed a
perverse form, he leaves open the possibility that a more
reflective rationality might be the answer to the problem
created by its irrational opposite (DE, pp.85-93).
This is precisely the position held by Habermas. His
well known approach is to develop a normative theory of
action that is based on distortion free rational discourse.
He situates this project vis-a-vis the dialectic of
enlightenment in "The Entwinement of Myth and
Enlightenment.
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Habermas attacks Horkheimer and Adorno

for over generalizing and over simplifying the dialectic of
rationality. By excluding from their analysis all but the
most positivistic of sciences, neglecting the important role
of reason in formulating standards of morality and justice
during the modern epoch, and declaring that all contemporary
art is simple entertainment, the fruitful contributions that
the Enlightenment has made are ignored. In response,
Habermas contends that the development of science has been
driven by a rich internal dynamic, that enlightened
conceptions of justice and morality tend toward universality
and that the visions of avant-garde art have emancipatory
possibilities. Habermas does not praise these qualities at
the expense of the important critical insights provided by

30

Juergen Habermas, "The Entwinement of Myth and
Enlightenment," New German Critique, Fall (No. 18) pp. 29-43.
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Horkheimer and Adorno. Rather, he takes their insights to be
indicative of the need to rigorously apply critique to
Enlightenment thought and social practices. In doing so, the
normative content of modernity that remains undefiled by
purposive rationality can be extracted and developed,
continuing the dialectic of enlightenment.
Habermas concludes by claiming that theory must accept
the fact that myth and enlightenment are to a certain extent
entangled. This does not mean, however, that social
criticism should turn against rationality. Rather, it should
accept, for pragmatic purposes, the presuppositions of
rational discourse, allowing the efficacy of the better
argument to shape social-political reality. "Only a
discourse which admits this everlasting impurity can perhaps
escape from myth, thus freeing itself, as it were, from the
entwinement of myth and Enlightenment" (EME, page 30).
At the programmatic level, Habermas and Foucault come
down on the same foot. Both consider the aim of a politics
of enlightenment to be that of generating critical insights
that move in the direction of discourses of emancipation. At
other levels, however, they are quite different. While
Foucault sees little merit in what has taken place as a
result of the historical Enlightenment, Habermas praises its
contributions to Truth, Freedom, and Justice (the normative
foundations of modernity). They differ significantly at the
level of strategy as well; Foucault suggests the need for
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transgression while Habermas seeks progression in the form
of establishing a continuum with pure Enlightenment ideals.
while both see the need for a notion of Enlightenment,
Habermas' is unequivocally modern whereas Foucault moves in
a postmodern direction. It is this direction that I will
attempting to come to grip with in the pages that follow.
Habermas' claim that there are unambiguously positive
products of the Modern Enlightenment strikes me as being
mistaken. The concepts of truth, freedom and justice to
which he appeals are far more bound up in the capitalist
economy of modernity than he cares to recognize. These are
claims that I will develop in subsequent chapters. I will
attempt to show that Habermas' own analysis of advanced
capitalism in many ways confirms my position. It provides,
in a sense, the prelude to a theory of the politics of
enlightenment that moves beyond the normative structures of
an unenlightened modernity.
While the normative appeal of Habermas' communicative
resolution to the impasse presented by the dialectic of
enlightenment is strong, the force of Horkheimer's and
Adorno's analysis causes one to question its viability.
Furthermore, Habermas' most recent assessment of the latemodern condition is even bleaker. He describes a scenario in
which systems driven by money and power have come to
permeate all spheres of human life. The following passage
sums up his analysis:
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The legal-administrative means of translating socialwelfare programs into action are not some passive, as
it were, propertyless medium. They are connected,
rather, with a praxis that involves isolation of facts,
normalization, and surveillance, the reifying and
subjectivating violence of which Foucault has traced
right down into the most delicate capillary tributaries
of everyday communication. The deformation of a
lifeworld that is regulated, fragmented, monitored, and
looked after are surely more subtle than the palpable
forces of material exploitation and impoverishment; but
internalized social conflicts that have shifted from
the corporeal to the psychic are not therefore less
destructive.~

In other words, a domineering modern system has chopped the
modern lifeworld into bits and pieces, severely limiting the
possibility for a politics of enlightenment. In spite of
this, Habermas continues to insist, albeit in more localized
form, that the appropriate strategy in light of this
predicament is to form collectives of solidified
consciousness that can establish patterns of communicative
action within specifically politicized spheres. The aim is
to "sensitize the self-steering mechanisms of the state and
the economy to the goal oriented outcomes of radical
democratic will formation" (PDM, 368). If Habermas' own
characterization of advanced-capitalist society is taken
seriously, however, then it would seem that the system is
already beyond the point that it can be sensitized through
reform movements.
In this final phase of the politics of enlightenment we
seem to have come full circle. On the one hand we have the
31

Juergen Habermas,
Modernity, page 362.

The

Philosophical

Discourse

of
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noumenal factors that make it possible to theorize about
ideal discourse; on the other we have the rational utility
maximizers of advanced modern society who would make Kant's
race of devils quake in their boots. While Habermas' attempt
to mediate this discrepancy involves "building up
restraining barriers for the exchange between system and
lifeworld and of building in sensors for the exchange
between lifeworld and system" (PDM, 364), I would argue that
the more appropriate strategy is to break down or dismantle
the structural barriers that prohibit the development of
"radical democratic" political processes. In other words, if
we are to thematize a politics of enlightenment that is
appropriate to the aftermath of modernity, we can't simply
rehash that which has brought us to the present impasse.
WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT?
The analysis that I have developed up to this point is
provisional at best. My main objective has been to
illustrate the claim that there is more than one way to
develop a politics of enlightenment. The approaches
suggested by both Habermas and Foucault have their
respective merits and problems. I focus on these

approaches

for two main reasons: First, because Habermas' work is
identified almost completely with the project of
rehabilitating the idea of enlightenment after Horkheimer's
and Adorno's critique; this is true to such a degree that
the remainder of this book will focus on Habermas.

Second,
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because Foucault alludes to an approach to the question

of

enlightenment that moves away from the modernist conception
that Habermas embraces. As such, he suggests the possibility
of developing a theory of enlightenment that is compatible
with conditions that I will refer to as the aftermath of
modernity. Nevertheless, Foucault merely makes allusions
whereas Habermas has a comprehensive theory. In the pages
and chapters that follow I will aim at substantiating these
allusions by way of a critique of Habermas that takes up the
question of enlightenment in a serious fashion. This will
require that I draw

on a number of sources that may at

first glance appear to run contrary to the objective of
theorizing a politics of enlightenment.
In order to begin thinking about such a politics I
would like to turn to Derrida's essay "The Ends of Man.
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I will argue that the title for this paper could just have
easily have been, "What is enlightenment." In doing so I
will attempt to show how Derrida's concluding remarks in
this essay bear upon the fundamental Enlightenment values
that Habermas so relentlessly defends, and to raise
questions as to whether these are really the values that are
seminal to enlightenment.
I will begin, as does Derrida, with the question of
internationalism. The context in which this paper was
32

Jacques Derrida, "The Ends of Man," in Margins of
Philosophy Alan Bass trans. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1982 (pp. 109-136).
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presented, an international philosophical colloquium,
prompts Derrida to consider the relationship between the
political and the philosophical. His claim: "Every
philosophical colloquium necessarily has a political
significance." Further, he asserts that the international
dimensions of this particular colloquium complicates its
political significance. Finally, the specific events that
were taking place at the time of this writing, "the weeks of
the opening of the Vietnam peace talks and of the
assassination of Martin Luther King," along with the fact
that "the universities of Paris were invaded by the forces
of order ... and then reoccupied by the students in the
upheaval," further problematizes the question. What, then,
does this have to do with internationalism, and, more
importantly, what does internationalism have to do with
enlightenment? The first aspect of this question, as Derrida
indicates, presupposes the formation of national identities
and assumptions about the conditions under which those
identities can converge. These assumptions seem to be of an
enlightenment bent: Derrida chooses to concentrate on
certain democratic presuppositions which depend upon the
nexus between a formal category and a practical orientation.
This nexus is both the condition that gives rise to the
possibility of internationalism--"the colloquium can take
place only in a medium, or rather in the representation that
all the participants must make of a certain transparent

54

ether, which here would be none other than what is called
the universality of philosophical discourse"--and the
condition that brings about reaction when things begin to
get dangerous--"a declaration of opposition to some official
policy is authorized, and authorized by the authorities,
also means, precisely to that extent, that the declaration
does not upset the given order, is not bothersome."~
Hence, internationalism is fundamentally communicative, but
likewise is confounded both internally and externally by the
limits of communication.
With respect to the second aspect of the question, the
relationship between internationalism and enlightenment,
Kant's role becomes more explicit.

In order to have

enlightenment, we need to achieve perpetual peace, which
necessitates the establishment of a world community. Kant is
concerned with the role of law in the formation of such a
community, but in the backdrop of his conception of law
formation is an implicit appeal to the complex principle of
democracy. Sorting through some of the loose threads here we
can see the following set of conditions converging.
Internationalism, as a political or even philosophical
objective, presupposes some notion of enlightenment. At the
same time it assumes some notion of nationality, which
serves as the particular in relation to the international
33

It should be quite clear how precisely this links up
with Habermas' overriding goal in developing a theory of
communicative action.
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universal. This is mediated by a principle of democracy-constituted at the nexus of form and content, theory and
practice--which is driven by a set of principles that
emerged within the context of the historical enlightenment.
The field of enquiry circumscribed by this set of
intersections establishes a context within which the
question of enlightenment can be raised--by Derrida no less
than Habermas.
Returning to those enlightenment values to which
Habermas constantly appeals--truth, freedom, and justice--I
think it is safe to say two things: a) Derrida the
philosopher doesn't oppose such values, but b) Derrida as
the sort of postmodernist that Habermas characterizes 34 him
as being, does raise problematic questions about the "value"
of these values. These questions revolve around how we "read
us"--the way in which we interpret the limits and
possibilities of collective social and political action.
While I think that it would be wrong to say that Habermas
doesn't carefully consider the possibility for social and
political action, I also think he does so in a manner that
confines these possibilities to a fixed understanding of
what the term enlightenment can mean. The obvious reason for
this is that the conception of enlightenment which rests at
the base of his theory of communicative action requires a
fairly straight forward understanding of the range of
34

See George A. Trey, 1989.
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possibilities for human aggregation. Following three points
that Derrida makes at the end of "The Ends of Man" I would
like to explore a somewhat different reading of collective
action than Habermas' procedural approach allows.
While Habermas is quite obviously interested in the
conditions that must obtain in order for validity claims to
be raised and redeemed, the analysis of these conditions
forces him into the nebulous structures of the modern
lifeworld. He accounts for these as linguistic structures
and proceeds to consider the manner in which they lead to
the production of meaningful utterances that can be put into
play within specific forums of discourse. The relationship,
in his analysis, between the lifeworld as the basis for
discourse, and particular arenas of discourse, fails to
consider any but a fairly conventional notion of
enlightenment.

This is the point at which Habermas resists

reading collective action carefully enough. The
appropriation of the linguistic basis of discourse within
particular discursive formats is relatively unproblematic
for Habermas. In a Derridean formulation, however, this is
where semantic stability can be quite radically altered. As
Derrida puts it, "it is a question of determining the
possibility of meaning of the basis of a 'formal'
organization which in itself has no meaning, which does not
mean that it is either the non-sense or the anguishing
absurdity which haunt metaphysical humanism." My sense is
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that Habermas' concern with postmodernism is precisely this
non-sense which Derrida is quite determined to distance
himself from. At the same time he is careful not to retain a
safe but implausible anthropology. While I won't attempt to
spell out the full implications of Derrida's views on
semantic indeterminacy at this point, I do want to emphasize
that they seem to pose important questions concerning the
relationship between the semantic mode of production that
operates in Habermas' conception of the lifeworld and the
value production that operates under conditions regulated by
ideal speech. This, as I will discuss in the final chapter,
raises challenges that must be addressed within the
framework of the theory of communicative action.
By introducing Derrida at this point I have simply
intended to show that a serious enquiry into the prospects
for enlightenment needs to take into consideration various
possible approaches to the basic question of enlightenment.
I will be pursuing these possibilities in the following
chapters.

Habermas may be right that the risk of exploring

what lies beyond Enlightenment humanism is too great to
consider. He likewise may be right that most of the
theorists that "gesture" away from the Kantian project of a
politics of enlightenment are risking the loss of
enlightenment possibilities. At the same time, however,
issues pertaining to culture, gender, and even class
continue to play a marginal role in his analysis. For him
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the basic form of enlightenment has already been determined
by the normative developments of modernity. Derrida's
counter-Enlightenment respect for alterity seems to be one
way of keeping open the teleological question. In doing so
it also preserves the question of enlightenment.
My objective in this chapter has been to show that the
question of enlightenment cannot be neatly compartmentalized
as a subdivision of the debate between modernists and
postmodernists. There is no compelling case to be made that
a postmodern conception of enlightenment is impossible or
even unlikely. I have argued that the common thread which
runs through both approaches to the question of
enlightenment can be traced back to Kant's writings on the
subject in the waning years of the 18th century: a time when
both the possibility for, and impossibility of,
enlightenment was being expressed through new found freedoms
as well as new forms of domination. This tension, which Kant
was vaguely aware of, generated the dialectic of
enlightenment that was taken up critically by Max Horkheimer
and Theodor Adorno in the middle of the twentieth century.
It is their essays which reintroduce the significance of
grappling with the important questions that surround
interpretations of the Enlightenment. I have argued, by
appealing to the work of Habermas, Foucault and Derrida,
that a number of resources must be brought to bear on the
question of enlightenment if a fruitful theoretical model is
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to be developed.
rt is the development of this model that I will pursue
in the chapters that remain. The issues introduced in this
chapter--such as the modern/postmodern debate, the state of
advanced capitalist societies, and the status of
enlightenment norms--will be taken up in further detail. My
intent in doing so is to thoroughly rethink the question of
enlightenment in such a way that a concept of enlightenment
that is relevant to the aftermath of modernity can be
articulated.

CHAPTER 2
MODERNITY, LATE MODERNITY, POSTMODERNITY:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
The

central

question

in

chapter

one

concerned

the

conceptual status of "enlightenment." I argued there that a
politics of enlightenment could be formulated without any
necessary or absolute linkage to the historical Enlightenment:
particularly the normative terms of the Enlightenment.

The

point in doing so was to show that enlightenment was not by
necessity a product of modernity. This, of course, leads to
complex

issues

concerning

if

and

how

modernity

can

be

distinguished from postmodernity. In this chapter I will take
up those

issues

directly.

I

will

develop

this

along the

following lines: 1) I will provide an analysis of Habermas'
account of the development of modern societies up until the
present; 2) I will then bring into play the views of several
noted postmodernists that will serve as a critical foil to
Habermas'

defense of modernism;

3)

finally,

I will draw a

distinction between descriptive and normative postmodernism
that facilitates the development of the idea of the aftermath
of modernity.
Habermas on the Development of Modern Societies
In Critique, Norm, and Utopia, Seyla Benhabib contends
60
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that critical social theory must have two related components.
The first, which she labels "explanatory-diagnostic, " utilizes
empirical
identify

data,

compiled

structural

political

system;

through

weaknesses

the

second,

scientific
in

the

deemed

research,

existing
the

to

social-

"anticipatory-

utopian" component, projects from this analysis a theory of
transformation that aims at a more humane form of existence.
Insofar as critical theory "addresses the needs and demands
expressed by social actors," the second component must include
a

theory

of

Enlightenment,

action.

With

the

advent

of

Dialectic

of

critical theory all but lost this important

feature--resigning it to quietism. 1
Considering

the

historical

Horkheimer and Adorno,

it

is

circumstances

little wonder that

faced

by

critical

theory reached a post-war stalemate. The "realities of the
cold war, the moral and political horrors of Stalinism, and
the conservative-restorationist tendencies of some Western
democracies in the aftermath of WW II did not leave much room
for hope.
pervasive

112

Disillusioned by what they considered to be a
instrumentalism

rationality,

Horkheimer

that

and

infects

Adorno

lost

all
faith

forms

of

in

the

scientific tools needed to develop the explanatory-diagnostic

1986, p. 226.
2

Ibid, p. 227.
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phase of theory. 3 As
present

such,

their account of

(explanatory-diagnostic)

remedial

theory

of

did

social-political

not

the

give

change

concrete

.rise

to

a

(anticipatory-

•
) 4
utopian
.

3

As I mentioned in Chapter I, the analysis of post-war
20th century society in Dialectic of Enlightenment is sobering
to the point of leading one to quietism. The following samples
form their most consequential subsequent works do little to
dispel this deep pessimism: "The revolt of natural man--in the
sense of the backward strata of the population--against the
growth of rationality has actually furthered the formalization
of reason, and has served to fetter rather than free nature.
In this light, we might describe fascism as a satanic
synthesis of reason and nature--the very opposite of that
reconciliation of the two poles that philosophy has always
dreamed of"
(Horkheimer, 1974, pp. 122-3).
"After the
catastrophes that have happened,
and in view of the
catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say that a plan
for a better world is manifested in history and unites it. Not
to be denied for that reason, however, is the unity that
cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered moments and
phases of history--the unity of the control of nature,
progressing to rule over men, and finally to that over men's
inner nature. No universal history leads from savagery to
humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot
to the megaton bomb" (Adorno, 1973, p.320). Given the
significance of Horkheimer's and Adorno's influence upon
Habermas it is remarkable that he places so much stock in the
rationality which his mentors so roundly criticized. Habermas
would argue that both failed to recognize the reflexivity that
developed in discourse during the modern epoch. As such, in
systems where discursive communication is not systematically
distorted (such as Nazi Germany--critical theory's paradigm
case), norms of action can always be called into question in
such a manner that reasons must be provided to support
validity claims. I will take up Habermas' position later in
this chapter. For his critique of Horkheimer and Adorno see
chapter I. Also see Chapter V of The Philosophical Discourse
of Modernity and Chapter IV of The Theory of Communicative
Action.
4

Habermas points out in "Psychic Thermidor and the
Rebirth of Rebellious Subjectivity" that negative thinking,
such as that of Horkheimer and Adorno, Doesn't have to result
in lamenting the horrors of the present. The third key member
of the Frankfurt school provides an alternative. "No doubt,
Herbert Marcuse claimed negation to be the very essence of
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Benhabib

credits

Habermas

with

reviving

the

two

dimensional approach to critical theory. "In this respect, it

is one of the great merits of Habermas' critical social theory
to have restored that moment of genuine collaboration between
philosophy and the social sciences, and to have developed an
empirically fruitful explanatory-diagnostic theory of latecapitalist societies.
against
analyses

reason,
that

115

By not ultimately passing judgment

Habermas

is

able

cast the present

in

to

utilize

critical

scientific

light without

conceding a futuristic vision. In the section that follows I
will

focus

society.

on

Habermas'

account

of

advanced

capitalist

The questions that I will pursue are these:

does

Habermas' account of modern norms square with his analysis of
thinking--as did Adorno and Horkheimer; but the driving force
of criticism, of contradiction and contest carried him well
beyond the limits of an accusation of unnecessary mischief.
Marcuse moved further ahead. He did not hesitate to advocate,
in an affirmative mood, the fulfillment of human needs, of the
need for undeserved happiness, of the need for beauty, of the
need for peace, calm, and privacy. Although, certainly,
Marcuse was not an affirmative thinker, he nevertheless was
the most affirmative among those that praised negativity. With
him negative
thinking negative
thinking retained the
dialectical trust in determinate negation, in the disclosure
of possible alternatives" (Bernstein, 1985, p. 67). Marcuse
has often been criticized for being hopelessly utopian.
Habermas, nevertheless, applauds this up to a point. His
primary disagreement with Marcuse pertains to the focal point
of emancipatory rationality. For Marcuse, reason is embedded
in human instinct (this view ties Marcuse to the same
philosophy of nature that st if led Horkheimer and Adorno)
whereas for Habermas it is to be found in communicative
structures. See Habermas' and Marcuse's discussion of their
respective views in "Theory and Politics: A Discussion with
Herbert Marcuse, Juergen Habermas, Heinz Lubasz and Telman
Spengler," in Telos, Vol 38 (1978-79) pp. 124-153).
5

1986, p. 227.
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the development of modern

societies? And,

does

his

final

analysis of modern societies leave room for a politics of
enlightenment?

I

will begin by examining Habermas' concern in

the 70's with the question of political legitimation and will
proceed to his more recent work where he develops a bilevel
theory of society.
While Habermas considers his project to be rooted in the
marxist

tradition,

considerably
Marx's

the

analysis

he

recognizes

original
of

19th

critique
century

the
of

need

to

political

capitalism

led

revise
economy.
to

the

conclusion that the economy would collapse under the pressure
of its own contradictions, paving the way for an emancipated
socialist future. 6To him it was inconceivable that political
interventions
patterns

would

in the

be

used

to

off set

self-contradictory

liberal market economy. 7 This,

however,

is

precisely what has happened. As a result, Marx's prediction
6

This thesis is developed in a number of Marx's writings
(many in collaboration with Engels). See for example Manifesto
of the Communist Party, The Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 469-500.
While Marx substantiates his theory with considerably more
data in later works, such as the mammoth Capital, the general
idea is conveyed effectively and enthusiastically in this
pamphlet.
7 See David Mclellan,

Karl Marx: His Life and Thought,
pp. 280-284. Here Mclellan provides an account of Marx's
indebtedness to the bourgeois tradition of political-economy
(Smith and Ricardo in particular). It seems quite clear that
Marx never dreamed that the state would save capitalism
through political intervention. This would run contrary to the
enlightenment view (Smith's invisible hand) that things left
to themselves always balance out. While Marx of course was
highly critical of this theory, he didn't suspect that the
political magnates operating the bourgeoisie superstructure
would also recognize its limits.
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that socialism and communism would replace capitalism has not
. l"ize d . 8
materia

It is generally agreed that Marx correctly assessed the
crisis potential of liberal-capitalism; free market economies
are

undermined

by

their

own

dynamics. 9 The

20th

century

scenario, however, is considerably more complex then the one
faced

by

Marx,

placing

additional

burdens

on

the

social

analyst. David Ingram sums this up as follows:
For Marx, it was sufficient to show that so-called free
exchange of equivalents in the market involved coercion,
exploitation, and the promotion of class interests. But
now that the state plays a leading role in manipulating
the market, ideology critique can no longer take the form
of a critique of the economy. Instead, it must focus on
the legitimacy of political decisions that have been made
through formal democratic channels. Justification for
such a critique resides in the conviction that Westernstyle democracies fall short of the standards of rational
dialogue--equal access to publicity,
freedom from
systematically distorted communication, and so on--that
they ostensibly embody (1987, p. 173).
Habermas, in his reformulation of marxist analysis, focuses on
the

increasingly

important

role

of

the

Twentieth century capitalist economies
bureaucratic-administrative
economic

analysis

is

politics.

not basis

for

superstructure.

are permeated with
As

such:

accurate

"A

purely

prognoses.

8

1110

Habermas considers Marx's fundamental error to be his
failure
to
recognize
the
resilience
of
capitalism:
"Capitalism's capacity to adapt is very great: it is an
incredibly flexible order, which still possesses significant
cultural and motivational reserves. It is surprising how it
has been able to combine different forms
of social
integration." (Habermas: Autonomy and Solidarity, p. 64).
9

10

See in particular Marx's Theory of Surplus Valu.e.
Habermas: Autonomy and Solidarity, page 65.
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This, of course, breaks sharply with classical marxism (the
base/superstructure model): a necessary move given the present
conditions. What Habermas retains of classical marxism is the
conviction that theory and practice should not be sharply
separated. "I'm convinced that the left in general, and the
Marxist Left in particular, can claim one advantage over all
other political forces. This is the belief in the possibility
of introducing theoretical analyses with a middle or longrange perspective into day-to-day politics (Dews, 1986, p.79).
In

the

section

that

follows

I

will

examine

Habermas'

assessment of liberal and advanced capitalism (explanatorydiagnostic), using Legitimation Crisis (LC) as the main text.
This provides an informative account of the conditions and
tendencies prevalent in mature capitalist economies as well as
the

backdrop

for

his

(anticipatory-utopian) .
capitalism,

like

theory

of

Habermas

capitalism

in

social-political
argues

that

earlier

forms,

tendencies that will lead to crisis.
solution

is

a

form

of

democracy

change

advancedexhibits

He contends that the

premised

on

undistorted

political discourse. My critical remarks will focus on the
theory/practice issue.
Habermas

accounts

for

liberal-capitalism in terms

of

three criteria: The determining principle of organization, the
possibility for social evolution and the types of crises that
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develop. 11 The determining principle of social organization is
located in the relationship between wage-labor and capital.
This in turn is maintained through a system of prohibitive
civil law.

Economic activity is determined solely by the

market; direction and maintenance are left to the "invisible
hand." The invisible hand also serves as the primary social
steering

mechanism,

resulting

in

a

decentralized,

depoliticized social structure. 12 Government is restricted to
enforcing civil law, establishing minor economic regulations,
satisfying needs that cannot be met by the private sector and

11

Habermas uses these criteria for evaluating all
societies. His analysis, which develops a "social-scientific
concept of crisis" examines three increments of social
evolution: primitive, traditional and liberal-capitalist (see
chart in LC, p. 24). This exhibits Habermas' view that
societies all evolve along similar lines which result in their
either becoming Western-like or stagnating prior to that
point. Benhabib is quite critical of this view. Developmental
sequences cannot be determined with respect to social orders
in the same way that they can in human individuals as their
exists no determinate end to societies (I would contest that
their is a determinate end for individuals also). As such, no
conf irmable model by which existing societies can be measured
for regressive or deviant developments is available. On the
other hand, the future is always unknown and unknowable; there
is no available data about futures which allows the theorist
to do more than anticipate and project what will be. "To put
the objection I am raising to Habermas in a nutshell: if the
problem with early critical theory seemed to be that their
conception of utopian reason was so esoteric as not to allow
embodiment in the present, the difficulty with Habermas'
concept is that it seems like such a natural outcome of the
preset that it is difficult to see what would constitute an
emancipatory break with the present if communicative
rationality were fulfilled (Benhabib, 1986, 276-7). This is a
crucial point. My central argument against Habermas will take
this up in subsequent chapters.
12

I am of course referring here to Adam Smith's famous
invisible hand metaphor. See Smith, 1937, p. 423.
•
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structuring an environment that is conducive to accumulating
wealth. The potential for social evolution is intensified in
liberal-capitalism as

the development of

industry greatly

increases

capacity.

the

productive

Further,

relationship

between the state and economy is refined and minimized.

A

"production morality" also emerges (Weber's protestant work
ethic)

which

emphasizes

accumulation

of

wealth

while

sidestepping the "traditional" mediations that limit the free
movement of capital (LC, pp. 20-22).
Crisis tendencies in liberal-capitalism are all linked in
some way to the opposition between wage-labor and capital.
Class domination is

exposed when

standards

of

living for

laborers become intolerable. At this point social-structural
deficiencies are manifest, resulting in a crisis which moves
quickly from the

economy to all

components of the social

system. Due to the rapidity with which crises reach system
threatening

proportions,

liberal-capitalism

evolves

into

advanced capitalism. A considerably larger role is now played
by the
explicit
13

administrative-political
class

domination

system,

less

making previously

evident. 13

As

such,

This occurs in several ways, the most obvious of which
is to "buy off the proletariat." Wages are much higher but the
worker is still at the mercy of the industrial complex.
Another way is through the shifts in class. Marx's model holds
that classes are defined purely in terms of socio-economic
status and that this is reducible to the distinction between
owner
and
worker.
In
advanced-capitalism
different
distinguishing characteristics become more determinate. For
example, the rise of "pink collar workers", women in low
paying service jobs, indicates that gender plays an important
role in exploitation in advanced capitalism. See Ben Agger,
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legitimation deficits initially go undetected as the economic
trauma

that

clarifies

them

is

clouded by

interventionary

programs (LC, p. 23).
Advanced-capitalism is based on three internal systems:
the

economic

system,

the

administrative

system,

and

the

legitimation system. The economic system is foundational and
is composed of three subsystems:

1) the competitive market

system which is characterized by labor intensive production,
low salary

levels

and

a

lack of

rationalization;

2)

the

monopoly market system where production is capital intensive,
labor

is

well

paid

and

there

is

a

high

level

of

rationalization; and 3) the system that serves the needs of
the government (military, infrastructure maintenance, etc.)
which is both labor and capital intensive,

supports a well

organized labor force and is not highly rationalized (LC, p.
34).

The input for the economic system is labor and capital;
the output is consumer products.
that

crisis

tendencies

distribution

regulation.

appear
This

It is at the output level
due
results

to
in

breakdowns
a

crisis

in
in

government finance, permanent inflation, public poverty and a
disparate concentration of wealth. Insofar as the government
plays a critical role in the administration of the economy,
economic crises place pressure on the political administrative

"The Dialectic of Deindustrialization: An Essay on Advanced
Capitalism", in Forester, 1985, pp. 9, 10, 16-19.
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system (LC, 45-46).
The

primary

is

system

function

replace

to

of

the

the

political-administrative

liberal

with

market

a

global

regulatory strategy that seeks to sustain economic growth,
establish

a

stable

currency,

minimize

unemployment

and

maintain a balance of trade. 14 Doing so requires a number of
interventions: the state coordinates international economic
activities

by

forming

blocks,

facilitating

ventures

and monitoring trade when

develop;

the

domestic

economy

is

imperialistic

unfavorable

imbalances

bolstered by government

contracts for non-consumable products (military spending and
certain types

of

technological projects),

stimulating the

economy by creating jobs (at a number of levels) and using raw
materials;

sectors of the population that are economically

marginalized

by

the

market

social-welfare programs;

receive

compensation

both the material

and

through

immaterial

infrastructures are maintained and improved; various levels of
public education are made available so that productivity can
increase across

the board;

and the

costs

of

capitalism's

negative side effects, such as unemployment and environmental
pollutants, are covered (LC, pp. 35-36 and LPC, p. 647).
The input for this system is public loyalty; the output

is a

range of

administrative decisions

that are executed

through sovereign authority. Administrative failure leads to
14

In addition to Legitimation Crisis I am drawing upon
Habermas' essay "What does Crisis Mean Today? Legitimation
Problems in Late Capitalism" (LPC).
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a rationality crisis which generates a legitimation crisis as
the "masses" retract their loyalty. "The legitimation crisis
is directly an identity crisis. It does not proceed by way of
endangering system integration, but results from the fact that
the

fulfillment

of

governmental

planning

tasks

places

in

question the structure of the depoliticized public realm and
thereby,

the

formally

democratic

securing of

the

private

autonomous disposition of the means of production." At this
level, crisis threatens the entire system (LC, pp. 46-47).
These

crisis

phenomena

are

reflected

in

the

socio-

cultural system which has as its input the output form the
previous two systems. Disturbances produced by output crises
in these systems lead to withdrawal of public support for the
system as a whole which threatens its legitimacy. Insofar as
the output of the legitimation system is social integration,
crisis here leads to a motivation crisis: unwillingness on the
part of the public to perform economically necessary tasks.
Only a rigid sociocultural system, incapable of being
randomly
f unctionalized
for
the
needs
of
the
administrative system, could explain how legitimation
difficulties result in a legitimation crisis. This
development must therefore be based on a motivation
crisis--i.e. a discrepancy between the need for motives
that the state and the occupational system announce and
the supply of motivation offered by the sociocultural
system (LPC, p. 660).
Habermas claims that this crisis sequence is a "consequence of
the fundamental contradictions of the capitalist system." the
economic system fails to meet the consumptive needs of the
population and the political system is unable to compensate
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through rational administrative decision making. This renders
the

system

of

(which

legitimation

is

central

to

the

preservation of the system in general) ineffective, creating
a motivation crisis that cripples the socio-cultural system.
Therefore, the crisis center is at the level of legitimation
(LC, 48-49).
Given the centrality of legitimation crisis in Habermas'
analysis of advanced-capitalism,

as well as

his

normative

theory, further consideration is warranted. In "Legitimation
Problems in the Modern State" (LPMS), Habermas documents the
importance of political legitimation in the development of the
bourgeois

epoch.

A

political

•

institution's

ability

to

establish societal norms depends upon its claim to legitimacy.
For

the

modern

state

this

is

particularly

important

as

democratization and the emergence of a public realm that is
accessible to the masses places increasing demands on the
means

by which

legitimacy is

established and maintained.

Whereas previously legitimacy claims were substantiated by an
appeal to the authority of a higher order (god or church), now
they must be redeemed as validity claims in a

process of

political discourse (LPMS, pp. 178-183).
With the replacement of traditional means of legitimation
by

a

rational-discursive

mode,

formal

conditions

of

justification needed to be established. Two competing models
emerged: state of nature theories and transcendental theories.
The former argues that will formation is shaped by an original
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social agreement, while the latter claims that it follows from
a set of universal presuppositions. While in many respects
these two theories are at odds, they share the view (which is
all important for Habermas)
product

of

consensus

rather

that

legitimation must be the

than

an

appeal

to

de

facto

authority. "In both traditions, it is the formal conditions of
possible consensus formation, rather than ultimate grounds,
which

possess

establish

a

legitimating

political

order

force."
that

The
would

objective
be

is

to

agreeable

to

everyone on the basis of arguments forwarded in an arena of
free discourse. This requires a communicative structure within
which valid and invalid claims can be distinguished. "Only the
rules and communicative presuppositions that make it possible
to distinguish an accord or agreement among free and equals
from a contingent or forced consensus have legitimating force
today." Malfunctions in this communicative structure confound
the norm producing capacity of the modern state (LPMS, pp.
184-188).

While

the

original

ideal

of

the

modern

state

was

political minimalism, as the industrial revolution blossomed
and the popular masses began to feel the contradictions of
large scale capitalism, it became clear that the state would
have to take a more active role (as I discussed above). This
leads

to

a

paradox

which

makes

the

late

modern

state

precariously susceptible to legitimation crises.
On the one hand, the definition of deficiencies and the
criteria of success of dealing with them arise in the
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domain of political goal-settings that have to be
legitimated; for the state has to deploy legitimate power
if it takes on the catalog of tasks mentioned above. On
the other hand, in this matter the state cannot deploy
legitimate power in the usual way, to push through
binding decisions, but only to manipulate the decisions
of others, whose private autonomy many not be violated.
Indirect control is the answer to the dilemma, and the
limits to the effectiveness of indirect control signal
the persistence of this dilemma (LPMS, pp. 195-6).
Insofar as the legitimacy of the state rests primarily on its
ability to maintain the economy, it will remain intact only if
one or the other of two sufficient conditions is met: l) that
it continues to successfully suppress economic dysfunctions;
or 2) that the modern standard of acceptable legitimation is
lowered.
dynamic

Meeting the first condition is confounded by the
of

the

economy;

meeting

the

second

condition

is

regressive and contrary to explicit modern ideals. Hence, a
legitimation crisis is virtually inevitable (LPMS, pp. 195200).

A legitimation crisis would make explicit the scope of
administrative functions, exhibiting the lack of traditional
legitimacy

and

issuing

discursive processes

of

in

an

unprecedented

legitimation.

"Thus,

mandate
the

for

forcible

shift of things that have been culturally taken for granted
further politicizes areas of life that previously could be
assigned to the private domain." This, for Habermas, sets the
stage for either a re-politicized public realm of discourse or
a regression to some form of totalitarianism (LPC, pp. 655-
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660) • 1

5

Legitimation

crises

occur mainly because the

general

population has been excluded from "meaningful" participation
in the political sphere.

So long as the powers that be can

disguise the lack of genuine democracy by administering to the
consumptive wants
problems

and

needs

remain latent

conflict--LPC p.

of

the people,

deep

systemic

(specifically the problem of class

659). They will surface, however (Habermas

argues), when the internal contradictions of the welfare state
economy become manifest. As such, a remedy that establishes
meaningful political participation must be developed or modern
society will become vulnerable to totalitarian domination.
If this is correct, a legitimation crisis can be avoided
in the long run if the latent class structure of advanced
capitalist societies are transformed or if the pressure
for legitimation to which the administrative system is
subject can be removed. The latter, in turn, could be
achieved by transposing the integration of inner nature
in toto to another mode of socialization, that is, by
uncoupling it from norms that need justification (LC,
p.94).

Insofar

as

the

former

is

obviously

preferable,

the

anticipatory-utopian dimension of theory must point toward a
system
15

in

which

dialogical

participation

provides

When asked why advanced-capitalist countries have not
yet experienced legitimation crises, Habermas' response is
simply that we tend toward crisis; it cannot be determined at
what point irremedial economic dysfunctions will emerge as
actual crises. He does, however, identify the following
phenomena as strong indicators that crisis is immanent:
failure to vote by a large percentage of the population,
disintegration of the two party system, success of a third
party platform and the emergence of a socio-economic class
that experiences a great deal of discomfort. See Dews, 1986,
p. 66.
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legitimation. That this is possible, according to Habermas, is
formally demonstrated through an analysis of the universalpragrnatic content of speech acts. The following provides an
account of Habermas' attempt to develop the results of his
reconstruction of communicative action into an anticipatoryutopian theory.
This theory rests on the view that practical questions
(questions

of

norms

and action)

can be responded to with

claims that have universal validity:

"that the values and

norms in accordance with which motives are formed have an
immanent

relation

to

truth"

(LC,

p.

95).

As

such,

moral

development can be "logically reconstructed," facilitating the
explanation of motivational development. This is significant
in

that

at

the

highest

developmental

stages

of

moral

consciousness, a universal morality emerges that is rooted in
a "fundamental norm of rational speech" (LC, p. 95). Hence, a
connection is drawn between rationally conducted discourse and
the establishment of universal

norms.

This

indicates that

there can be a link between legitimation and truth--something
which "must be presumed to exist if one regards as possible a
motivation crisis resulting from a systematic scarcity of the
resource of meaning" (LC, 97).
Legitimation claims without truth content suffice for
psychological purposes only; when crises arise they lose their
effectiveness.

This creates something of a dilemma,

as the

claim that practical statements can have truth content is at
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best dubious. In defense of his position Habermas appeals to
the consensus theory of truth. In discourse, the validity of
a norm is argumentatively tested by the constituency that it
will effect.
subjected

This . produces rational agreement that can be

to

further

discursive

scrutiny

if

deemed

appropriate. Discursively established norms are true insofar
as general agreement is the criterion for truth (LC, pp. 104106). In a later formulation Habermas provides these criteria
for normatively redeeming validity claims: l) the statement
must be true;

2)

normative context;

it must be appropriate to the

relevant

and 3) the speaker's intention must be

properly expressed and received.

"Thus the speaker claims

truth for statements or existential propositions, rightness
for

legitimately

regulated

actions

and

their

normative

context, and truthfulness or sincerity for the manifestation
of subjective experience" (1985, pp. 163-4). Truth content is
embedded in the propositional component of any speech-act
uttered

in

discourse;

and

truth

is

the

foundation

for

universality. As such, all utterances that meet these three
requirements,

discursively

tested

under

appropriate

conditions, can be deemed universally valid.
The truth value of an established norm is not equal to a
deduction. Truths of this sort (such as those in mathematics
or

formal

political

logic)
sphere.

have

no

Practical

practical
truth,

product of a process in which

11

consequence

for

Habermas,

in

the

is

the

substantial arguments

11

are
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validated through a discursive procedure that goes beyond the
analysis of abstract sentences (as is the case with the formal
logical

analyses

validity

is

of

some

determined

in analytic philosophy);

trends
by

an

analysis

of

the

content

established through a series of coherently connected sentences
which are shaped in the course of argumentation. The result is
acceptance or rejection of validity claims that have been
procedurally clarified (LC, p. 107).
With this
discourse

on

in mind,

Habermas

practical

lays out a

questions

(this

is

platform for
a

practical

interpretation of the ideal speech situation). Discourse, as
he defines it in this context, is a communicative form that
takes place outside the realm of "experience and action" (LC,
p.

107).

The

discussion

be

general

rules

limited to

are:

that

validity

the

claims;

topics
that

under

types

of

arguments remain unrestricted with the exception that they
stick to the validity claim in question; that the only force
employed

be

argumentative;

and

that

there

be

no

self-

interested motives. Dialogue under these conditions results in
the establishment of norms that reflect the general interest
of participants (LC p. 107-108). Habermas considers this to be
an idealized model

for public debate concerning questions

pertinent to the life of a community. Its viability rests on
the purportedly established fact

that

the

intersubjective

structures of language usage allow for agreement on questions
of practice that can be translated into universal norms. As
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such, there is no need for a higher order of validation than
consensus.
In support of this Habermas argues that the hypothetical
ideal speech situation (the above described platform) is the
presupposition underlying any communicative practice.

It is

the prerequisite for acceptance of the fundamental norms of
rational speech. The ideal speech situation, coupled with the
language

of

discourse

(natural

language)

provides

the

theoretical ground for politically determined universal norms.
"This,

if

you

language ... can

will,
be

transcendental

reconstructed

in

character
the

of

ordinary

framework

of

a

universal pragmatics" (LC, p. 110").
In summary, Habermas' explanatory-diagnostic analysis of
late modern

capitalism reveals

action

strategic.

is

This

that the dominant mode of
operates

via

a

distorted

communicative medium that relies on perlocutionary force to
accomplish

purposively

defined

objectives

(those

of

the

political regime or the monopolized capitalist complex). While
considerably more systematic than Horkheimer's and Adorne's
analysis in Dialectic of Enlightenment, the conclusions do not
conflict. Habermas, however, is not resigned to quietism, as
would seem to be the case under one reading of his mentors. In
his reconstruction of language usage he points out that the
distorted

communication

advanced-capitalist

patterns

rationality

intersubjective aspect of

that

operate

paradigm

under

exclude

the double dimensional

the
the

semantic
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structure that

is

characteristic of ordinary language.

By

reactivating the intersubjective element, via a systemic shift
towards

substantive political discourse,

the way toward a

society that operates on the basis of communicative rather
than strategic action is paved. The main point of Habermas'
anticipatory-utopian theory is that increasing democratization
through a revitalization of the presently distorted realm of
public communication is the only palpable solution to the
crises of the welfare state. 16
At this point I would like to raise several issues that
will be developed more thoroughly in subsequent chapters.
These comments will thematize the reservations that I have
about

the

Habermas'

relationship
work

(this

between

will

be

theory

and

addressed more

practice

in

directly

in

chapter IV). As I noted in chapter I, Habermas is sympathetic
to,

while

still

Enlightenment.
16

critical

At the

of,

core of

the

aspirations

enlightened thought

of
is

the
the

See Habermas'
discussion
in
"Conservatism and
Capitalist Crisis" in Dews, 1986, pp. 67-68. Here he states in
unequivocal terms that democratic forms of life are part of
the human telos (or one might say human nature). This seems to
cohere with the claim that intersubjective communication is
the telos of language. Neither of these assertions can be
verified empirically or argued for convincingly. Habermas'
enlightenment aspirations clearly shape his interpretation of
human nature and the ends of language. This also represents a
reaction to the "stalemated" critical theory that emerges
after Dialectic of Enlightenment. A I will argue later, a
shift away from the goals of the Enlightenment does not
necessarily lead to pessimistic quietism. While I agree that
participatory forms of government is the route to go, I see no
reason to think that social evolution will lead to this. As
such, normative theory needs to consider strategies that
promote more revolutionary modes of action.
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notion

that

all

human

enterprises

must

proceed

from

demonstrable foundations. Habermas contends that relinquishing
this in the political sphere leads either to quietism (which
he claims is the case with Horkheimer and Adorno) or, worse
political

yet,

nihilism

(which

Habermas

poststructuralism).

he

associates

considers

a

with

reformulated

Enlightenment project, with built in reflexivity, to be the
way out of the predicaments of late capitalism.

I will now

point out--in the spirit of Habermas' own appeal to internal
critique--several "enlightened" elements of his thought that
could have been reflected on more carefully.
As I
advanced

just indicated,
capitalism

when the subterranean crises of

surface,

two

distinct

political

alternatives emerge: democratization and totalitarianism. It
can be well documented historically that popular uprisings
often lapse into totalitarianism; Nazi Germany serves as the
paradigm for Habermas' concern with this possibility. Insofar
as

this

is

obviously

undesirable,

some

form

of

initial

direction is necessary if responses to late modern crises are
not to turn into postmodern nightmares. Enter the enlightened
social analyst. 17 Habermas develops the model for this in an
early

essay,

17

"On

Systematically Distorted

Communication,"

See Habermas' introduction to Theory and Practice,
"Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis".
The section subtitled "Objectivity of knowledge and interest"
is particularly relevant to the argument that I am developing.
It fails to meet my objections for reasons that will become
clear shortly.
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(Which I will discuss in chapter III) and seems to uphold it
in his more recent work as well. I want to be quite clear that
the model, as I am construing it, is an interpretation of the
perspective from which the theory of communicative action is
constructed; it is not a critique of the theory itself nor a
contention that Habermas would describe his own view of social
science as I do in my interpretation. My concern is to show
that when the relationship between analyst and analysand is
based on this quasi-medicinal (Habermas himself comments on
the oddity of using medical terminology) model, the normative
implications of that analysis will be skewed by an
of

power.

The

analyst

tacitly

purports

to

imbalance

have

a

more

enlightened perspective and as such can legitimately prescribe
curative measures for social-political ills. This may or may
not cause difficulties in the case of the simple relationship
between a psychoanalyst and her/his patient. When magnified to
the dimension of the relationship between the social-analyst
and the social body, however, a different problematic emerges.
While in the analyst's eyes the source of crisis is
systematically

distorted

communication

which

prohibits

meaningful political participation, in the eyes of the general
public (according to Habermas) the only indication of crisis
will be a failure on the part of the state to ensure that all
of their wants and needs are met. This indicates that the
standards of legitimacy are different from the perspective Qf
enlightened science then from that of the average consumer.
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The

analyst's

task

is

to

demonstrate

that

substantive

democracy, not the potential to accumulate exorbitant wealth,
or even to merely subside is where the true wants and true
needs of the populous reside. If this can be accomplished, the
transition towards a society defined by communicative action
will begin.
increasingly

As a result,
manifest

the general interest will become

which

in

turn

contributes

to

the

establishment of universal norms of action.
A theoretical projection of this sort, however, relies on
questionable

two

assumptions

that

reflect

Habermas'

Enlightenment orientation. The first assumption is that the
scientific sphere of society (upon which the analyst depends)
can gain objective distance from the political and economic
spheres, enabling an accurate analysis. While Habermas quite
clearly recognizes the degree to which distorted communication
and strategic action have infected the economic and political
systems,

he

fails

to

consider

the

possibility

that

the

sciences reflect these problems as well. His rebuttal to this
would be that the sciences are by definition formally in the
realm

of

disinterested

discourse

and

as

such

have

the

potential for making objective pronouncements without becoming
completely detached from specific interests. 18 In taking this
stance

Habermas

is

attempting to

defend

one

of

the

most

contested planks of the Enlightenment platform.
18

See Habermas' discussion of the Heidelberg Research
Project in Systems Analysis in Towards a Rational Society, pp.
70-73, for an example of this.
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such

an

assumption

is

problematic

in

two

specific

respects: first, the gap between the standards of legitimacy
adhered to by the

enlightened scientist and the

average

consumer is obvious and can only be narrowed if the predicted
economic crisis occurs. As will be evident shortly, however,
Habermas' most recent analysis of the late modern condition-and the type of problems it generates--is less committed to
the inevitability of economic collapse. While he continues to
be interested in the economic dynamics that could lead to
substantial political change, he likewise acknowledges that
capitalism has a remarkable ability to survive. This places
additional pressure on the embedded Enlightenment premise that
the only happy, healthy society is one in which the citizenry
actively contributes to the determination of patterns of
collective activity. The fact that public demand for this is
not exerted when the economy is operating smoothly indicates
that there is a serious bifurcation between the ideals of the
Enlightenment and the standards of consumer societies. Second,
it fails to take into account the degree to which the economic
and administrative systems in advanced-capitalist societies
can infiltrate the spheres of scientific--including social
scientific in the form of ideology--research. In the same way
that workers can be politically neutralized by higher wages,
etc., the scientist can be co-opted by government sponsored
grants

that

steer research

in the direction of

strictly

economic interests, high paying private sector jobs that place
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the

scientist

in

settings

where

subordinated to corporate profit,

scientific

discovery

is

and the general consumer

ethos that prevails in advanced-capitalist societies. In other
words, the production of truth can easily be reduced to the
production of commodities.
The problem in general is this: there is a gap between
the

ideals

of

enlightened

science

and

the

objectives

of

consumer societies. It is possible that if this gap is to be
narrowed,

enabling

Enlightenment

ideals

to

play

a

more

important political role, then there will have to be some type
of

economic

crisis.

Unless

this

takes

place,

enlightened

science won't have any social-political impact.
direction

in which this

gap can narrow is

The other

toward what

I

referred to as the consumer ethos of advanced capitalism. This
seems to be the more likely case given the survivability of
the capitalist economy. Under such an arrangement, science is
assimilated by economic imperatives that render it potentially
dangerous. While I disagree with Habermas as to the exact role
played by science in a theory of social-political change, I do
agree

that

obtaining

relevant

social-scientific

knowledge

contributes to the process of social-political transformation.
Nevertheless,

it must be dealt with cautiously or science

(including social science) will contribute to the domination,
rather than liberation of humanity.

This

is precisely the

concern of Horkheimer and Adorno. "Knowledge, which is power,
knows no obstacles: neither in the enslavement of men nor in
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compliance with the world's rulers" (DE, p. 4).
The communicative practices that have constituted the
modern sciences that Habermas depends upon are bound up in the
same

general

counterparts:

discourse
the

as

their

discourse

of

economic

modernity.

and

political

Habermas

would

contend that the sciences accommodate a moment of internal
reflection. This, however (as he points out), was the ideal of
the modern state as well.

In both cases these ideals are

subject to corruption: a corruption that I would argue is the
product of the way that power and knowledge interpenetrate
under the rationality paradigm of capitalism. The consequence
for action is that the already empowered continue to define
emancipation in terms
democracy as
obtain. 19

vacuous

of their own interests.
as

bourgeois

democracy is

As

such,

a

likely to

The second enlightenment assumption that is

apparent, and problematic, in Habermas' solution to the crisis

19

Ben Agger, in "A Critical Theory of Discourse," an
article that contests the practicability of Habermas' theory
of discourse, indicates the importance of the powerless
setting the agenda for dialogue. While Agger regresses in the
direction of orthodox Marxism at times, and settles for the
philosophically questionable theories of Herbert Marcuse, this
~s a crucial point that Habermas fails to accommodate. By
insisting on a movement towards discursive symmetry by way of
therapeutically transforming those who are not presently
competent, he ignores the fact that within the boundaries of
~any populist movements symmetry already exists, and that this
is a source of power. I would argue that the power embodied in
these corporate units should be exercised against the
established sectors of power. This of course pi ts power
against power--something that rationalists like Habermas would
loathe. My argument will be that this is necessary if the gap
between the empowered and the subordinated in late modern
society is to be dissolved.
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conditions

advanced-capitalism

of

emerges

in

his

characterization of the potential for communicative action.
For Habermas this is rooted in the development of linguistic
capabilities. As rationality develops, and becomes sedimented
in natural languages, communicative practices tend to reflect
a tacit reliance on the regulative principles of ideal speech.
In turn, human coexistence moves toward a corresponding ideal
that is rooted in communicative rationality and action. 20 This
view follows from the universal pragmatic theory of language
and communication (which is heavily dependent on sciences such
as linguistics and psychology), a formal reconstruction that
abstracts from concrete historical and political realities.
Guided by the assumption that humanity evolves progressively
and that reason is

ultimately the driving force of this

movement, Habermas conflates the formal model of linguistic
development

with

social-political

evolution.

As

both

his

empirical assessment, and Horkheimer's and Adorno's critique,
reveal,

human

reason

does

not

exhibit

a

discernible

developmental pattern that verifies this. In fact the powerknowledge model suggested by Horkheimer and Adorno seems to be
based on more concrete evidence. 21

°

2

For a critical discussion of this see Anthony Giddens'
"Reason
Without
Revolution?
Habermas'
Theorie
des
kommunikativen Handelns", in Bernstein, 1985, pp. 95-121. See
in particular pp. 112-121.
21

For Habermas' view of social evolution see Legitimation
Crisis, pp. 20-23. His view is that all societies evolve along
similar lines in a manner that is characterized by increasing
rationality and increasing freedom. For a critique of this see
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This does not establish that the authors of Dialectic of
filllightenment

are

right

and Habermas

is wrong.

It merely

redefines their points of contention. Further, Habermas has
carefully revealed the paradox that in his judgment freezes
Horkheimer and Adorno in their tracks: you can't use reason to
reason.~Nevertheless,

obliterate

completely

anticipatory-utopian

dimension

of

Habermas'

the

if

theory

is

to

succeed (even on a strictly theoretical level), so must the
theory of language and communication which, as I will argue in
chapter

III,

is

bound

up

with

the

normative

theory

of

modernity in a problematic fashion.
I have raised these concerns at the present jµncture to
introduce

the

idea

that

there

are

radical

discrepancies

between the normative content of modernity and the practices
that define it socially, politically and economically. This
leads to further questions pertaining to what it means to say
we live in a modern society and can tap into its enlightenment
resources

for

the

sake

of

bringing

about

emancipatory

transformations. In the section that follows I will argue that
Habermas'

more

recent

analysis

of

contemporary

Western

societies pushes him in the direction of concessions to the
descriptive

claims

of

postmodernists

such

as

Lyotard

and

Jameson. This in turn, I will claim, has further implications
Benhabib, 1986, pp. 270-277.
22

See "The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment", The
Theory of Communicative Action,
and The Philosophical
Q..iscourse of Modernity.
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for the status of his normative theory.
In

the

segment

that

follows

I

will

discuss

some

of

Habermas' recent work, concentrating on the second volume of
I)le Theory of Communicative Action CTCA:2) and an essay titled
"The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the
Exhaustion

of

Utopian

Energies"

( TNO) .

Habermas'

latest

assessment of modernity in general and advanced-capitalism in
particular

takes

as

its

point

of

departure

reformulation of the system-theoretic model of
model that dominated Habermas'
theory

views

society

in

a

critical

society

work in the 70' s).

terms

of

functions

(a

Systems

that

are

coordinated with respect to the social system in general. This
model, Habermas argues, fails to account for the role played
by the lif eworld in the process of rational differentiation
that is necessary for a

functionally organized society to

evolve in the first place. He proposes, in response, a bilevel
theory of society:

one which recognizes the relations that

exist between system and lif eworld and the extent to which
they have developed and been damaged during the modern epoch.
Habermas

takes

careful

note

in

this

context

of

the

paradox that emerges with respect to action motivation in the
modern

period.

secularization
modernity

meets

On
and

the

one

hand,

due

differentiation

the

conditions

to

within

necessary

rationalization,
the
for

lif eworld,
consensus

formation to coordinate social action. On the other hand, due
to the huge need for coordination in a social order that has
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grown increasingly complex, non-linguistic "steering media"
(money and power) play a more dramatic role. As efficiency is
of paramount importance to the capitalist economy, it is the
latter mode of action coordination that comes to dominate,
relegating the lifeworld to subsystem status.
My primary concern will be with Habermas' recognition of
the way that subsystemic units interact with one another via
steering media and the degree to which this subdues available
lifeworld resources. This analysis, I will suggest, conflicts
with the view that language has as its telos intersubjective
communication.
language

In response

merely

has

I

the

will

continue to argue that

potential

for

numerous

other

communicative and action coordinating modes.

This critique

will be developed largely in the chapter V.

Habermas has

adequately demonstrated

the

potential

for

intersubjective

communication (explanatory-diagnostic) and has convincingly
argued

that

desirable

a

society

based

on

communicative

(anticipatory-utopian).

theoretical propositions,

however,

Between
is

a

huge

action
these

is
two

gap that

is

filled with the tangled bureaucracies of advanced-capitalism
(which

are

particularly

void

of

communicative

action

coordination). My argument here, and in the remainder of this
book, will be that Habermas' theory doesn't allow for a praxis
that can bridge the gap between communicative potential and a
communication based social reality. Another way of putting
this would be that Habermas fails to allow for a politics of
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enlightenment that is adequate to the task of dealing with the
adversity plagued aftermath of modernity.
Habermas' aim in his conceptualization of the lifeworld
is

to

avoid

developed

the

by

pitfalls

Shutz

and

of

the

phenomenological

Luckrnann. 23

They,

in

model

line

with

traditional phenomenology, start from the standpoint of the
abstract

subject.

"Like

Husserl,

they

begin

with

the

egological consciousness for which the general structures of
the lifeworld are given as necessary subjective conditions of
the experience of a concretely shaped, historically stamped,
social

lifeworld;"

position

is

that

(TCA:2,
the

p.

129).

lifeworld

is

The

strength of this

conceived

as

a

socio-

historically developed backdrop for action. The chief problem
lies

with

fundamental.

the

assumption

In contrast,

that

the

acting

Habermas argues,

subject

the subject

is
is

always formed in contexts of intersubjectivity that are rooted
in the communicative structures of the lifeworld (TCA:2, pp.
126-135).
As conceived by Habermas,

the lifeworld serves as the

"horizon and backdrop of communicative action",

a pool of

already give resources that can be readily thematized within
contexts of discourse.
description

of

three

His characterization begins with a
actor/world

relations.

Each

time

a

speech-act is uttered one of three world domains is explicitly
thematized:
23

the

objective

world

which

See Shutz and Luckrnann, 1973.

is

the

domain

of
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external things; the subjective world which is the domain of
internal experience; and the social world which is the domain
shared in common by a community of actors. In addition to the
explicitly thematized relation, the other two relations are
implicitly thematized, thus creating in each act a network of
overlapping worlds. It is this network that constitutes the
above mentioned pool of resources, situating a communication
dynamic

that

proceeds

by

defining

and

redefining

the

communicative possibilities available at any give time. "These
redefinitions are based on suppositions of commonality in
respect to the objective, social, and each's own subjective
world.

With

this

reference

system,

participants

in

communication suppose that the situation definitions forming
the background to an actual utterance hold intersubjectively"
(TCA: 2, 120-22).

In
content

each
is

specific

drawn

from

communication
the

lifeworld.

situation,
This

pertinent

points

to

the

variability of lifeworld contexts relative to the situation
being defined. Habermas accounts for this in terms of three
lifeworld dimensions that correspond with the above mentioned
actor/world relations. The spatio-temporal dimension, which
corresponds with the relation to the objective world, varies
relative to the world that is available to the actor. This is
delimited by such things as communication opportunities and
transportation

technology.

The

social

dimension,

which

corresponds with the relation to the social world,

varies
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relative to the specific collectivity of which the actor is
part. This is delimited by the role of the actor and the scope
of

the

world

in

which

he/she

acts

(this

might

be

a

neighborhood for one person, a country for another and the
entire world

for

another).

The personal

dimension,

which

corresponds with the relation to the subjective world, varies
relative to personal background experiences of actors. This is
delimited

in terms of the social dimension to which an actor

is bound. Themes of action, and their attendant plans, will
shift with respect to context variability. These shifts effect
both the focal point and the boundaries of the lifeworld
( TCA : 2 I p . 12 2 -2 4 ) .
As

general

trivial,

gaining

background

the

significance

lifeworld

only

when

is

relatively

thematized

in

a

specific situation. Habermas states this as follows:
From a perspective turned toward the situation, the
lifeworld appears as a reservoir of taken-for-granteds,
of
unshaken
convictions
that
participants
in
communication draw upon in cooperative processes of
interpretation. Single elements, specific taken-forgranteds, are, however, mobilized in the form of
consensual and yet problematizable knowledge only when
they become relevant to a situation (TCA:2, p. 124).
The lifeworld should be conceived as·a reserve of patterns
which facilitate the interpretation of specific scenarios.
These

interpretive

patterns

are

conveyed

via

cultural

traditions and are organized linguistically. It is the view
that

the

lif eworld

distinguishes

Habermas'

is

linguistically

account

from

the

ordered

that

phenomenological

version. By positing semantically determined boundaries that
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are

grammatically

regulated,

the

"egological"

problem

is

solved. Language, rather than the abstract subject, serves as
a transcendental primitive.

It (language)

is the medium of

exchange for content that can be thematized into communicative
situations (TCA:2, pp. 124-25).
In summary, the lifewor!d is comprised, fundamentally, of
a bank of knowledge that is located in the capacity to utilize
ordinary

language

with

the

aim

of

reaching

consensus

(understanding). This is the unproblematic, unproblematizable
resource
lifeworld

that
yet

accommodates
makes

shifts

transgression

in

the

horizon

impossible.

of

the

While

the

boundaries of the objective, social, and subjective worlds can
be

problematized

and

overcome,

the

lifeworld

always

constitutes the intersubjective acts that generate movement of
this sort.
The lifeworld is, so to speak, the transcendental site
where
speaker
and
hearer meet,
where
they
can
reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the
world (objective, social or subjective), and where they
can criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle
their disagreements, and arrive at agreements. In a
sentence: participants cannot assume in actu the same
distance in relation to language and cul tu re as in
relation to the totality of facts, norms, or experiences
concerning which mutual understanding is possible ( TCA: 2,
p. 126).
With this in mind I will proceed to Habermas' discussion of
the way that the lifeworld is effectively subdued by "the
system" in mature capitalist societies (TCA:2. pp. 124-26).
This aspect of Habermas' analysis is entrenched in the
theory of social evolution that I

commented on above.

The
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general

sequence of

social evolution proceeds

from tribal

(organized by kinship) to traditional (organized by a central
to

modern

(organized

steering

media).

Differentiation is the active mechanism in this

sequence:

state)

within the

lifeworld

(functionalization)
lifeworld. 24
developmental

(rationalization),
and

Habermas'
trends

by

between

main
that

concern

lead

to

the
is
both

within the
system

system

and

the

to

identify

the

the

positive

and

negative consequences of differentiation in the modern epoch.
As we shall see, modern societies attain a level of
system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous
organizations are connected with one another via
delinguistified media of communication: these systemic
mechanisms--for
example,
money--steer
a
social
intercourse that has been largely disconnected from norms
and values, above all in those subsystems of purposive
rational economic and administrative action that, on
Weber's diagnosis, have become independent of their
24

Habermas draws a parallel between social evolution and
ontogenesis in humans. Following Lawrence Kohlberg, he
contends that in the same way that children develop such that
they achieve increasing ability to resolve conflicts,
societies evolve so that they are more capable of resolution.
This of course would be the case if consensual communication
were visibly the main medium of dispute and resolve (See
Communication and the Evolution of Society, pp. 69-94 and
TCA:2 pp. 172-79). The analogy Habermas draws is quite
obviously questionable. "Is the structural isomorphism between
the two developmental schemas strong enough to justify the way
of proceeding? The homology is strongest, Habermas observers,
in the case of cognitive development, weaker in the case of
moral development. In both cases one can observe roughly
parallel paths of decentration. Nevertheless, there are places
where the analogy breaks down. The pattern of individual
development cannot mirror that of social evolution, since even
the most primitive societies have institutionalized (at the
~dult level) relatively advanced interactive competencies
involving reciprocity and generalized expectations. Again, the
sorts of crises confronting the individual personality differ
f7om those encountered by the social system and hence call for
different developmental solutions" (Ingram, 1987, p. 133).
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moral-political foundations (TCA:2, p. 154).
In spite

of

the

"delinguistification"

process

within

the

system, and the degree to which this effects the lifeworld,
Habermas contends that the lif eworld remains fundamental to
the fabric of society. As such, it is within the structures of
the

lifeworld

generally

that

emancipatory

sympathetic

to

energy

this

is

located.

position

(with

While
certain

reservations concerning Habermas' account of the lifeworld),
I will argue in the concluding chapter of this book that a
lifeworld based politics of enlightenment has to break with
certain key standards to which Habermas adheres.
The

first

state

of

social

relatively undifferentiated.

evolution

(tribal)

is

There is no distinction drawn

between objective, subjective, and social worlds; the system
itself is premised on kinship and gender relations rather than
functional

operations;

and

there

is

no

distinguishable

difference between system and lifeworld (TCA:2, pp.156-164).
It is not until the phase of traditional (state organized)
society develops that differentiation begins to appear. "It is
in

societies

organized

around

a

state

that

functional

specification first encroaches upon the very way of life of
social groups"

( TCA: 2,

p.

16 9) .

Membership in traditional

societies is determined on the basis of a criterion other than
kinship.

One

is

acknowledged

by

virtue

of

legal

status,

acceptance (in principle) of the state's validity, willingness
to participate in group activity by proxy and submission to
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centrally administrated executive procedures. The significant
difference between tribal and traditional societies lies in
the amount of functional differentiation and the degree to
which social action is centrally orchestrated (TCA:2, pp. 169171).
The

transition

decentralization
development

of

subsystems.

This

capitalist
currency

subsystem
coordinates

of

The
and

the

action

both

serves

an

phase

the
as

is

orchestration
and

primarily to

economy,
as

modern

governmental

is due

economy and

which

subsystems.

into

through

medium

the

as

such,

of

relations within the

the

emergence
a

a

between

both

substrata

subsystemic

of

monetary

exchange

functions

interconnective

by

non-governmental

standardization of
a

marked

as

a

which

network.

The

state comes to rely on this coordinating mechanism, leading it
to restructure its own method of directing activity.
state

apparatus

becomes

dependent

upon

the

"The

media-steered

subsystem of the economy; this forces it to reorganize and
leads, among other things, to an assimilation of power to the
structure of steering medium: power becomes assimilated to
money" (TCA:2, p. 171). Hence, political power (administrative
capacity) and economic power (money) converge. On the positive
side,

the

shift

into

the

modern

epoch

does

away

with

traditional (that is to say unquestionable) norms, creating an
environment in which legitimation can be rooted in rational
discourse. On the negative side, the type of economic system
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that emerges, and the efficiency that is demanded therein,
ieads to the above mentioned delinguistif ied mode of action
coordination. Rather than discourse (as Habermas is defining
it),

late

modernity

has

steering media:

money and

power

( TCA : 2 I PP • 1 71-1 7 2 ) • 25
The prominence of steering media as coordinative devices
weakens

the

capacity of

the

lifeworld

to

provide

social

integration. In Habermas' terms, the system is uncoupled from
the

lifeworld

in

definitively bursts

modern

societies:

"The

social

out of the horizon of the

system

lifeworld,

escapes from the intuitive knowledge of everyday communicative
practice,

and

is

henceforth

accessible

only

to

the

counterintuitive knowledge of the social sciences developing
since

the

structural

eighteenth

century"

differentiation

(TCA: 2 I

within

the

p.

173).

lifeworld

While

(due

to

increased rationalization) delineates the domains appropriate
to

the

three

communication

validity

claims

(objective/truth,

raised

consensual

subjective/truthfulness

honest and social/rightness or justice),
25

in

or

it likewise gives

In "Human Agency Between System and Lifeworld:
Habermas' latest version of critical theory", Klaus hartmann
states that Habermas fails to recognize that the steering
media of the capitalist economy are in fact linguistic (p.
152). Habermas does not commit this error, as a careful
reading clearly reveals. When Habermas uses the term
"delinguistification" he does not mean to imply that
activities such as negotiation and "dealing", which are
c7ntral to the capitalist mode of exchange, are engaged in
simply by flashing great roles of money. Rather, his point is
that the linguistic aspect is secondary and does not utilize
the "understanding reaching" capacity that is inherent in
language.
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rise to increasingly complex systemic structures which tend to
rope off or "colonize" the lifeworld: "the lifeworld seems to
shrink to a subsystem", restricting its role as the social
foundation. From the former aspect of rationalization follows
an abstract

system of

law and an

increase

in demand for

political legitimation that has a communicative basis. From
the latter aspect follows a propensity to allow the steering
media, which are reflections of the capitalist economy,
infringe upon the institutional domains

(political,

to

legal,

etc. ) that depend on highly developed communication structures
( TCA : 2 I p . 1 7 3- 7 8 ) . 26
The dilemma alluded to here can be thought of in terms of
a process of clarification. During earlier stages of social
evolution the spheres of communicative and strategic action
were not clearly delineated. In contrast, the modern epoch is
defined by its ability to draw distinctions between the two.
Habermas

characterizes

motivation:
formation,

rational,

this
which

and empirical,

in

terms

is

of

two

premised

on

which operates

modes

of

consensus

on the basis

of

coercion through the use of steering media (money and power).
The

former

of

course

is

grounded

in

the

differentiated

lifeworld structures; the latter, however, is detached from

26

Here Habermas follows Marx in pointing out that
bourgeois law and bourgeois democracy do not reflect the
enlightened ideals that they are supposed to objectively
preserve. As long as there is class differentiation based on
access to steering media (money and power) there will be
discrimination in these spheres.
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the lifeworld altogether.
The way these media function differs according to whether
they focus consensus formation in language through
specialization in certain aspects of validity and
hierarchizing processes of agreement, or whether they
uncouple action coordination from consensus formation in
language altogether, and neutralize it with respect to
the alternatives of agreement or failed agreement ( TCA: 2,
p. 183).
As a consequence of the tendency during the modern epoch to
rely on steering media rather than linguistic modes of action
coordination the lifeworld has been effectively subordinated.
This

results

in

the

replacement

symbolically determined behavior.

of

language

Habermas

games

refers

with

to this

trend "as a technizing of the lifeworld", the outgrowth not of
modernity

in

(capitalism)

general
that

but

has

of

the

determined

specific
systemic

economic

mode

formation

and,

consequently, social integration (TCA:2, pp. 179-183).
More

recent

developments

in

the

capitalist

economy

(specifically the emergence of the welfare state) have only
contributed

to

the

problem.

The

"utopian

energies"

of

modernity have grown increasingly suspect 27 while the media of
money and power have become more and more dominant. Habermas
labels

this

"the

new

obscurity"

(which

I

will

argue

is

tantamount to saying "the aftermath of modernity") which "is
part of a situation in which the program of the social welfare

27

Specifically the faith in rationality, science, and
technology. Late modern phenomena such as the holocaust,
nuclear war, the arms race, environmental crises suggest that
these Enlightenment ideals produce the exact opposite of what
was intended.
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state, which still feeds on the utopian energy of a laboring
society, is losing its capacity to project possibilities for
a collectively better and less endangered way of life" (TNO,

PP·

3 -5).28

The welfare state, Habermas contends,
oriented;

its

main

task

is

to

off set

is compensation

class

conflict by

utilizing administrative mechanisms (which function under the
guise of democratic consensus while actually operating on the
basis of power) to dampen the "quasi-natural" evolution of the
economy. In theory this enables capitalism and democracy to
felicitously coexist, even if in a compromised fashion. Two
important questions, however, must be addressed in light of
this:

Can

the

administrative

welfare

state

intervention

sustain
provide

itself?
a

path

and,

Does

towards

emancipation? (TNO, p. 5-7).
In response to the first question Habermas identifies a
number of barriers that the welfare state must face. These can
28

Bill Martin expresses this concern in terms of the loss
of the possibility for community. "Humanity is on the verge of
forever losing the sense of community, even as this sense
seems to have been recreated in thousands of diffuse ways.
Though the word, 'community', is a commonplace of public
discourse it is a mere trace of its former self" (1992, p. 1).
Martin goes on to argue that the loss of the meaning of the
word community is virtually equivalent to the loss of the
meaning of what it is to be human, a possibility that he
associates with "the impasse of postmodernity." I see strong
resonances between Martin's concern with the loss of meaning
and Habermas' concern with the colonization of the lifeworld
which issues in the new obscurity. Both focus on the question
of the regeneration of human-being through semantic analyses
which lay out the possibilities for renewal. See the third
chapter of Martin's Matrix and Line for an important critique
of Habermas' semantic theory.

102

be

viewed

in

terms

of

the

complexity

of

international

capitalism and the antagonisms that arise as a consequence of
its administration. The outgrowth is a system of political
blocks,

each

businesses),

reflecting
that

vie

for

special

interests

positions

of

(e.g.

power.

big

This

is

destabilizing and potentially debilitating. In response to the
second question, the welfare state is always on the defensive,
gearing itself more toward preservation than

emancipatory

transformation. As such, a dense bureaucratic network develops
which impinges upon the remaining autonomous spheres of the
lifeworld with purposive-rational patchwork strategies. 29
In short, inherent in the project of the social state is
a contradiction between goal and method. Its goal is the
establishment of forms of life which are structured
according to egalitarian standards and which at the same
time open up arenas for individual self-fulfillment and
spontaneity. But apparently this goal cannot be achieved
directly
through
a
legal
and
administrative
transformation of political programs. Producing new forms
of life is beyond the capacities of political power (TNO:
p. 9--my emphasis).
The

answer

29

to

both

questions

is

negative.

Welfare

state

This is a key point in the argument that I am
jeveloping in that here Habermas explicitly recognizes that
importance of Foucault's analysis of rationalized processes of
"normalization." "It is this reifying and subjectivating power
that Foucault has traced into even the thinnest capillary
)ranchings of everyday communication. The distortions within
~uch
a regulated, analyzed, controlled, and watched-over
Lif eworld are certainly more subtle than the obvious forms of
naterial
exploitation,
and
impoverishment;
but
these
~onflicts, shifted into the domains of the psychological and
:he bodily, internalized, are no less destructive for all
:hat" (TNO, p. 9). This points precisely to the gap that I am
:rying to thematize--that between modernity and postmoderni ty·within which a different notion of the politics of
~nlightenment needs to take shape.
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like liberal capitalism, needs to be protected

capitalism,

from itself (TNO, pp. 7-12).
Habermas proposes as a
existing

channels

be

solution to this problem that

viewed

with

suspicion

as

their

communicative structures are distorted by power relations and

economic interests. The subsystemic media steered spheres must
be bypassed by autonomous collectivities that emerge out of
what remains

of the

lifeworld.

Of the existing means

social regulation--money, power,

for

and solidarity--solidarity

needs to be positioned above the other two.

This

entails

drawing upon the communicative capacity that is latent in the
structures of the lifeworld. Habermas maintains that doing so
will

"influence

the

boundaries

between

communicatively

structured areas of life, on the one hand, and the state and
economy, on the other" (TNO: 14-17) . 30
A

number

of

important

developments

take

place

in

Habermas' analysis of modern society between the ?O's and the
80's. First, he reconceptualizes the paradoxical situation of
modernity,
element.

concentrating on

Second,

the

lifeworld

as

the pivotal

he defends a theory of the operations of

modern societies which focuses on the dynamic of subsystemic
relations. Third, he acknowledges that rationalization in the
lifeworld is a necessary condition not only for communicative
action but also for the type of strategic action, guided by

30

Also see Habermas' discussion of new social movements

in TCA:2, pp. 391-396.
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steering media, that dominates social intercourse during this
epoch.

Finally,

distribution

of

he

notes

power

in

that

the

given

later

the

phases

fragmented

of

modernity,

remedial discourses must spring up locally in the form of
grass roots solidarity movements. Given this,

I will sketch

out the reasons why these developments are incompatible with
Habermas' communicative-evolutionary theory of social change.
This in turn necessitates a reassessment of the diagnostic
dimension of critical theory which unavoidably leads to an
encounter that I will construct between Habermas and certain
key postmodernists.
The

implication

differentiations
dialectical

in

the

process

Habermas'

of

of

lifeworld
social

position

are

the

evolution.

is

product

As

a

that
of

result

a
o·f

increased differentiation, two distinct and incompatible modes
of

social

discourse

incompatibility,

emerge.

This

leads

to

intolerable

resulting in one or the other gaining the

upper hand. In the case of advanced capitalist society, the
strategic

mode

is

clearly

dominant.

Insofar

as

this

is

problematic, its opposite (pure intersubjectivity) is posited
as

the

only acceptable

solution.

For

Habermas,

there

is

apparently no middle ground--even for transitional purposes.
This is due partly to his overly narrow view of the potential
that resides in ordinary language. The position that I will
come to argue for is that ordinary language is susceptible to
a number of different normatively structured formations and
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that the contextual circumstances of a

"discourse"

(and I

intend to expand the meaning of this term) will vary quite
dramatically. The demands of the early modern period gave rise
to

consensus

oriented

and

purposive

oriented

discursive

practices. The latter has subsequently become dominant, giving
rise

to

the

crises

or pathologies

(as

Habermas

has

more

recently labeled them) of late capitalism. I will argue that
this calls for a reconceptualized notion of the politics of
enlightenment: a type that is willing to breakdown,

rather

than repair, the discursive arrangements of late-modernity.
This is suggested by Habermas' account of the degree to
which purposive discourses have fragmented the social system
and infiltrated every dimension of social life. Nevertheless,
he continues to insist, albeit in more localized forms, that
the appropriate practices in light of this predicament are the
formation of collectivities of solidified consciousness that
can establish patterns of communicative action within their
subsystemic regions. This stance denies the revelations of his
own analysis. Whether or not reform represents a viable way of
altering existing patterns of social-political interaction is
questionable The alternatives seem to be either to capitulate
to the standards of the system or to expand the vision of
emancipation--the utopian energy of the theory--such that more
substantive notions of transformations will factor into the
normative
developing

content
such

of
a

critical
theory

social

entails

theory.
thinking

Part

of

through--
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that

practically--ways

existing

of

channels

social

coordination can be broken down. Only then does the utopian
energy

of

communicative

action

begin

to

have

political

viability.
Habermas'

response

to

my

suggestions

would

be

that

theoretical knowledge provides the kernel of potential that
will

facilitate

efforts

to

deploy

consensus

oriented

discourses. Picking up on the point I made earlier,

I will

argue that the normative terrain of modernity is inextricably
intertwined with the political and economic systems,

thus

leaving no virgin soil for the growth of enlightened dialogue.
If my assessment is correct, these views follow directly from
Habermas' own analysis. Yet he fails to acknowledge the huge
gap between his communicative ideal
whole

heartedly)

and

the

(which I

communicative

subscribe to

reality

that

his

analysis discloses. In order to substantiate this position I
will now turn to the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard and Fredric
Jameson.
Modernity vs. Postmodernity:
Normative and Empirical Questions

As I

indicated in the introduction,

postmodernism has

replaced positivism as the arch enemy of critical theory in
recent years. Habermas' concern with postmodernism has been
centered

around

the

political

implications

of

a

mode

of

thought that insists upon undermining "established" normative
structures simply for the sake of showing that they can be
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undermined. Further, he is concerned that this leads to an
ambivalence with respect to regenerating normative standards
that can provide the grounds for emancipatory action. Finally,
he is

distressed by the

celebratory posture of

reckless

postmodernist who revel in a bacchanalian disdain for the
progress that has been made in the quest for universally valid
social, political, and ethical standards. The fact that the
"post" in postmodernism situates his "debate" with central
thinkers of that movement in either /or terms provides Habermas
with an important opportunity to defend his attachment to the
Enlightenment. In this section I will attempt to complicate
this dichotomy--one to which Habermas strongly adheres.
Before proceeding to this it is useful to gain a sense of
the genealogy of thought, as Habermas reconstructs it, that
leads to the current modernity vs. postmodernity debate. In
The Philosophical

Discourse

of Modernity

(PDM),

Habermas

provides a sophisticated historical analysis of the two main
strains of anti-modernist thought that have followed from
Nietzsche's critique of modernity. The strain which develops
from Heidegger to Derrida takes up Nietzsche's critique of the
Western metaphysical tradition; the strain which develops from
Bataille to Foucault assimilates his erotic lebensphilosophie
and

his

genealogical

approach

to

the

study

of

history.

Habermas focuses his criticisms of the anti-modernists upon
the "paradox" of attacking modernity while still relying on
modern philosophical suppositions. This is developed into an
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analysis of the problems that he associates with the "boundary
obliterating" postmodern thinkers: specifically, that once the
distinctions that have traditionally delineated various modes
of discourse are blurred,

the substantive fields

(such as

scientific or political discourses) will have no basis for
claiming

their

(literary

or

hierarchical

artistic)

superiority

over

Habermas

concurs

modes.

expressive
with

the

postmodern thinkers on one point: that the modern philosophy
of the subject has run its course (see the above discussion of
lifeworld

theories).

His

proposal

for

transforming

subjectively based philosophy, however, is different in two
crucial respects 1) Habermas contends that in order to break
from the philosophy of the subject the modern project of
enlightenment

must

be

completed;

and

2)

that

a

critical

component of this project is to theoretically rope off domains
of discourse in terms of the validity claims that they raise.
This,

as I

restricts

have been arguing (and will continue to argue)
a

perpetuating

theory
the

gap

of

social-political

that

exists

between

action,
real

thereby

and

ideal

communication.
The fundamental question raised in PDM is: what is the
significance

of

modernity?

In

addressing

this

question

Habermas identifies two strains of anti-modernist thought that
have

emerged

in

the

20th

century:

neoconservatism

and

anarchism. Both developed a conception of modernity based on
Weber's observation that the constitutive elements of modern
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society are secularization and rationalization--f eatures that
are systematically manifest in "the organization cores of
capitalist enterprise and the bureaucratic state apparatus"
The

1) •

(PDM,

anti-modernists

de-historicize

Weber's

observations, which are still marxist enough to be framed in
the context of universal history. Breaking from the tradition
of meta-narrative historical theory enables two key moves
pertinent to the epoch question: 1) the necessity of closure
or completion of modernity is done away with; and 2) as a
result, the shift into postmodernity can be posited without an
identifiable historical referent. Hence, one merely has to
declare the death of God, the death of metaphysics, the death
of philosophy, the death of art and in general the death of
Enlightenment as sufficient grounds for claiming that a new
age

has

arrived. 31

Habermas

is

suspicious

of

this.

His

suspicions focus on whether attempts to make this break are
not always determined by a conceptual and historical linkage
with

modernity.

"We

cannot

exclude

from

the

outset

the

possibility that neoconservatism and aesthetically inspired
anarchism, in the name of a farewell to modernity, are merely
trying to revolt against it once again. It could be that they
are merely
tradition

cloaking their
of

complicity with

counter-enlightenment

in

the

the
garb

venerable
of

post-

enlightenment" ( PDM, 5) .

31

For an interesting discussion of this see
introduction to Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind.
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Modernity

runs

into

none

of

these

problems.

It

is

qualitatively distinguishable from its predecessor epochs.
"Modernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which
it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another
epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself" (PDM,
7)· Modernity developed along with historically determinate
events such as the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the
bourgeois

great

revolutions.

Hence,

the

primary

characteristics of modernity have a traceable evolution. The
attempted

break

paradoxically

from

modernity

dependent

on

does

categories

leaving

not,
that

it

no

it

longer

recognizes. It is this "paradox" that leads to the discussion
that I will now pursue.
While,

as

I

mentioned in the

introduction,

the term

postmodernism has been around for quite some time, it was the
publication

of

Jean-Francois

Lyotard's

La

Condition

postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir that transformed it into a
term with wide circulation in academic circles. Originally
designed as a

report for the

governmen~

of Quebec on the

current status of knowledge in advanced societies,
become the postmodern bible for

a

generation of

it has
literary

critics,

philosophers and specialists in cultural studies.

Lyotard

defines

metanarratives"

postmodernism
(PC,

p.xxiv).

as
This,

"incredulity
of

course,

toward
situates

postmodernism in a precarious position vis-a-vis the tradition
of the Enlightenment from the outset. For instance, Kant's
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theory of enlightenment is deeply embedded in a historical
metanarrative, as are the theories of Hegel and Marx as they
attempted to reformulate the idea of enlightenment such that
it met the demands of a rapidly changing world. Furthermore,
even

radical

critics

of

the

enlightenment--most

notably

Horkheimer and Adorno--rely on a meta-narrative theory to
"ground"

their

analysis.

Finally,

Habermas

retrieves

the

tradition of metanarrative in his theory of social evolution,
which

as

I

showed

emancipation.

above

is

central

to

his

theory

In short: without a meta-narrative,

of

it would

appear that the very idea of enlightenment, regardless of ones
perspective, starts to lose shape.
This immediately pits Habermas and lyotard against one
another

on

a

very

important

issue:

the

possibility

emancipatory politics. The following claim further

for

clarifie~

their points of contention:
Thus, the society of the future falls less within the
province
of
a
Newtonian
anthropology
(such
as
structuralism or systems theory) than a pragmatics of
language particles. There are many different language
games--a heterogeneity of elements. They only give rise
to institutions in patches--local determinism (PM, p.
xxiv).
In other words,

a

systematic

theory of

society,

such as

Habermas' reconstructs social and political arrangements in a
manner that enables the determination of where power resides
and what

forces

operate

at

the

heart

of

the

system.

In

Habermas' case this tendency manifests itself as an analytic
schema

which

places

"language

games"

into

two

distinct
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categories:

those

that

are

coercive

and

those

that

are

enabling or emancipatory. In Lyotard's judgment, this denies
the fundamental disorder that society finds itself in.
The decision makers, however, attempt to manage these
clouds of sociality according to input/output matrices,
following a logic which implies that their elements are
commensurable and that the whole implies that the whole
is determinable. They allocate our lives for the growth
of power. In matters of social justice and of scientific
truth alike, the legitimation of that power is based on
optimizing the systems performance efficiency. The
application of this criterion to all of our games
necessarily entails a certain level of terror, whether
soft or hard: be operational (that is commensurable) or
disappear (PC, p. xxiv).
In denying this disorder, a disservice is done to those social
agents--embroiled

in

their

language games--that is

own

heterogeneous

matrices

tantamount to annulling their

of
(we

might say) autonomy. 32
While these passages represent a not so veiled polemic
against Habermas, the next remark states their differences in
straight forward terms.
Is legitimacy to be found in consensus obtained through
discussion, as Juer·gen Habermas thinks? Such consensus
does violence to the heterogeneity of language games. And
invention is always born of dissension. Postmodern
knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it
refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our
ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is
not the experts homology, but the inventor's paralogy
(PC I p. xxv) .
Under this description Habermas'

32

discursive approach to a

I am intentionally couching this discussion in a
vocabulary that highlights the internal incoherence that
Habermas finds with postmodernism. While one wearies of
hearing him harp on about performative contradictions there
are points at which he is just right about this.
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politics of enlightenment is both impossible and violent:
impossible in the sense that it tries to bring order to that
which is fundamentally

chaotic; and violent in that in trying

to achieve the impossible, differences between incommensurable
groups of social actors are destroyed. 33 Furthermore, Lyotard
suggests that there are emancipatory possibilities within the
postmodern condition. This is where, as I will argue in the
final

section

of

the

present

chapter,

his

postmodernism

becomes normative. From this perspective it is possible to
discuss whether a politics of enlightenment that has as its
fundamental

aim the

toleration

of

incommensurability

is

really worth anything.
In the main body of The Postmodern Condi ti on Lyotard
develops

his positions

in considerably greater detail.

He

extends his discussion even further in Just Gaming (JG) and
The Differend (TD).
vis

Habermas'

My aim here is to situate Lyotard vis-a-

discursive

view

of

the

politics

of

enlightenment. This politics, as I have shown above, and will
portray more formerly and abstractly in the next chapter, is
rooted in the normative force of ordinary language within
specified forums of discourse. Under conditions of discourse,
33

I feel as though this is a charitable reading of
Lyotard's remark. Less charitably I would say that its a bit
silly to think that the impossible can be violent. The very
fact that it is possible brings about the threat of violence.
Habermas is also guilty of this sort double talk from the
other side of the coin. His concern with violence is a more
legitimate one but nonetheless problematic. Any viable theory
o~ emancipation must be able recognize that violence is always
within the realm of possibility.
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claims Habermas, it only makes sense to communicate if we hold
common presuppositions about the purpose of communication. For
him this includes the general agreement that we will proceed
in the direction of truth, that we will express our interests
with sincerity, and that we will engage our interlocutors as
equals. 34 Normatively this implies that linguistic discourses
are governed by movement toward consensus. Lyotard,

on the

other hand, holds that consensus is not a viable candidate as
the

standard

for

validating

claims

concerning

truth

or

justice. Holding such a position involves an anthropological
mistake in that it holds false assumptions about subjectivity-such as that subjects are self possessed agents of knowledge
and that

they

are

governed by

their

own wills--and

also

propagates the notion that history is moving in the direction
of emancipation. 35

These

ideas,

according to

Lyotard,

are

34

It is a point of interest that a theory which is so
deeply committed to reciprocity has painfully little to say
about listening. We get an elaborate characterization on the
way that speech acts operate but there is an assumption that
the reception of speech acts is unproblematic. The question of
listening, which is a hot topic in popular psychology, of all
places, is flagrantly ignored in what I consider to be the
most sophisticated theory of communication available. This
strikes me as an important area for critical theorists to
address.
35

Both these points are addressed by Habermas to a
certain extent in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity
where he refigures the subject so as to accommodate
poststructuralist
critiques
of
the modern version of
subjectivity, and also recharacterizes the narrative of
emancipation. These responses might not satisfy Lyotard, and
don't entirely satisfy me, but they do show how to get beyond
the dichotomy between the totally fragmented subject which
Lyotard propounds and the idea of subject as absolute totality
that follows from one reading of Kant. Axel Honneth's
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rendered invalid (and here the need to use normative language
is once again significant) by the postmodern condition. "For
this reason, it seems neither possible, nor even prudent, to
follow Habermas in orienting our treatment of the problem of
legitimation

in

the

direction

of

a

search

for

universal

consensus through what he calls Diskurs, in other words, a
dialogue of argumentation" (PC, p. 65--my emphasis) . Habermas'
view, Lyotard claims, assumes the possibility for universal
agreement whereas in fact, language games are heteromorphous.
It likewise assumes that the telos of discussion is agreement
whereas in fact, Lyotard suggests, it is paralogy (PC, pp.6065).

In

The

Diff erend,

Lyotard

claims

that

Habermas'

insistence on consensus building dialogues is Platonic. "You
are preferring dialogue to differend. You are presupposing,
first of all, that univocality is possible; and second, that
it constitutes the healthiness of phrases"

(TD, p.

84). He

continues by raising questions about two key issues pertaining
to Habermas:

First,

whether the

idea of heal thy vs.

sick

discourses is addressing the nature of language; and second,
whether

there

is

a

pre-differentiated

dynamic

to

the

circulation of phrases that is lost in discourse analysis.
This, for Lyotard, is the differend: "the unstable and instant
of language wherein something that must be able to be put into
discussion of this at the 1992 meeting of the Society for
Phenomenological and Existential Philosophy is instructive on
this point.
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phrases cannot yet be" (TD, p. 13). The question that Habermas
would raise at this point would concern the ontological status
of the differend.

Is this a transhistorical category that

takes its final shape within the postmodern condition? Or is
it merely a symptom of a colonized lifeworld that has been
stripped of its ability to serve as a historically developed
linguistic

resource?

This

is

at

the

core

of

the

normative/empirical question, as well as the modern/postmodern
question. These in turn, are at the heart of the possibility
for a politics of enlightenment in the aftermath of modernity.
Turning now to the broader context in which Lyotard
situates his claims concerning language games, paralogy, and
the differend, the distinction between modern and postmodern
is designated as follows:

"I will use the term modern to

designate any science that legitimates itself with reference
to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to
some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the
hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or
working subject, or the creation of wealth"
these categories

(xxiv). All of

are rendered obsolete by the postmodern

condition which represents a "maturity" that enables us to see
beyond the great ideological constructs of modernity. 36 In
36

It is significant that Lyotard attempts to identify his
normative postmodernism with maturity. This is of course the
way that Kant defines enlightenment. In his view enlightenment
meant waking up to our own capacity for freedom. For Lyotard,
maturity is precisely the opposite of this. Lyotard explicitly
writes off this side of Kant's work in Just Gaming as being
totalizing. "But nonetheless it goes without saying for Kant--
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order to demonstrate this he turns to the work of the later
Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein, language usage is constituted
within distinct forms of life. These forms of life are in turn
framed

by

rule

governed

language

games.

Such

games

are

composed of syntax, grammar, vocabulary and a performative
context. Hence, they are heterogenous--being contingent upon
the form of life out of which they emerge and in turn which
they

help

to

form

and

re-form.

Language

games,

for

Wittgenstein, are not universal, but rather are related to one
through

another

the

exhibition

of

certain

family

resemblances. 37
Lyotard characterizes his appropriation of Wittgenstein
as follows:
What he means by this term is that each of the various
categories of utterance can be defined in terms of rules
specifying their properties and the uses to which they
can be put--in exactly the same way as the game of chess
is defined by a set of rules determining the properties
of each of the pieces, in other words, the proper way to
move them (PC, p. 10).
Lyotard's

aim

is

to

show

that

discourses

are

not

self

legitimating; they are based on ad hoc contracts of sorts.
This leads to the establishment of tacit

rules, without which

there is no game. In turn, to alter the rules is to alter the
game. Within this game context any particular linguistic act
and it is very clear in the article on "Enlightenment", and in
"The Cosmopolitan Idea", or in the "Project of Perpetual
Peace"--that humanity must form a whole" (JG, p. 86). For this
reason it is Kant's third critique that plays the most
important role in Lyotard' s "postmodern" Kantianism (Ingram).
37

See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations.
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is analogous to a particular move in a given game. The main
idea that Lyotard wants to convey in his appropriation of
Wittgenstein

is

that

language

usage

is

fundamentally

agonistic. It is not about establishing reciprocal relations
with other speakers;

rather,

it is a

question of gaining

position vis-a-vis an interlocutor that will define relations
of power. To speak is to fight. Such interaction leads to the
composition of networks of social relations in the postmodern
world. 38
Up to this point Lyotard's discussion

sounds perfectly

modern. Metaphysically grounded norms are no longer valid so
legitimation must assume a different form. In this case that
form is provided by the tacit rules

that govern language

games. Another version of this is Adam Smith's invisible hand
theory which claims that economic activity is motivated and
orchestrated by interests which at the intentional level are
purely

self

oriented but

collectively

assume

a

logical

coherence. In other words it is a war of all against all by
different means--one of the trade marks

of post-Hobbesian

political thought. What is distinctly postmodern about the
language

38

games

that

Lyotard

describes

pertains

to

their

Lyotard' s model is really more economic than linguistic
and the game is much more like monopoly than chess. His views
reflect that side of modern life which Habermas associates
with system imperatives. Rather than show the normative
depravity of this, however, Lyotard attempts to describe it in
a manner that celebrates the constant strife and contestation
which prevents the realization of a social or political
totality.
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indebtedness

to

new

technological

developments

that

fundamentally alter the modes of circulation. The Postmodern
society

is

increasingly

ordered

by

mechanistic

means,

primarily due to the advent of highly sophisticated computer
technologies and the languages that are developed such that
they can operate in the absence of centralized modes of
administration. This results in the disabling of key modern
categories such as the nation-state, democracy, truth, and
most importantly for Lyotard, the "self." "The self does not
amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a
fabric of relations that is more complex and mobile than ever
before" (PC, p. 15).
Lyotard's view of the self is an extreme version of the
"de-centered" subject that has been characterized by various
poststructuralist thinkers. In his judgment the subject is a
nodal

point

within

a

matrix

of

linguistic

operations.

Together, these points create a linguistic circuitry that give
rise to ever changing social formations. The model for this is
a computer language and the programs that can be generated
through its implementation. In any given program the status of
individual lines in that program is contingent. When one line
is changed, the matrix itself is altered. As the matrix is
altered,

so too are all of its constitutive parts. Hence,

nodal points, represented by subjects within the matrix are
flexibly (not reflexively) related to one another and are only
as stable as the matrix itself. The question of the stability
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of the matrix is crucial here as in order to characterize this
"description" as fundamentally different from the modernist
system-theoretic approach it must be demonstrated that the
matrix or matrices in question are relatively unstable. While
the demonstration for this is scant, it seems to be Lyotard's
assumption

(and to a certain extent a correct one).

Given

this, the status of the subject is reduced to that of a post
through

which

understanding
postmodern

messages
that

societies

pass.

while
is

This

the

leads

Lyotard

circulation

increased--that

is

of
to

to

power
say,

the
in
the

category of power plays an expanded role--the prospect for
subjects being empowered is virtually annulled.

Instead of

drawing normative distinctions between freedom and slavery,
emancipation and domination, or coercion and communication,
the

normative

delineations

are

based

on

degrees

of

performativity.
Lyotard sums this up as follows:
It may even be said that the system can and must
encourage such movement to the extent that it combats its
own entropy; 39 the novelty of an unexpected move with
its correlative displacement of a partner or group of
partners, can supply the system with that increased
performativity it forever demands and consumes. (PC, 15).
Hence, the distinction between manipulation and reciprocity
dissolves into the postmodern melange.

It no longer makes

sense to talk about truth, freedom or justice as all of these
39

This sounds like a typically superficial growth economy
claim. For a careful critique of the normative failure of
growth economics theory see David Schweickart, Against
£.apitalism, chapter four.
•
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immature modern

categories

have

been

invalidated by

flexible positionality of contemporary social,

the

political,

economic and legal institutions. At the same time however--and
this is where the incoherent normative structure of Lyotard's
thought coalesces somewhat with Horkheimer's and Adorno's, as
well as my own--the potential for total administration is also
eliminated. The postmodern society has too many points of
slippage for any particular point to be the locus of power. To
the extent that Lyotard is taking a position--and in fact I
think he is taking a rather strong position which factors
importantly into the descriptive aspect of his theory--it is
that modernity totalizes. Postmodernity, on the other hand,
recognizes the "truth" of the fundamental indeterminacy of all
things. In this realization, which must me accompanied by the
proper acceptance or resignation, we are liberated from the
dangerous

tendency to pursue totalities,

whether they be

social, political, or ethical.
As I have been hinting at all along in my discussion of
Lyotard, there seems to be a philosophy of being lurking in
the

backdrop

of

his

cryptic

analysis

of

the

postmodern

condition. I find this most clearly expressed in his notion of
paralogy and the differend.

Paralogy,

loosely defined,

is

false reasoning. In his appropriation of this term Lyotard
attempts to utilize it as a critical foil against the grand
rational schematizations of the meta-narrative tradition. His
notion of paralogy is rooted in the micro dynamics of "mini-
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narratives"

which

constitute

what

I

will

risk

calling

postmodern lifeworlds. Mini-narratives (or possibly regional
lifeworlds)

are

paralogical

due

to

internal

limitations

determined by their radical temporal and spatial contingency.
leads

This

to

confusion,

and

paradox,

perpetual

reconfiguration as the rules that govern these systems are
grounded only in terms of their referential relationship to
one another.

Since these relations

are not governed by a

principle of coherence, the discourses that they produce are
essentially arbitrary. As such, knowledge production, social
organization

and

political

legitimation

are

inherently

unstable: they are practices in paralogism, the point of which
is

not

to

progress

or

generate

consensus

but

rather

to

undermine previous establishments.
If we situate this in terms of Habermas' characterization
of the difference between the lifeworld and discourse (see
chapter V for more details on this), paralogy would be located
at

the

level

of

discourse.

More

fundamental

than

this,

however, is the level of the differend, which I see as being
similar to the lifeworld in the broadest sense. Not in the
sense of regional lif eworlds,

as

I

called them above,

but

rather in the sense of a postmodern lif eworld that corresponds
to

Habermas'

modern

lifeworld.

Lyotard

characterizes

the

differend as follows:
The dif f erend is the unstable and instant of language
wherein something that must be able to be put into
phrases cannot yet be. This state includes silence, which
is a negative phrase but it also calls upon phrases which
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are in principle possible. This state is signaled by what
one ordinarily calls a felling: 'One cannot find the
words,' ~tc. A lot of searching must be done to find new
rules for f orrning and linking phrases that are able to
express the differend disclosed by the feeling, unless
one wants this dif f erend to be smothered right away in a
litigation and for the alarm sounded by the felling to
have been useless. What is at stake in literature and for
philosophy, in a politics perhaps, is to bear witness to
differends by finding axioms for thern"(TD, 13).
The

dif f erend

is

the

inexpressible

which

is

basic

to

expressibility. It always exceeds that which can be put into
phrases. As such, it provides for the generation of new, even
if

inadequate

modes

of

expression.

In

other

words,

the

differend is an anti-rnetatheory of the impossibility of a
self-contained

discourse

outside

of

parochially

limited

spheres. It likewise serves as the ontological precondition
for the postmodern condition.
In brief summary: For Haberrnas, the lifeworld represents
the

possibility

for

discourses

that

tend

toward

the

transformation of society through emancipatory practices. For
Lyotard, the differend represents the impossibility of unified
language games that tend toward totalities. Paralogy is the
ontic state that demonstrates this ontologically rudimentary
condition.

For

Haberrnas,

the

advanced

capitalist

system

confounds these possibilities by literally imprisoning the
semantic

resources

which

supplant

the

potential

for

liberation. For Lyotard, postmodern capitalism is the corning
to fruition of the repressed under current of modernity, hence
"freeing" us to recognize the radical contingency of the human
condition. For Haberrnas, the modern lifeworld offers us the
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iast hope of a politics of enlightenment. For Lyotard, the
differend annuls the desire for a politics of enlightenment.
I will return to Lyotard in the concluding section of this
chapter. At this time, however, I will move on to the work of
Fredric Jameson.
For readers of Horkheimer's and Adorno's Dialectic of
!flliqhtenment, reactions are similar to those of readers of
Aldous

Huxley's

Brave

New

World:

it

evidently right or outrageously wrong.
differ,

I believe,

either

seems

self

The interpretations

along political lines--depending on the

readers position vis-a-vis the neo-conservative "revolutions"
of the

1980' s.

In

this

light,

Fredric

Jameson makes

the

following remark:
Here at length, in this decade which has just ended but
is still ours, Adorno's prophecies of the 'total system'
finally came true in wholly unexpected form. Adorno was
surely not the philosopher of the thirties (who has to be
identified in retrospect, I'm afraid, as Heidegger); nor
the philosopher of the forties and fifties; nor even the
thinker of the sixties--those are called Sartre and
Marcuse,
respectively;
and
I
have
said
that,
philosophically and theoretically, his old-fashioned
dialectical
discourse
was
incompatible
with
the
seventies. But there is some chance that he may turn out
to have been the analyst of our own period which he did
not live to see, and in which late capitalism has all but
succeeded in eliminating the final loopholes of nature
and the Unconscious, of subversion and the aesthetic, of
individual and collective praxis alike, and, with a final
fillip, in eliminating any memory trace of what thereby
no
longer
existed
in
the
henceforth
postmodern
landscape. 40
In other words, Adorno is the first modernist to theorize the

°

4

Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism:
R..ersistence of the Dialectic, p. 5.

Adorno,

or,

The
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postmodern condition. What Habermas recognizes, but tries to
steer

around

with

normative

theory,

and

what

Lyotard

recognizes and tries to make normative theory, Adorno saw in
advance. This is far from saying that Adorno just had it all
right and that we need not look farther in our attempts to
grapple with the present and forge a new future (Adorno is
particularly weak on the latter). Rather, it is to say that
Adorno

anticipated

calvinism:
material

a

what

I

am

calling

consumer society that has

base

and

which

possibly

capital

without

lost track of

doesn't

have

its

enough

consciousness left to maintain hope of regenerating visions of
enlightenment. This is crucial for my argument as the issue
hinges on whether or not the lifeworld has been irretrievably
colonized by the system. Habermas thinks not (and in fact I
agree).

His own analysis,

however,

suggests otherwise.

The

difficulty, then, as I have alluded to above, lies with how to
square the idea of a colonized lifeworld with a
based politics of enlightenment.

For Habermas,

lifeworld
the modern

lifeworld contains all the necessary possibilities.

In my

judgment (and as I will argue in chapter V), to the extent
that

the

lifeworld

possibilities.

Hence,

is

modern,

it

has

the return to Adorno,

exhausted

its

and hence my

appeal to Jameson.
If Lyotard' s

The Postmodern Condition has become the

postmodern bible, than Jameson's essay "The Cultural Logic of
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Late Capitalism" ~ should at least be assigned the status of
one of the lost gospels. In the book length version of CLC,
Jameson provides a

series of analyses of the contemporary

social, theoretical, political and economic scene; or, more
generally, postmodern culture. As one commentator puts it:
" ... Postmodernism can be read as a

long meditation on the

place of Marxism in contemporary culture. " 42 The title essay
sets the stage. It demonstrates the way that various cultural
products of late capitalism grovel nostalgically for the past
without even entertaining the possibility of a

future.

In

doing so a sort of depthlessness is admitted which doesn't
merely preclude emancipatory political practices but goes a
further

step

by

precluding

even

the

thought

of

"enlightenment." Jameson situates· this in terms of a metanarrative

(in spite of Lyotard)

of capitalist development.

Informed

by

Late

Ernest

Mandel's

Capitalism,

Jameson

identifies three distinct phases of capitalism's evolution.
The first he deems market capitalism, the second, monopoly
capitalism,

and

the

capitalism.

To

each

technological

third,
of

innovation.

multinational

these

corresponds

For the

first

or

postmodern

a

particular

it was

the

steam

engine and the revolutionary changes that it made possible in

41

Originally published in 1984, this essay is reprinted
in its entirety in Postmodernism, or,The Cultural Logic of
kate Capitalism (CLC).
•

42

Reed Way Dasenbrock, "Fredric Jameson and the Dilemmas

Of Late Marxism" (1992).
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the industrial world; for the second it was electricity that
enabled a qualitative departure from the classical period of
capitalist production--one which led to imperialism; for the
third it was the computer, which enabled capital to achieve
the sort of liquidity that made the whole world its back yard.
Jameson

claims

that

this

final,

postmodern,

phase

of

capitalism is the purest. In a sense it represents the destiny
of capitalism. 43
This is one of the points that I was attempting to make
in my discussion of Lyotard: that the postmodern condition is
a

highly

developed--if

not

quite

inevitable--stage

of

capitalism. This, once again, seems to square with Habermas'
analysis.

Reading Lyotard' s description of the postmodern

condition leads one almost immediately to the conclusion that
what postmodernity is about is economies. That is to say, the
postmodern world is a grand circulatory system in which sign
value is exchanged at the same pace, and on the same level, as
commodities. Or, to put this in Habermasian terms: We live in
a world that is steered by forces-- money and power--that have
systemic

lives

which

range

well

beyond

the

control

of

individuals or collectives of individuals. As such, the ideas
of autonomy and emancipation really are reduced to the nodal
politics

of

Lyotard's

Matrix.

For

Jameson,

who

remains

attached to the base/superstructure model of marxian fame,
43

For a useful summary of Jameson's Marxist approach to
postmodernism see Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, pp.
128-132.
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this is best explained in terms of ideologies of the market.
AS

such,

I

will

turn

to

the

chapter

in

CLC

titled

upostmodernism and the Market."
Jameson begins his discussion by identifying the market
as one of the great "ideologemes" of the modern period. It
represents a transcendental force that rescues us from our
futile attempts to order our own lives, rationally determine
our material wants and needs,

and corrects our tendencies

toward excessiveness by defining limits in terms of consumer
power.

Jameson's objective is to show how the market,

as

ideologeme, cannot be separated from the political-economy of
capitalism:
So also with the attempt to separate ideology and
reality; the ideology of the market is unfortunately not
some supplementary ideational or representational luxury
or embellishment that can be removed from the economic
problem and then sent over to some cultural or
superstructural morgue, to be dissected by specialists
over there. it is somehow generated by the thing itself,
as its objectively necessary afterimage; somehow both
dimensions must be registered together, in their identity
as well as their difference (CLC, p. 260).
His view is that the idea of the market lies at the very heart
of the possibilities for the radical transformation of society
(or in my terms a politics of enlightenment). Once we have
thoroughly

internalized the

idea

that

the

market

is

an

economic constant which reflects human nature we will have
effectively eliminated a whole range of other possibilities.
As one reads through Jameson's analysis--which is based
on section one of Marx's Grundrisse (to which I will return in
chapter III)--one begins to wonder what this has to do with
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postmodernity. He returns to this theme, however, precisely
where his argument concerning the idea of the market reaches
a point of transition. "The representational consequences of
a view like this will now lead us belatedly to pronounce the
word postmodernism for the first time" (CLC, p. 268-69). What
distinguishes the modern market from the postmodern market is
effectively a shift in pace and volume. In other words, it is
a classic case of a quantitative change becoming qualitative.
whereas the modern market was underpinned by a frugality-rooted in the protestant work ethic (which was both an ethic
of production and an ethic of contained consumption )--the
postmodern market

is

consumption

gone

berserk.

"We must

therefore posit another type of consumption: consumption of
the very process of consumption itself, above and beyond its
content and the immediate commercial products" (CLC, p. 276).
For Jameson this shift is rooted in the new technologies that
he identifies with multinational or postmodern capitalism:
electronic

technologies

such

as

computerized

information

systems and mass media. This meta-consumption can be explained
in terms of the evolution of modern market economies. In order
for

capitalism to work there

has

to

be

ever

increasing

consumption. Yet consumer needs are finite--you can only need
so much. As such, in order for the economy to continue to
operate, mechanisms need to be introduced so as to trump up
consumption.

Hence,

the

economy

becomes

dematerialized:

exchange for exchange sake. Without stating this in so many

130

words, what Jameson implies is that the postmodern market has
created a sort of consumptive ethos that has permeated to the
core of consciousness in advanced capitalist society. This is
not to say that meta-consumptive urges can be fulfilled under
these conditions. In fact, needs are never fulfilled: whether
one lives in abject poverty or in extravagant luxury.

The

market, Jameson seems to claim, has moved qualitatively from
the

base

of

modern

superstructure of

economics

po~tmodern

to

the

metaphysical

economies. This development must

be confronted if a pol1tics of enlightenment is to take shape.
"What is wanted is a great collective project in which an
active majority of the population participates, as something
belonging to it and constructed by its own energies.
setting of

social

literature

as

collective

project.

priorities--also

know

planning--would have
It

should

to

be

in

the

socialist

be part

clear,

The

of

such a

however,

that

virtually by definition the market cannot project at all"
( CLC I

p • 278 ) •

Normative vs. Descriptive Postmodernism:
Toward a Critical Theory of the Aftermath of Modernity
The focus of this chapter has been Habermas' account of
advanced capitalist societies.
thinking

from

Legitimation

.Q.ommunicative Action.

This

I

identified a shift in his

Crisis

shift,

to

The

Theory

in my estimation,

of

makes

important concessions to a certain type of postmodernism. A
good indication of this is the way in which he appropriates
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the language of "steering media." That his description is of
Q_ostmodern capitalism is testified to by the way that he shows
how money and power have become those media. The modern dream
of self-determination has been surpassed by the

systemic

imperatives that are at the heart of the capitalist mode of
production. The fact that Habermas has significantly toned
down the language of legitimacy in this more recent analysis
indicates that the notion of political legitimacy has come to
play a much smaller roll. This suggests that he is making
major concessions to the critique which started with Dialectic
of Enlightenment; It is conceptually incoherent to forecast a
legitimation crisis when illegitimacy has been internally
accepted.

This

analysis

is

augmented

by

Lyotard's

and

Jameson's. Lyotard, it could be claimed, has a micro-analysis
of steering media. While he wouldn't want to accept Habermas'
systematic totalization of the situation,

his own account

resonates strikingly with the notion that all of social life
is determined by systems of exchange. Jameson makes this point
more explicitly. His claims are more economic than political,
but in the final analysis so are Habermas'. He (Habermas)
shows quite conclusively--without any sophisticated economic
analysis--that a material base rooted in market economies
which are premised on the high speed exchange

(money)

of

commodities leads to the exchange of political power in a
similar fashion. What drops out of the analysis for all three
theorists

is

the notion of

collective agency under

such
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conditions. In each case some mechanism, or set of mechanisms,
have

kicked

in which

diminish

significantly

the

social,

political, and economic role of the modern subject. This, in
my

judgment,

adds

up to a

qualitative

change,

if

not

a

determinate rupture.
Does this mean, then, that we now live in a postmodern
world? Further, does it mean that we are beyond the point of
establishing movements aimed at collective emancipation? Both
of these questions depend to a certain extent on how we define
our terms. This is particularly the case with the former. As
such, I would like to conclude this chapter by distinguishing
more clearly between normative and descriptive postmodernism
and to show why I prefer to revise the terminological debate.
Let me begin with descriptive postmodernism. This side of
the distinction is relatively self-explanatory. A descriptive
postmodernist is one who characterizes various contemporary
scenarios as being postmodern without making value judgments
about that condition. Jameson falls easily into this category
as he explicitly claims that postmodernity is an advanced
phase of capitalism. I have also suggested that to a certain
extent Habermas

falls

into this

category.

His

is a more

difficult case as he would deny this at all cost. His reasons
for

this

denial

are

sound

as

for

him,

the

politics

of

enlightenment are bound up in normative structures that are
distinctly modern. As I indicated above, however, there are
key shifts in his analysis that place him closer to Lyotard
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than he himself would be comfortable with. This leads to an
empirical/normative

dualism

which

plays

itself

out

as

incompatibility. In other words (and as Jameson points out)
you can't wish for a modern politics of enlightenment if we
now live in a postmodern world.
Habermas' response to this would be that if we concede
the postmodern condition we can't talk about a politics of
enlightenment at all. Jameson equivocates on this question
while Lyotard seems to agree with Habermas and celebrates this
point of no return. As Christopher Norris puts it, Lyotard
propounds a "rock-bottom cynical outlook" (and in sighting
this I am agreeing with it). Citing a passage in which Lyotard
lampoons virtually all the ideals of modernity, Norris states
the following:
This passage is the center-piece of Lyotard's argument
that we have now lived on into a postmodern epoch when it
is no longer possible to attach any credence to those old
'meta-narrative' schemas (truth, enlightenment, progress
and so forth) which once lent support to such grandiose
ideas. Henceforth it can only be a matter of 'phrases in
dispute', piecemeal items of evidential witness which
claim no privileged epistemic status (much less any
access to the master-code of history), and which thus
submit themselves to the nominalist tribunal of isolated
facts, dates, or events. Any theory that attempts to do
more--to situate those facts within some larger, more
ambitious explanatory paradigrn--is ignoring the weight of
de facto evidence that composes the sad chronicle of
history to date. 44
Lyotard

fails,

however,

in

his

attempt

to

be

a

cool

positivist, simply laying out the facts. As I pointed out in

44

p. 7.

Christopher Norris, What's Wrong With Postmodernism,

134

my analysis of The Postmodern Condition Lyotard's vocabulary
is laced with terminology which celebrates the postmodern
condition that we find ourselves in. We have been liberated
from

myth

the

of

autonomy;

we

are

from

emancipated

the

responsibility to pursue our own destinies; we have matured
beyond

the

point

thinkable;
history.

and

that

we

universally

are

no

longer

valid

values

responsible

are

for

even

making

Lyotard doesn't simply describe postmodernity;

prescribes

it

formulation,

as

well.

Lyotard

In what might

is

a

straight

seem a

he

paradoxical

forwardly

normative

postmodernist. His description is an admonition to be resigned
to a world in which we are no longer expected to think and act
for ourselves and with others.
The cynicism of this, as Norris put it, is more blatantly
expressed in Lyotard' s

Just Gaming.

This text,

between Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud,
postmodern

version

of

Plato's

a dialogue

is supposed to be a

Republic.

It

is

a

playful

attempt to think through the question of justice in an age
that has no basis for distinguishing between legitimate and
illegitimate action.

The thesis is that in a

standardless

world we are limited to the expression of preferences.

In

their defense of this position they turn to Kant's Critique of
Judqment. 45 I won't rehearse the views that they articulate as
they are generally weakly defended and of no great interest to
~ As I indicated
in Chapter I, I believe this sort of
analysis distorts the potential that lies in a Kantian
political philosophy.
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critical social theory (unlike The Postmodern Condition and
1]1e Differend which I think are very important). Rather,

I

will turn to a passage that illustrates both the normative
status and moral and political vacuity of Lyotard's stance. He
states the following:
Yes, it is quite broadly a politics of capital, actually.
That is true. And I think that what interested me, was to
see it at work within capital, to make it appear in its
affirmative force. Except that, insofar as one is a
political thinker, one cannot do without justice. But the
question is: What is this horizon? Which horizon are we
determining? (JG, 90-91).
This

remark

is

prefaced

with

a

parenthetical

laugh

"(laughter)". It seems to be an attempt at irony. 'We used to
believe in the abolition of capitalism, the goals of 1968, but
now we are simply defending the status quo. Isn't it ironic?'
Lyotard realizes,

in a moment of self reflection, that his

postmodernism has brought him full circle. Since all of the
ideals

that

factor

into

a

theory

of

justice

have

been

obliterated, we are right back to square one: only better or
worse, depending on ones perspective. Better if the return to
capitalism, in its postmodern form, is the sign of maturity;
worse if it represents the lost hope that Kant identified with
maturation. Lyotard, while loathe to judge positively on this
issue,

seems

to

come

down

squarely

on

the

side

of

postmodernity, which as he seems to recognize is to advocate
what Jameson calls postmodern capitalism.
Having
distinction,

roughly

sketched

the

normative/descriptive

I would now like to problematize it.

Habermas
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seems concerned that to concede the descriptive point is to
border

on

accepting

the

normative

point.

Lyotard' s

irrepressible use of normative language seems to illustrate
this problem. Jameson makes the strongest effort to keep the
two separate but ultimately runs into similar problems.~ A
possible solution to this difficulty would be to dispense with
postmodernity as a

descriptive term and refigure it as

a

normative term. It is interesting to note that the first time
Habermas uses the term postmodern, in legitimation Crisis, he
does so with the intent of affirmatively expressing a possible
future. I don't think too much should be made of this in terms
of

attributing to

however,

quite

developing.

If,

Habermas

significant
as

I

claim,

postmodern
in

the

tendencies.

framework

the project of

that

It

is,
I

am

enlightenment

cannot be fulfilled in modern terms than it only stands to
reason that we should look toward something post-modern. What
is currently described as postmodernity holds some of the
answers; but as I have been trying to show, it culminates in
a cynical resignation to what is worst about modernity. As
such,

I prefer to call what is being characterized as the

postmodern condition, the aftermath of modernity: a phase in
the

evolution

of

modernity

that

is

qualitatively

distinguishable from early phases, but does not represent a
radical departure.
In defense of this terminological shift it is important
46

See the introduction to CLC.

137

to

note

once

postmodern.

again

the

reasons

for

labeling the present

The most sophisticated advocates of this view

point to important cultural, social and economic changes which
indicate the end of modernity.

It is not precisely an end,

however, but rather a slipping back and forth--into and out
of--modern forms

and conditions.

As

such,

the distinctive

feature of postmodernity is ultimately its fuzziness. This is
most obvious in modes of cultural expression; rather than the
clean detached radicalism of "high-modern" art, architecture,
prose and poetry, postmodern expressions integrate elements
from diffuse traditions while at the same time disintegrating
the

notion

that

they

comprise

a

totality.

Socially,

postmodernity is defined by crises in identity; gender roles,
racial

identities

and

sexual

orientation

have

all

become

question marks rather than handed down truths. Economically,
postmodernity is marked by radical liquidity; capital, in the
atmosphere

of

leverage

buyouts,

multi-national/multi-

dimensional conglomerates and maze like corporate structures,
has

in

a

sense

lost

its

determinateness

and

as

such

is

vulnerable to radical redistribution. These I take to be some
of the more positive aspects of the postmodern condition-those that afford important possibilities.
The

common

postmodernity

is

factor
the

in

each

emergence

of

of

these

radical

spheres

of

difference

and

conglomeration. I question, however, the authenticity of these
features.

In

the

cultural

sphere

they

seem

subjectively
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contrived; in the economic sphere they cloak and preserve the
very worst of modern capitalism (alienation and exploitation)
while

expunging that

which

is

desirable

(efficiency

and

productivity); in the social sphere they provide the framework
for a political myth which deflates contestation and reif ies
existing hegemonies. In fact then the conditions of advanced
capitalist societies are not postmodern at all. Rather they
represent the aftermath of modernity, or modernity in struggle
with itself: still modern but at a point where modernity runs
up against its own contradictions. At its best, postmodernity
is a projection--one which must be thought through in terms of
political

strategies that are appropriate to bringing it

about. Hence the need for a politics of enlightenment in the
aftermath of modernity.
As I indicated above, Habermas could possibly agree with
this up to a point. He certainly wants to deny that advanced
societies are postmodern. It is his view that all necessary
emancipatory structures have developed during modernity and
that this is where a poiitics of enlightenment must take its
heed. This, however, ignores the radical deformation of these
structures in their present state--a condition that Habermas
describes with piercing insight. In the following chapter I
will focus on the value structures of modernity and argue for
my claim that they are inextricably intertwined with the
capitalist mode of production.

CHAPTER 3
MODERN NORMATIVITY AND THE
UTOPIAN IDEALS OF DISCOURSE
In chapter one I examined the problem of enlightenment
from a conceptual point of view. In Chapter two I discussed
the same problem in sociological terms. In the present chapter
I

will

be

approaching

the

question

from

a

normative

perspective. The primary concern can be stated as follows: Do
the normative structures of modernity have a relationship to
enlightenment that is unambiguous enough to ground a politics
of enlightenment? I have suggested thus far that this is not
the case. Here I will undertake the task of providing a more
substantial defense of my position. In doing so I will begin
by examining Habermas' theory of language and communication.
This may, on the surface, seem odd; but for Habermas this is
the most important place to examine the pure normative content
of modernity. It is within the structures of modern languages
that we find the embedded moral content which provides us with
a

foundation

for

criticizing

the

aberrations

that

mark

advanced capitalist societies. My critique of this will take
as

its

point

of

departure

Marx's

analysis

of

bourgeois

categories such as freedom and truth in the Grundrisse and
will proceed to an analysis of Habermas' central categories:
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communication that enabled the rise of fascism? And, what are
the necessary conditions for a social structure premised on
discursive clarity? These questions lead Habermas deeply into
theories of language and communication. According to Thomas
McCarthy, this provides the foundation for his entire project:
"the theory of communicative competence is decidedly not a
theoretical luxury in the context of critical social theory;
it is a concerted effort to rethink the foundations of the
theory-practice problematic. The success or failure of this
effort cannot be a matter of indifference to a social theory
designed with a practical intent. As we shall see, Habermas'
argument is, simply, that the goal of critical theory--a form
of life free from unnecessary domination--is inherent in the
notion

of

truth;

communication.
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it

is

anticipated

in

every

act

of

This states the importance of language and

communication analyses for Habermas' formulation of critical
theory.

In

the

following

section

I

will

discuss

the

development of his views on this topic, keeping in mind the
role

that

they

play

in

his

notion

of

a

politics

of

enlightenment.
Fred Dallmayr points out that while Habermas' work did
not take an abrupt "linguistic turn",

at a relatively well

defined point it became necessary for him to undertake a
careful study of language and communication theories. In 1970
two articles, "On Systematically Distorted Communication" and
2 Thomas McCarthy,

1978, p. 273.
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"Towards a Theory of Communicative Competency", appeared in
back to back issues of Inguiry which for the purposes of this
essay will serve as an introduction to Habermas' theories of
language

and

communication. 3

The

first

utilizes

Freudian

psychoanalytic methods to evaluate communication breakdown
caused by systemic linguistic discrepancies; the second draws
upon Chomsky's theory of generative linguistics, as well as
Austin's and Searle's speech-act theories, to substantiate the
view that in discourse, validity claims can be raised to the
levels of truth,

truthfulness

and rightness.

These essays

state the fundamental problem, and provide the framework for
a solution, that has guided Habermas' critical theory in the
70 's and 80 's.

I will here explicate their main features,

highlighting the themes that are developed more completely in
subsequent writings.
In

"On Systematically Distorted Communication"

( SDC),

Habermas identifies two types of communication irregularities:
the first he associates with psychosis--communicative behavior
that is

completely out of

synch with

social

reality;

the

second, which he labels "pseudo-communication", is a form of
communicative

neurosis,

causing

distortion

that

is

not

noticeable in the context of communicative practice. It is the
latter form of deviance that concerns Habermas as it has a
significant effect on everyday discourse. Pseudo-communication
is detectable only by a neutral observer who can then trace
3

See Fred Dallmayr, Language and Politics, pp. 123-125.
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distortion to an elemental point of crisis. Habermas uses the
Freudian analyst

as

a

model

for

the

evaluating communication patterns
criteria,
counsel

in

neutral
terms

of

observer.

By

established

the analyst can identify the problem and provide
that

will

contribute

communicative

behavior

deviances

eliminated. 4 Habermas

norms

of

These

are

are

such

to

communication that
instantiated

in

a

that

ensure

the

reconstruction

systematically
argues

language

embedded

that there

communicative
system

of

are

clarity.

shared by a

community of speakers. When the rules of the system aren't
adhered to, communicative practice will be distorted. Habermas
sµmmarizes as follows:
No matter on which level of communication the symptoms
appear, whether in linguistic expression, in behavioral
compulsion, or in the realm of gestures, one always finds
an
isolated content therein which
has
been excommunicated from the public-language performance. This
content expresses an intention which is incomprehensible
according to the rules of public communication, and
which, as such, has become private, although in such a
way that it remains inaccessible even to the author to
whom it must nevertheless be ascribed.
There is
communication obstruction in the self between the ego
which
is
capable
of
speech and participants
in
intersubjectively established language-games, and that
"inner foreign territory" (Freud), which is represented
by a private or primary linguistic symbolism (SDC, 2057) •

Habermas' intention is to use psychoanalysis as a model

4

Habermas cites three basic criteria for discerning
incomprehensibility in communicative practices:
1) rule
d~viation--either
syntactic
or
semantic;
2)
context
~isorientation--use
of
linguistic
gestures
that
are
i~appropriate to a given situation; 3) lack of congruency--a
disintegration in the coherence between linguistic symbols,
action and non-verbal gestures (SDC, 206-7).
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for

examining

communicative

distortion.

He

asserts

that

incomprehensible communicative practice is infected with a
sort of neurosis of the language system. This results in
semantic

incongruity,

causing

defective

meaning

representation. The process of tracing this back to a point of
critical breakage in the sequence of linguistic development is
analogous to the psychoanalyst's probing of the patients past
experiences in search of a crisis that will account for some
behavioral disorder. Like the psychoanalyst, the communication
analyst attempts to reconstruct the developmental process in
line with normative standards,

enabling the communication

participant to regain access to public discourse (SDC, 207-9).
The analyst must adopt a hermeneutical posture in order
to understand distorted communication. Semantic analyses are
sufficient for identifying the problem; in order to grasp its
nature,

however,

a

careful

explanation,

informed

by

a

scrupulous interrogation of contextual circumstances pertinent
to the instance of distortion, must be provided. "The What,
the

semantic

content

of

a

systematically

distorted

manifestation, cannot be 'understood' if it is not possible at
the

same time to

'explain'

the Why,

the origin of the

symptomatic scene with reference to the initial circumstances
which led to the systematic distortion itself" (SDC, p. 209).
This hermeneutic move has two phases: the context of a deviant
communication
completely

pattern

explain

must

the

be

point

understood
of

in

order

to

distortion;

once

an
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explanation has been provided it serves as

the basis for

understanding the operation of this communication pattern in
undistorted fashion. 5
Achieving a sufficient level of understanding requires
that the analyst go beyond standard hermeneutic approaches,
developing an interpretive strategy that is shaped by a set of
scientifically conceived theoretical propositions. Habermas
terms this "scenic understanding": an understanding premised
on the relationship between the original--where distortion
ernerges--and

the

transference

of

semantic

distortion

to

analogous scenes. The analyst uses the "everyday scene"--which
is based on normal communication--as a standard of measure.
Habermas

embraces

scenic

reasons:

first,

special mode of communication is opened

which

enables

distortion
analyst

a
the

understanding

analyst

to

for

penetrate

the

the

(the analyst/patient relationship);

has

a

is

pre-understanding that

already isolated distorted pattern.

following

contexts

of

second,

the

informed by

the

The former provides a

situation that enables the explication of distorted meaning
which

would

communication;

never
the

arise
latter

in

the

narrows

course
the

range

of
of

everyday
semantic

possibilities to a manageable number. These two features of
scenic understanding distinguish it from semantic analysis and
5

This view resembles G.H. von Wright's theory of the
relationship between understanding and explanation. For von
Wright, understanding must inform explanation; in turn,
explanation provides the framework for further understanding.
See Explanation and Understanding, Chapt III.
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standard hermeneutic understanding, neither of which has the
theoretical sophistication needed to sufficiently grasp the
situation in question (SDC, p. 208-9).
The theoretical basis of scenic understanding rests on
three propositions: 1) that we have a preconceived notion of
undistorted communication; 2) that distortion can be traced to
a

specific

symbolic

breakdown

organization;

in

and

the
3)

developmental
that

in

sequences

order

to

of

explain

communication distortion a theory of interactional patterns
and personality structures must be utilized (SDC, 209-10).
The first proposition is concerned with the structures of
normal communication. Non-distorted communication is coherent
at all of the three fundamental levels: language, action and
gesture. This model of coherence provides a meta-communication
standard against which deviant patterns can be evaluated. The
standard for the meta-system is established by the structure
that undergirds communication communities: a set of linguistic
rules

that

are

commonly

adhered

to.

For

Habermas,

the

important feature of the meta-system is its rootedness in a
shared

sense

of

meaning.

As

such,

normal

communication

provides for a plenitude of mutual understanding. This enables
participants to make fundamental distinctions (subject/object,
public/private, etc.) as there are commonly applied rules that
allow speakers to differentiate opposites. Further, shared
semantic rules allow clear references to be made, enabling
accurate and efficient object identification. Finally, speaker
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identity (ego, alter-ego and collective ego) is clarified in
terms of rules of intersubj ecti vi ty, facilitating intelligible
reciprocal discourse.

With such a system properly intact,

abstract concepts such as substance, causality and space and
time can be developed in a mutually comprehensible fashion
(this hints at Habermas' consensus theory of truth--SDC, pp.
210-12).
The second proposition is basically the antithesis of the
first.

Insofar as the analyst presupposes an "ideal speech

situation", 6 she/he must also assume a pre-linguistic, prerational

mode

communication

of

to

which

distorted

communicative behavior regresses. The theoretical model that
Habermas

adopts

is

"archaic

symbol-organization"--a

communication system based on "paleosymbols." "Paleosymbols do
not fit into a system of grammatical rules.

They are not

classified elements and do not appear in sentences which could
be transformed grammatically" (SDC, p. 212). Habermas places
emphasis on the fact that at this level there is no way to
systematically account for communicative structures. Rather
than being grounded in a set of internally coherent rules,
paleosymbolic communication is based on emotive gestures that
are

specific

to

immediate

contexts.

As

such,

making

differentiations necessary for communicative transference (to
6

Habermas doesn't use the phrase ideal speech situation
7n this essay. I will be discussing his conception of the
ideal conditions that he presumes undergird communicative
relations shortly, clarifying my usage of the phrase in the
present context.
.
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a broad range of contexts)
remains

private;

a

is impossible.

paleosymbolic

substantive public communication.

system

Semantic content
cannot

generate

"The distinction between

reality and appearance, between the public and private sphere
cannot be clearly differentiated with the help of paleosymbols
(adualism)" (SDC, p. 213).
Guided by this theoretical precept, the analyst can trace
communication disturbances

to

a

point

at which

primitive

symbolism infects the speakers linguistic system. Once this is
identified, the distorted system can be resymbolized such that
it falls in line with the reality represented in the metasystem.
On the basis of the analysts experience with neurotic
patients, we can, as has been shown, recognize the
function of psychoanalysis as language analysis, insofar
as it allows separated symbolic content, which lead to a
private narrowing of public communication,
to be
reintegrated into common linguistic usage (SDC, p. 214).
The objective is to "excommunicate" prelinguistic elements
that impinge upon the rational structures of shared linguistic
systems. These first two theoretical propositions articulate
the

ideal

presuppositions

that

ground

the

analytic-

reconstructive practice of scenic-understanding (SDC, p. 21415). 7
7

It should be quite clear that the paleosymbolic
intrusions that Habermas would have the analyst purge, and the
methodologies and meta-linguistic presuppositions that the
analyst
would
use,
are
symptoms
of
the
enlightened
rationalization of language that the authors of DOE indicted.
For Horkheimer and Adorno these fragments of non-rationalized
expression would represent emancipatory hope. This, for the
most part, is not the case for Habermas. His response to
•
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The

final

proposition

establishes

the

relationship

between psychoanalytic and communication theory. The Freudian
triad of personality dimensions

corresponds to the three

linguistic levels which concern Habermas: The Id corresponds
to disordered speech; the Ego corresponds to normal speech;
and the Super-ego corresponds to the meta-system. In summary,
"the

structural

model

which

Freud

introduced

as

the

categorical frame of meta-psychology can be reduced to a
theory of deviant communicative competence" (SOC, p. 216).
Habermas' objective can be understood more clearly by
taking into consideration the point I made earlier concerning
his interest in the role of propaganda in the rise of fascist
regimes.

Propaganda is the archetypical form of distorted

communication: it is monological, semantically inconsistent
and

appeals

to

emotions

rather

than

reason.

Insofar

as

language plays an important role in action coordination, a

Horkheimer and Adorno would be that they yearn for a primitive
reality that never existed. Habermas does, however, make this
curious comment: "There is however a third case: the processes
of the creative extension of language. In this case a genuine
integration is accomplished. The paleosyrnbolically fixed
meaning potential is then brought into the open and is there
made available for public communication. This tr an sf er of
semantic contents from the prelinguistic into the common stock
of language widens the scope of communicative action as it
diminishes that of unconsciously motivated action. The moment
of success in the case of creative language is a moment of
~mancipation"
(my emphasis). Habermas' recognition that
systemic deviance has emancipatory potential is an interesting
aspect of this essay that fails to re-emerge in subsequent
writings. While he would insist on inscribing this deviant
moment in the established system, he is willing to acknowledge
that a distortion of normativity can be productive. I will
return to this issue in chapter five.
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linguistic
corporate

system
action

premised
that

is

on

propaganda

unreflective,

will

lead

unpredictable

to
and

irrational. Given the obviously undesirable nature of such
activity, remedial action should be aimed at distortion in the
communication system(s). How this can best be accomplished is
an

entirely

different

matter.

The

approach

suggested

by

Habermas is problematic in several crucial respects.
First,

the

analogy

between

psychoanalysis

and

socialanalysis is weak. There are radical differences between
a patient on the analysts couch and an aggregate of subjects
that share a communication system.

How can a communication

community be interrogated in such a way that the corporate
soul is laid bare? Who is qualified to conduct the analysis?
To what degree is the analyst a

product of the distorted

communication patterns of the community? Habermas would argue
that the answer to all of these questions is located in the
social

scientific

psychoanalyst.

This

hermeneutic
simply

that

needs

is

to

be

applied
adapted

by

the

to

the

circumstances faced by a social analyst.
Another

important

objection

is

issued

in

by

this

response. The assumption fundamental to Freudian analysis is
that behavioral disorders can be linked to a traumatic moment
in the past. Once this moment is identified and brought to the
level of patient consciousness, the "cure" can begin to take
shape.

Disregarding

the

questions

that

can

be

raised

concerning this approach to psychoanalysis, the notion of an
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origin to which communicative distortion can be traced is
highly problematic. Language, and the formations it assumes in
communication,

is the product of a complex of historical

phenomena. To isolate a particular phenomenon, label it the
primary cause of distortion,
reshape

communication

and begin to therapeutically

from

this

point

of

original

transgression is a dubious task. The example that seems to be
in the back of Habermas' mind--communicative distortion in
Nazi Germany--is a case in point.

A

number of interwoven .and

overlapping phenomena facilitated the proliferation of fascist
propaganda. To isolate a point of origin in this causal mishmash would be difficult if not impossible.
Finally, the claim that a set of communicative rules can
be

used

as

a

standard

of

normalcy

is

problematic.

If

discursive practice is distorted, why would discourse rules be
any less distorted? This ties into the question raised in my
first objection concerning the relationship between the social
analyst and the "patient". If the analyst operates within the
same network of communication as the
necessary
analysis

if
will

there

is

reflect

to
the

be

any

"patient"

(which is

intelligibility),

distortions

that

permeate

then
the

communicative system. Habermas' assumption seems to be that
the analyst is enlightened above and beyond the average
participant; and that this illumination provides access to
ideal rules of communication.
distorted discursive rules,

If the analyst is bound by

the proposed remedy will only
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contribute to the existing predicament. Habermas would claim
that there are meta-systemic rules that can be grasped and
used as

standards

measured.

I

will

against which

discursive

indicate

problems

some

practices

with

this

are
view

shortly.
While this is not Habermas' most sophisticated version of
his theory of clear and distorted communication,

it does

contain several elements that figure prominently in later
formulations.

Specifically,

communicative form,

the

notion

of

an

originary

the claim that intersubjectivity has a

natural primacy over other discursive patterns and the use of
hermeneutic social science to grasp and repair problems. As
they stand, the objections I have raised are merely questions.
I will develop these more completely in terms of Habermas'
latest work in the final chapter of this book.
suffices

to

say

Communication"

is

that
a

"On

problematic,

Systematically
yet

For now it
Distorted

crucially important,

phase in the evolution of Habermas' theory of communicative
action.
The main tenets of this essay are drawn together with a
view to its sequel. Semantic analysis in general depends upon
a well

formed

notion

of

communicative

competence between

native speakers (participants in a communication community).
In

order

to

detect

and

remedy

distortion,

a

theoretical

understanding of communicative competence is essential. As
such,

this

essay

leads

directly

into

the

theory

of
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communicative competence.
rn "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence" ( TTCC) ,
Habermas moves out of Freudian psychoanalytic theory and into
chomskyan linguistics. His focus is on Chomsky's view that
linguistic

experience

knowledge;

is

disproportionate

to

linguistic

we know more than can be accounted for by our

experiences. Chomsky explains this in terms of the following
assumptions: 1) speakers rely on an abstract linguistic system
that is composed of generative rules; 2) this system of rules
is

innate;

3)

the

innate

structure

shapes

all

natural

languages (universally); and 4) specific instances of language
usage are a manifestation of deep linguistic structures that
surface through the application of transformation rules. The
competent speaker is one who has sufficiently mastered these
rules--derivatives of the innate linguistic mechanism (TTCC,

p. 360-1).
While

impressed

creativity,

with

Chomsky's

focus

speaker

the grammatical structures of language and the

asymmetry between experience and knowledge,
fault

on

in his

"monological"

Habermas finds

characterization of

linguistic

competence. The only model of intersubjectivity that can be
derived from this is mechanistic; shared meaning is merely a
function of similarities between the linguistic program of
speakers.

"Speech, the actual language behavior, would then

have to be explained as the result of interaction between
linguistic competence and certain psychological, as well as
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sociological,

peripheral

conditions

which

restrict

the

application of competence"

(TTCC, p. 362). This monological

model

accompanied by an a

of

communication

is

prioristic

semantic theory which neglects the "pragmatic dimension of
language

performance",

denying

the

potential

for

meaning

development in the context of reciprocal communication (TTCC,
361-2) .

Habermas attempts to counter these flaws by developing a
semantic theory that recognizes both a priori and a posteriori
universals. A priori universals provide the foundation for
interpretive

schemas.

A

posteriori

communicative

and

universals

contingent but apply trans-culturally.

are

The

difference between the two can be understood in terms of the
difference

between

intersubjectively

and

rnonologically

determined semantic structures. "Therefore, we differentiate
between semantic universals which precede all socialization
and semantic universals which are linked to the condition of
potential socialization (rnonological/intersubjective)" (TTCC,
p.

363).

This

universals:

theory

generates

dialogue-constituent

personal pronouns, imperatives,
etc;

four

cultural

universals

classes

universals

of

which

semantic
include

interrogatives, assertives,

which

include

organizational

signif iers such as words that designate kinship relations;
universal

cognitive

schemes

of

interpretation

such

as

substance,

causality and space and time; and universals of

perceptive and motivational constitution which are a function
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of basic drives--such as the sex drive, hunger and thirst--and
patterns

of

emotional

expression.

The

first

two

are

respectively intersubjective a priori and intersubjective a
posteriori;

the second two are respectively monological a

priori and monological a posteriori (TTCC, p. 363-4).
Habermas seeks to develop his theory of communicative
competence on the basis of intersubjective universals. While
Chomsky's monological universals have a valid function, their
theoretical usefulness is limited by an inability to go beyond
an

"elementaristic meaning-analysis"
all

excludes

complex

semantic

(TTCC,

p.

relations

365).

and

This

meaning

development. Speaker competency must be defined in terms of
situations

of

linguistic

application

that

depend

on

an

intersubjective linguistic structure.
This structure is generated neither by the monologically
mastered system of linguistic rules, nor by the extralinguistic conditions of its performance.
On the
contrary, in order to participate in normal discourse the
speaker must have at his disposal, in addition to his
linguistic competence, basic qualifications of speech and
symbolic interaction (role-behavior), which we may call
communicative competence. Thus communicative competence
means the mastery of an ideal speech situation (TTCC, p.
367).

In order to clarify this position,

Habermas

turns to the

speech-act theory of Austin.
Austin, in his analysis of the usage of performative
verbs,

draws

illocutionary
function

of

a

distinction

meaning.
the

Locutionary

propositional

illocutionary meaning

between

is

a

locutionary

meaning

content

combination

of
of

is
an

solely

and
a

expression;

propositional
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content

and

the

general

notion

of

a

speech

situation. 8

Habermas, following Austin, labels this "illocutionary force".
Any expression of illocutionary force depends upon an a priori
knowledge of the structures of intersubjective communication.
This,

for

Habermas,

establishes

the

existence

universal pragmatic power of utterances"

(TTCC,

of

"the

367).

The

theory of communicative competence must therefore be premised
on this notion of universal pragmatics (TTCC, pp. 366-7)
Habermas'

claim

is

that

at

the

foundation

of

any

linguistic utterance lies an intersubjective a priori semantic
I

structure

which

determined;
relations.

is

itself,

in

a

sense,

the speech situation is
This

is

not,

however,

linguistically

composed of reflexive

to

be understood

as

an

empirical generalization. Rather, in order to generate data
for empirical observation, "the structure of potential speech"
must be in place. "It is the dialogue-constitutive universals,
as we now prefer to say, that establish in the first place the
form

of

intersubjectivity

between

capable of mutual understanding"
then,

of

situation.
speaker

communicative
In

must

order
have

a

to

mastery

of

competent

speakers

(TTCC, p. 369). The basis,

competence
engage

any

in

is

the

ideal

communicative

intersubjective

speech

acts
a

the

priori

universals.

8

Two meaning constitutives supplement the semantic
structure of the propositional content of performative
utterances:
interactional
indicators
and
situational
determinants.
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utterances 9 (TTCC, pp. 369-71).
As
number

a
of

result

of this

symmetrical

analysis,

relations

Habermas

which exist

identifies
in the

a

ideal

speech situation.
Pure intersubjectivity is determined by a symmetrical
relation between I and You (We and You), I and He (We and
They). An unlimited interchangeability of dialogue roles
demands that no side be privileged in the performance of
these roles; pure intersubjectivity exists only when
there is complete symmetry in the distribution of
assertion and dispute, revelation and concealment,
prescription and conformity, among the partners of
communication (TTCC, p. 371).
Maintaining

these

symmetries

enables

subjects

to

reach

consensus through open ended discussion, provides for genuine
interpersonal rapport through honest self-representation and
facilitates the establishment of universalizable norms through
the

explication

symmetries,

of

common

Habermas

expectations.

contends,

are

correspondents of the ideas of truth,

the

These

three

linguistic

freedom and justice

(truth, truthfulness and rightness): truth in the sense that
propositional content is universally intelligible; freedom in
the

sense

that

there

is

genuine,

undisguised

self

representation between speaking subjects; and justice in the
sense that correct courses of action can be determined (TTCC,
PP. 371-2).

Habermas

acknowledges

that

pure

intersubjectivity

9

is

The significance of truth, truthfulness and rightness
It is a very
important scheme as it lies at the root of Habermas' normative
theory.

~ill be spelled out in greater detail shortly.
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unrealizable--that

the

ideal

speech

situation

cannot

be

established. Nevertheless, the achievement of communicative
competence

does

indicate

the

presence

of

these

ideal

structures in the communicative practices of speakers.
such,

a

As

competent speaker is able to conceptualize truth,

freedom

and

justice

independent

of

any

existing

socio-

poli tical system. The model of ideal speech also provides a
standard against which asymmetries that distort communication
can

be

measured.

With

this

addition

to

the

theory

of

systematically distorted communication, Habermas provides a
model

for

rehabilitating

communicative

abnormalities.

The

claim that intersubjectivity is a standard form (or normal),
however, is not defensible on these grounds. Language can be
applied

in

asymmetrical

discourse

just

as

readily

as

in

symmetrical contexts without deviating from meta-linguistic
rules.

For example:

the fact that the

system of personal

pronouns in a modern language allows for clear identification
of dialogue roles among participants does

not standardize

participatory equality. It is just as likely that participants
will

be

distinguished

in

terms

of

subordinate

and

superordinate roles.
My

point

is

that

given

the

competence that Habermas provides,

analysis
there

is

of
no

linguistic
reason to

accept the implicit (later to be made explicit) claim that
intersubjective communication is the natural end or telos of
linguistic practice. That language can be applied in a number
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of

discursive

contexts

conclusion

plausible
conclusion

the

or

numerous

draw.
of

of

the

purposes
this

need

way

that

a

more

Habermas'

distortion
to

patterns

is

were

identifying

discursive,

terms

If

would

deviances

communicative,
in

to

method

rehabilitating

analyzed

for

revised.

be

would

and

have

to

meta-systemic

be

rules

translate into discursive rules. This would allow the social
theorist to dispense with the notion of an original point of
distortion and concentrate on existing discursive practices
that promote deception, domination and injustice. In the case
of fascist propaganda,
form

of

the specific relations between this

communication and

the

intolerable practices

that

follow would be analyzed in terms of the discursive rules that
operate

in

specific

communicative

contexts.

The

ideal

situation could still serve as a standard of sorts. But not as
one that represents the core or original mode of language
usage. Habermas recognizes that these two essays represent a
rudimentary "first attempt to grasp communicative competence
in

terms

of

linguistic

theory"

( TTCC,

p.

3 7 2) .

In

the

remainder of this section I will discuss his efforts to build
upon the basic analysis and his attempt to insert it into the
main body of a critical social theory.
In
Habermas

"Towards
suggests

competence
universal

are

a

Theory

that

both

susceptible

terms.

In

order

of

Communicative

linguistic
to
to

rational

and

Competence",
communicative

reconstruction

reconstruct

in

communicative
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competence, careful attention must be paid to the universal
pragmatic foundations of the ideal speech situation which are
presupposed by all speakers in communication communities.
Habermas'

most

communicative

detailed

competence

is

attempt

at

found

"What

in

reconstructing
is

Universal

pragmatic?" (UP), a lengthy and extremely complex essay that
is

a

benchmark

in

the

development

of

his

theory

of

communication. In the following section I will discuss this
essay in terms of the way that it develops the ideas forwarded
in "On Systematically Distorted Communication" and "Towards a

Theory of Communicative Competence."
In "What is Universal Pragmatics?", Habermas focuses on
the validity basis of speech. "I shall develop the thesis that
anyone acting communicatively must, in performing any speech
action, raise universal validity claims and suppose that they
can be vindicated (or redeemed) " (UP, p.

2) •

In communication

that seeks understanding, the following validity claims are
unavoidably raised: 1) that the utterance is understandable;
2)

that the utterance has propositional content; 3) that the

speaker is representing his/her self authentically; and 4)
that

intersubjective

agreement

can

be

established.

Corresponding to these are four requirements: 1) that speech
is intelligible; 2) that the propositional content is true; 3)
that the speaker presents him/her self truthfully; and 4) that
rightness can be agreed upon by subjects. This is of course
essentially that

same

as

the

criteria

for

communicative
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competence (intelligibility is an embedded criterion in the
earlier account). The purpose of the present analysis is to
determine the way in which ambiguity infiltrates communication
and to provide a discursive model of rectification. Without
this, communication becomes strategic: that is, manipulative
and domineering. 10 In order to isolate the point at which
communication becomes opaque, Habermas contends, distinctions
must be established between the situation which allows for
validity

claims

to

be

raised,

the

actual

content

of

the

validity claims and the means by which validity claims are
redeemed (UP, pp. 2-4).
Habermas writes at some length on the similarities and
differences

between

the

universal

pragmatic

approach

and

competing analyses of language and communication. It is not
necessary here to go into these questions

in detail.

The

conclusion drawn is that speech-act theory is most compatible
with his project. As such, I will direct my discussion towards
his appropriation of Austin's work. 11
As

was

noted

in

the

previous

section,

Habermas

is

10

As I mentioned above, Habermas' acute awareness of the
potential for communicative practice to lapse into dominating
modes seems to be shaped by fascism. As such, grasping the
social-structural contexts that allow language to be abused in
the way that it was in fascist propaganda is crucial. This is
why Habermas insists on taking the pragmatic dimension of
communication so seriously.
11

For a useful summary of this see McCarthy's discussion
in The Critical Theory of Juergen Habermas, pp. 273-76, or
John Thompson's essay, "Universal Pragmatics", in Habermas:
Critical Debates edited by Thompson and David Held.
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influenced by Chomsky's generative linguistics.

It was also

noted that he detected flaws in generative linguistics which
limited their usefulness for his theory.

In order to define

the object domain of universal pragmatics, linguistics (which
analyzes

sentences

in terms of grammatical rules) must be

supplemented with speech-act theory (which analyzes utterances
in terms of communicative rules). The domain of linguistics is
sentence

production;

the

domain

of

speech-act

theory

is

sentence utterance. Combined, they cover the four mandates of
communicative competence: comprehensibility (linguistics) and
truth, truthfulness and rightness (speech-act theory). Insofar
as it is speech-act theory that moves analysis closest to the
domain

of

utterances

intersubjective
rather

than

communication
sentences)

it

(by
will

focusing
.provide

on
a

theoretical point of departure (UP, 26-34). 12
Habermas identifies the following as the objective of
speech-act theory: "the principle task of speech-act theory is
to clarify the performative status of utterances" (UP, 34). As
was noted in section A-1., Austin's analysis of illocutionary
utterances proved useful for Habermas' theory of communicative
competence. His primary interest is not in the way that this
analysis characterizes utterances as always interrelational
(as

opposed

12

to

sentences

which

can

be

analyzed

in

the

Habermas goes into considerable detail about the
relationship between the mode and objective domain of
analysis. He provides a summary of this discussion in a chart
on page 33 of UP.
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abstract). Rather, Habermas is concerned with the generative
power of utterances,

which "consists in the fact that the

speaker, in performing a speech act, can influence a hearer in
such a

way that the

latter can take

up an interpersonal

relation with him" (UP, 35). At this level, speech act theory
can

enter

into

an

analysis

of

the

conditions

of

intersubjectivity or communicative action (UP, 34-40) 13
In
Habermas

"Towards

a

suggested

Theory
that

of

Communicative

the

a

priori

Competence"

structures

of

communication are already linguistic in that they represent a
set of reflexive relations. This, he now claims, is due to the
double structure of speech.

All speech acts have semantic

content on two levels: locutionary and illocutionary. At the
former level is propositional content that can be utilized in
any

number

of

speech

acts.

At

the

latter

level

is

intersubjective content which contributes to understanding in
a specific context of employment. Recognition of this double
semantic structure identifies a fundamental feature of natural
language:
natural
13

reflexivity.
language

rests

"Thus
in

the
the

peculiar
first

reflexivity

instance

on

of
the

Habermas identifies three basic types of action, all
of which fall under the general rubric of social action.
Symbolic action utilizes expressive modes that are incapable
of conveying propositional content (instrumental music or
dance).
Strategic action is action that is oriented
exclusively to the success of the speaker (generally
manipulative or domineering,
but not necessarily so).
Communicative action is action which strives for mutual
understanding (as modeled by the ideal speech situation). At
this point Habermas directs his analysis toward communicative
action.
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combination of a communication of content--eff ected in an
objectivating attitude--with a communication concerning the
relational aspect in which the content is to be understood-effected

in a

performative attitude"

(UP,

43).

As

such,

linguistic theories that attempt to abstractly analyze the way
that propositional content is transmitted are undercut; they
are incapable of accounting for the process of understanding
content.

In this light, Habermas def in es the direction of

universal pragmatic analysis.
As opposed to this, I consider the task of universal
pragmatics to be the rational reconstruction of the
double structure of speech. Taking Austin's theory of
speech acts as my point of departure, I would like now to
make this task more precise in relation to the problems
of meaning and validity (UP, 41-44).
Habermas begins by identifying the semantic categories of
universal pragmatics. Following Austin's distinction between
meaning ( locutionary) and force ( illocutionary), he delineates
pragmatic and linguistic meaning. Pragmatic meaning, that of
an utterance, is contingent and flexible; linguistic meaning,
that of a sentence,

is stable. The fundamental difference

between pragmatic and linguistic meaning can be characterized
as

the

difference

between

an

intersubjective

and

a

subject/object relation. In the former, meaning is shaped by
an illocutionary context while

in the

latter meaning is

determined by the relationship between component words and
sentence structure. Habermas considers his formulation to be
superior to Austin's in that it attributes semantic content to
contexts of employment. Any consistent theory of meaning must
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take this into account (UP, 44-50).
The

significance

of

the

transformation

of

Austin's

semantic distinction is demonstrated by the light it sheds on
the

relationship

between

communicative

modes

and

the

thematization of validity claims. Insofar as the distinction
between locutionary and illocutionary modes of communication
cannot be drawn on the basis of the difference between meaning
and force,

neither

can

it be

drawn

on the

basis

of

difference between constative and performative acts.

the

Under

this schema only locutionary acts can be evaluated as either
true or false; illocutionary acts are merely either happy or
unhappy. Austin came to realize this error and replaced the
class

of

locutionary

acts

with

"(a)

the

propositional

component contained in every explicit performative utterance,
(b)

a

special

class of

illocutionary acts that imply the

validity claim of truth--constative speech acts"

(UP,

50).

Austin understood the class of constative speech acts to be
unique in their ability to render universal validity claims.
Habermas, on the other hand, contends that this applies to the
whole range of speech acts:
It is easy to see the reason for this; the validity claim
of constative speech acts is presupposed in a certain way
by speech acts of every type. The meaning of the
propositional content mentioned in nonconstative speech
acts can be made explicit through transforming a sentence
of propositional content, "that p", into a propositional
sentence "p"; and the truth claim belongs essentially to
the meaning of the proposition thereby expressed. Truth
claims are thus a type of validity claim built into the
structure of possible speech in general. Truth is a
universal validity claim; its universality is reflected
in the double structure of speech (UP, p. 52).
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Truth

content

is

a

function

of

propositional

content;

propositional content is built into the semantic structure of
every speech act. Therefore, the truth claim embedded in the
meaning of all utterances enables the specific claim of an
utterance to be universalized (UP, 50-52).
Austin ultimately abandoned the constative/performative
distinction. Habermas, however, chooses to reconstruct it in
more

suitable

terms.

In

communication,

he

asserts,

participants engage one another on two distinct levels which
can

be

characterized

in

terms

of

intersubjective

and

propositional meaning. The former represents a predominately
interactional use of language while for the latter, language
usage is fundamentally cognitive. Depending on the context,
one or the other of these modes will be dominant. it appears
on

the

surface

that

the

nature

of

the

validity

claim

established in a given context will be shaped by the dominant
mode. This is in fact the case, but the difference, Habermas
claims, is Qne of degree, not of kind.
for

an

interactive

use

of

language

If the context calls
then

interpersonal

relations are thematized and validity is construed in terms of
rightness. The thematic difference determines which universal
aspect of

speech is

universalizable.
distinction,
that

he

By

emphasized,
retaining

not whether the claim is

the

constative/performative

albeit in highly revised form,
has

successfully

broadened

Habermas feels
the

range

of

universalizable validity claims, enriched the concept of truth
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and certified the notion of rightness. Comprehensibility is
presupposed in any mode of communication.

If a breakdown

occurs at this level a hermeneutic discourse is utilized in
order

to

establish

intelligibility.

The

fourth

speaker

mandate--truthfulness--is a function of expressive mode of
communication

and

is

thematized

in

terms

of

speaker

intentions. It also has universal implications insofar as it
plays a roll in all illocutionary acts (UP, 53-59).
The problems that I have alluded to thus far are to a
certain extent dealt with through the clarification of the
double

structure

of

speech

and

the

introduction

of

an

intersubjective semantic theory. These developments ground
communication in contexts of usage.

They don't,

however,

overcome my two main objections: the implicit claim that there
is an originary form of communication and that one particular
type of linguistic practice is in line with the purpose or
natural end of language usage. To suggest that because every
validity

claim

has

propositional

content

it

aspires

to

universality ignores the contextual embeddedness of patterns
of communication established by the intersubjective semantic
theory. And to claim that because meaning is formulated in
discursive
ignores

contexts

other

modes

it
of

is

grounded

in

communication

intersubjectivity
that

operate

in

discursive situations. Habermas' analysis is more advanced in
this version and seems to move in the direction of discourse
analysis. He nevertheless clings to the "universal" at the
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expense of the "pragmatic."
In the remainder of UP, Habermas attempts to ground his
analysis in a theory of rationality. This is dealt with more
effectively in subsequent work and will be addressed in the
following section. The significant contribution of this essay
is the detailed explication that it provides of the basic
notions outlined in TTCC.

It constructs a necessary bridge

between the early writings and The Theory of Communicative
Action.
At this point it is worth pausing for a moment to note
the amazing breadth of Habermas' social theory. Working under
the immediate influence of the revisionist marxism of the
Frankfurt school of critical theory, his studies span a range
that is bound by Vienna Circle positivism on one end and
French Poststructuralism on the other. His own philosophical
project

settles

in

somewhere between German philosophical

hermeneutics and Anglo-American speech act theory. Habermas'
work

in

the

80 's

draws

all

of

together into one magnum opus,
Action.

In

the

following

these

diverse

influences

The Theory of Communicative

section

I

will

discuss

the

development of his theory of language and communication in
this text. I will concentrate on the way that developments in
the present context lead into a theory of social action which
will be the main topic in the Chapter IV.
In the third major segment of The Theory of Communicative
Action

(TCA),

"Intermediate

Reflection:

Social

Action,
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purposive Activity and Communication", Habermas attempts to
articulate his analysis of linguistic communicative structures
to a normative theory of social action. Taking as his point of
departure

Weber's

theory

of

action

(TCA,

pp.

279-284),

Habermas develops a typology of action that is based on a
distinction between nonsocial and social action.
action

is

purely

instrumental;

its

only

Nonsocial

objective

is

to

achieve a desired consequence. 14 (For example, if I wanted a
window shut I would simply get up and shut it.) Social action
can be subdivided into two main categories: action oriented to
success and action oriented to reaching understanding. Success
oriented "strategic action" is based on what Horkheimer and
Adorno called "instrumental rationality" (see chapter I). It
aims at influencing rational agents in order to secure some
advantage
capitalist

for

the

uses

actor.

workers

(For
in

example,

order

to

the

secure

way

that

profit

a

for

her/himself.) Understanding oriented "communicative action" is
Habermas' primary concern:
By contrast, I shall speak of communicative action
whenever the actions of the agents involved are
coordinated not through egocentric calculations of
success but through acts of reaching understanding. In
communicative action participants are not primarily
oriented to their own individual successes; they pursue
their individual goals under the condition that they can
harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common
situation definitions. In this respect the negotiation of
14

Habermas
makes
the
point
that
nonsocial
or
"instrumental action" can play a role in social action.
"Instrumental actions can be connected with and subordinated
to social interactions of a different type--for example, as
the 'task elements' of social roles" (TCA, p. 285).

171

definitions of the situation is an essential element of
the
interpretive
accomplishments
required
for
communicative action (TCA, p. 286).
This can be pursued in terms of a theory of the rationality of
action informed by speech act theory.
Habermas begins by developing a schema that can be used
to determine whether an action is strategic or communicative.
Rather than depending on an analysis of psychological states,
this schema relies on knowledge of the structural foundations
of "reaching understanding.

1115

Understanding can be simply

defined as agreement between speakers. The process of reaching
understanding involves a rationally driven movement towards
consent with respect to the propositional content of an
utterance. Habermas stresses the point that understanding
cannot be imposed in any way; it must be mutually achieved.
This, for him, is "the inherent telos of human speech." In
order to def end this claim Habermas turns once again to speech
act theory (TCA, p. 286-88).
In addition to the original categories of locution and
illocution, a third category adopted from Austin, perlocution,
now enters into the analysis. A perlocutionary utterance is
one that brings about an effect or change in the world. These
effects can either be trivial or significant. Trivial effects
are merely unforeseen side effects of interaction; significant
effects
15

are

the

function

of

strategically

designed

This is an extremely important move for Habermas. He
does not want to work from the philosophical foundation of
subjectivity or abstract consciousness.
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interactional contexts. "The effects ensue whenever a speaker
with

acts

an

instrumentalizes

orientation
speech

acts

to

success

for

purposes

and
that

thereby
are

only

contingently related to the meaning of what is said" (TCA, p.
289). The relation between illocutionary and perlocutionary
acts, and communicative and strategic action should be clear.
As such,

distinguishing between illocution and perlocution

will contribute to the task of categorizing action (TCA, p.
288-90).
Habermas

proposes

the

following

set

of

criteria

for

drawing this distinction:
1. Illocutionary acts clearly aim to convey meaning
through reciprocal understanding while the aim of
perlocutionary acts is unclear and context dependent.
2.
Illocutionary success can be achieved without
achieving locutionary success while perlocutionary acts
must achieve locutionary success.
3. Illocutionary results are regulated by internal
meaning while perlocutionary results are regulated by
external meaning.
4. Successful illocutionary acts make intentions explicit
while successful perlocutionary acts leave intentions
unknown.
In

contrast

to

the

distinction

between

locutionary

and

illocutionary acts, the distinction between locutionary and
perlocutionary acts is not analytic. Perlocutionary acts are
structurally dependent upon illocutionary acts. If the speaker
cannot transmit meaning to the hearer, the effect will not
obtain.

This,

for

Habermas,

confirms

the

claim

that

communication is originally and essentially illocutionary.
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perlocutionary communication is an exploitative parasite (TCA,

P· 290-93).
The

basic

conditions

of

communicatively

coordinated

interaction include the utterance of a speech act by a speaker
and the reception and affirmation by a hearer. This grounds
the

speech act

in

an

interpersonal

relationship which

is

structured by propositional content, a speaker guarantee and
obligation on the part of the hearer (truth, truthfulness, and
rightness) .

The

speech act

can be

responded

to

on

three

levels: yes or no, accept or decline, and action in accordance
with

the

obligation

(truth,

truthfulness

and

rightness).

Insofar as semantic content is a function of the process of
understanding, the speech act has the authority to coordinate
interaction.

"The

effective for

pragmatic

level

of

agreement

coordination connects the

semantic

that

is

level of

understanding meaning with the empirical level of developing-in a manner dependent on the context--the accord relevant to
the sequel of action" 16 (TCA, pp. 294-300).
In order to raise this analysis to the level of validity
claims,

Habermas

imperatives

draws

a

distinction

and complex normative

between

imperatives.

The

simple
simple

imperative relies on the above stated conditions; the complex
normative imperative, which takes the form of a command or

16

Habermas defends this in terms of the universal
Pragmatic (or formal pragmatic as he calls it here) semantic
analysis. Insofar as there is little new development in this
context I will not discuss it any further.
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order, involves the additional conditions of an established
norm and institutionally based authority. Also, some threat of
sanction is generally included. Determining whether a validity
claim is raised with a simple imperative is relatively easy;
it

depends

on

understanding

whether
are

the

intact

conditions
in

the

of

interactional

specific

context

of

communication. In the case of a complex normative imperative,
whether or not a validity claim is raised depends on the
nature of its foundation. If it is based on rationality, can
be subjected to argumentation, and is accepted or rejected on
these grounds (as opposed to power motivated acquiescence),
then

in

fact

the

complex

normative

imperative

raises

a

validity claim (TCA, p. 300-305).
As I have noted, there are three criteria for determining
whether a

validity claim should be

redeemed or

rejected:

truth, truthfulness, and rightness. Habermas formulates this
in a number of ways and summarizes as follows: "the fact that
the intersubjective commonality of a communicatively achieved
agreement exists at the levels of normative accord,
propositional

knowledge,

and

mutual

trust

in

shared

subjective

sincerity can be explained in turn through the functions of
achieving

understanding

in

Illocutionary meaning is

the

language"
focal

point

( TCA,
for

p.

308) .

testing any

Validity claim as all speech acts have a cognitive, expressive
and regulative dimension.

The cognitive

content

indicates

something about the objective world; the expressive content
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indicates something about the speaker's internal or subjective
world;

and the

regulative

content

indicates what type of

action is legitimate in the social world.

Habermas 's main

claim is that by studying the structures of

language and

communication we can develop a method for categorizing the
different types of social actions and determining which of
these are legitimate (TCA, p. 306-310).
The

remaining

question

pertains

to

how

this

highly

idealized structure can be translated into the "real world".
Habermas suggests that a model for this can be developed by
connecting formal and empirical pragmatics. Doing so involves
adapting the

formal

analysis

basic

of

supplemented

with

conception
modes

of

in

a

number

communication

illocutionary

models

that

of

ways.

needs

to

account

The
be
for

culture-specific interpersonal communication. In addition to
a set of standard forms of speech acts a method for realizing
speech acts is required. The fact that the vast majority of
communicative practice does not plug neatly into a universal
pragmatic category is problematic. The scope of analysis has
to be broadened tremendously in order to accommodate the
complex

networks

of

communication

and overlap of

ideally

distinguished performative attitudes and their corresponding
"worlds." An operable model of planning, based on the concept
of

communicative

further

action,

consideration

must

needs

to

be
be

developed.
given

to

And

finally,

the

existing

networks of norms and background institutions. As such, the
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ideal speech situation is still an unrealizable abstraction;
and universal pragmatic distinctions break down when the ideal
meets the real (TCA, p. 328-330).
This is not to say that the formal pragmatic analysis is
without merit:
An empirical pragmatics without a formal-pragmatic point
of departure would not have the conceptual instruments
needed to recognize the rational basis of linguistic
communication in the confusing complexity of the everyday
scenes
observed.
It
is
only in
formal-pragmatic
investigations that we can secure for ourselves an idea
of reaching understanding that can guide empirical
analysis into particular problems--such as the linguistic
representation of different levels of reality, the
manifestation of communication pathologies, or the
development of decentered understanding of the world
( TCA, p . 3 31 ) •
The ideal model provides a

solid backdrop for identifying

communication related social problems
includes

virtually

all

social

(which

problems).

for

Habermas

It

likewise

establishes a rational foundation for what I consider to be
Habermas' primary objective: to develop a discursive theory of
social-political action that

is

premised on participatory

consensus. In short, then, what Habermas establishes--albeit
not unproblematically--is that there is a direct connection
between

normative

structures

and

patterns

of

language

usage. 17
In chapters IV and V I will concentrate on Habermas'
effort

17

to

develop

this

theory

into

a

politics

of

For a detailed account of the development of Habermas'
latest version of the theory of communicative action see David
Ingram (1987), chapter 3.
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enlightenment. In his efforts to do so, the gap between ideal
speech

and

narrowed.

communicative
Habermas

problems

situates

his

in

the

theory

real

of

world

language

is
and

communication within the context of the modern lifeworld (as
noted in chapter II). This establishes an historical context
for,

and

practical

application

of,

the

formal

normative

structures discussed in this section. The problems that I have
identified
theory.

are

While

likewise
in

the

carried

final

into

this

formulation

of

aspect
the

of

his

theory

of

communicative action (which I have just discussed) Habermas is
more

conscious

of

the

importance

of

actual

communicative

contexts, the difficulties that I have alluded to throughout
are heightened. Habermas states specifically that his theory
establishes

the

claim

that

all

language

usage

can

be

referenced to an "original mode" and that its natural end or
"telos"

is

intersubjectivity.

These

problems

will

factor

importantly into the remainder of my analysis in this chapter
and will

carry on

into

the

chapters

IV and

v. The most

significant development at this stage is the relationship that
Habermas has established between modern linguistic systems and
modern normativity. This is of crucial importance in that it
gives a historicist twist to universal ethical standards.

I

would like to twist the historicist point a bit more at this
time--moving it in the direction of classical marxism.

The

assumption that ethical standards and linguistic development
can emerge independent of concrete economic conditions strikes
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me as being mistaken. As such, in order to provide the basis
for my argument against this

I

will

take

a

short detour

through Jameson's analysis of Marx's Grundrisse.
A Marxist Interlude:
Modern Ideals and the Capitalist Mode of Production

In order for Habermas' normative positions to be viable
it is necessary that the standards of truth, truthfulness, and
rightness, or, alternately, truth, freedom and justice, can be
cleanly separated from the capitalist mode of production. As
we saw in chapter II, that mode of production has lead to the
distortion

of

values

and

the

reduction

of

communicative

interaction to the steering media of money and power.
attempt to make this separation is ingenious.

His

If, Habermas

surmises, we can show how modern modes of communication, are
inherently

dependent

established that,
capitalist

mode

on

these

qua values,
of

norms,

then

it

can

be

they are independent of the

production.

His

attempt

to

make

this

determination is enticing, if not ultimately compelling. Where
it fails, as I have indicated, is in its inability to contend
with the specific ways in which value structures are in fact
distorted

in

the

late modern

world.

As

I

put

it

above,

Habermas focuses too much on the formal and not enough on the
pragmatic. Another way to put this would be that Habermas'
theory of language and communication is excessively abstract.
In the following sections of this chapter I will argue this
point conceptually. In Chapter IV I will argue the same point
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This is precisely the case that I wish to make against
Habermas:

that

modern

norms

such

as

truth,

freedom,

and

justice, are figured in such a way that they cannot be cleanly
separated from the modern mode of production. This is not to
say that they are valueless;

in fact I will argue they are

invaluable. It is to claim, however, that if they

are to have

emancipatory content they need to be ref igured in terms of a
politics of enlightenment that is as independent of the modern
mode

of

production

as

possible.

This

is

to

say

that

a

normative appropriation of these values must be characterized
in terms of the aftermath of modernity--not as a defense of
modernity.
Returning briefly to Jameson and Marx,

I will cite a

passage from the Grundrisse to which Jameson appeals and then
show vis-a-vis Jameson's interpretation how this pertains to

my problem.
Exchange value, or, more precisely, the money system, is
indeed the system of freedom and equality, and what
disturbs
(the
Proudhonists)
in
the
more
recent
development of the system are disturbances immanent to
the system, i.e., the very realization of equality and
freedom, which turns out to be inequality and unfreedom.
It is an aspiration as pious as it is stupid to wish that
exchange value would not develop into capital, or that
labor which produces exchange value would not develop
into wage labor. What distinguishes these gentlemen from
the bourgeois apologists is, on the one hand, their
awareness of the contradictions inherent in the system,
and, on the other, their utopianism, manifest in their
failure to grasp the inevitable difference between the
real and the ideal shape of bourgeois society, and the
consequent desire to undertake the superfluous task of
changing the ideal expression itself back into reality,
whereas it is in fact merely the photographic image of
this reality (CLC, pp. 261-62--my emphasis).
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Jameson's analysis goes as follows:

what Marx is criticizing

is a sort of naive realism in the Proudhonist socialists. They

believe that the status of values such as freedom and equality
is to be found,

free of ambiguity, within the established

framework of bourgeois society.

While the reality of the

situation doesn't bear this out, all that needs to be done in
terms of concrete social change is to "improve the model and
make freedom and equality appear for real" (CLC, p. 262). This
sounds amazingly like Habermas' own account of the retrieval
of modern normativity. The question that I will approach in
the

concluding

section

of

this

chapter

concerns

whether

Jameson and Marx are right that the only way to realize these
ideals is to abolish them along with the reality that brings
them about. 18
The

issue

of

modern

normativity

is

addressed

most

directly by Habermas in lecture XII of The Philosophical
Discourse of Modernity (PDM). This discussion is situated by
his analyses of thinkers ranging from Nietzsche, to Horkheimer
and Adorno, to Foucault and Derrida. He distinguishes between
the "cryptonormativity" of, for instance, Foucault, and the

18

Jameson makes several direct references to Habermas in
this discussion. "They think (along with the Habermassians
today, perhaps) that the revolutionary ideals of the bourgeois
society--freedom and equality-- are properties of real
societies ... " His point, as is mine, seems to be that even
those on the more radical side of liberalism will always balk
at the idea of fundamentally transforming society. Habermas
has deemed it unrealistic to think that such change is
~ossible. This, Jameson would accord, is a simple case of
ideological deception.
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clear and distinct "normative content of modernity" to which
he appeals. In my discussion of this text I will flesh out the
position that I have been developing throughout this book:
that the normative content of modernity is at best ambivalent
and at worst in complicity with the very system that Habermas
denounces. And in line with my claim in Chapter II,
argue that Habermas'

I will

own assessment of late-modern society

provides some of the most convincing evidence in support of
this position.
Three thinkers and three methods of analysis that have
developed during the twilight of modernity are indicted by
Habermas as the greatest threats to modern normativity: Adorno
and

negative

dialectics,

Derrida

and

deconstruction,

and

Foucault and genealogy. Insofar as each defies the boundaries
that separate the constitutive discourses of modern knowledge
production,

without

acknowledging

any

debt

to

pre-modern

tradition (such as the neo-conservatives have done), they are
left without an analytic base. "They cannot be unequivocally
classified with either philosophy or science, with moral and
legal theory, or with literature and art. At the same time,
they resist any return to forms of religious thought, whether
dogmatic or heretical"

(PDM, p.

336).

In other words, they

subscribe to no standards--making up the rules as they go
along

and

monitoring their

development

only

in

terms

of

analytic efficacy. This, Habermas would maintain, along with
their characteristically flamboyant rhetoric, has earned them
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a following analogous to the patronage of outrageous lateroodern art: obscurity provides a shelter from the demands for
normative justification.
In their
"anarchists"

haste to
have

suspended

rationality--which
nevertheless
aptly

condemn modernity the

while

by

primary

dangerous

modern

when

The two abuses

inexpendable.

analyzed

the

above

the

instrumentalism and totalism;

late-modern
virtue--

misused,

is

of rationality,

mentioned

critics,

are

the critique of instrumental

reason was most adamantly pursued by Adorno while the critique
of totalistic reason was and is the pet project of Derrida.
Foucault,

it

genealogical

could

be

studies

said,

of

combines

discourse

the

two

formations

in

and

his
power

relations. Habermas wouldn't deny the value of these critiques
as he too is a

critic of modern forms

of reason.

His is

distinguished from the others, however, as it points to an
alternative form of reason--communicative rationality--that
while rooted in the normative content of modernity is not
vulnerable to modern abuses. The others, he claims, revert to
irrationalism.
pronouncement

The
is

assumption·

that

the

above

that

undergirds

mentioned

critics

this
view

rationality as something that is inherently warped: that there
are no

good

forms

of

reason.

Hence,

as

the

opposite

of

rationality is irrationality, and these critics oppose reason
in totalistic fashion, they must be irrationalists.
It would be difficult to find conclusive evidence in the
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writings of these thinkers supporting the claim that they
advocate irrationalism. Habermas confuses their renunciation
of certain forms of rationality . with an all encompassing
"obliteration" of reason. He himself recognizes that the forms
under analysis are not the only possible manifestations of
reason.

What

he

fails

to

see

is

that

there

is

quite

conceivably more than one alternative and that forms

of

rationality have to be tailored to the historical (social,
economic, cultural, political) circumstances within which they
are developed. Habermas argues that communicative rationality
has

universal

applicability and

that

the

differentiated

structures of the modern lifeworld facilitate its development.
·I

will argue that while communicative rationality needs to be

one element in the complex normative structures that take
shape in the aftermath of modernity, it is not in and of
itself sufficient for supplanting a politics of enlightenment:
it is not sufficiently forceful to solicit changes in laternodern societies which will lead to the establishment of the
communicative society that Habermas tacitly advocates.

In

order to

is

grasp the

rational

for

Habermas'

claim it

necessary to observe the relationship that he identifies
between communicative reason and the cultural reserve that
gives rise to its production.
For

Habermas,

modern

lifeworld

differentiations

correspond to the components of speech-acts (as discussed
above) .

The cultural sphere corresponds to propositional
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content;

the

societal

sphere

corresponds

to

illocutionary

content; and the personal sphere corresponds to intentional
content. The structures of language and the structures of the
lifeworld are functionally interdependent.
Cultural reproduction ensures that (in the semantic
dimension) newly arising situations can be connected up
with existing conditions in the world; it secures the
continuity of tradition and a coherency of knowledge
sufficient for the consensus needs of everyday practice.
Social integration ensures that newly arising situations
(in the dimension of social space) can be connected up
with existing conditions in the world; it takes care of
the coordination of action by means of legitimately
regulated interpersonal relationships and lends constancy
to the identity of groups. Finally, the socialization of
members ensures that newly arising situations (in the
dimension of historical time) can be connected up with
existing world conditions; it secures the acquisition of
generalized capacities for action for future generations
and takes care of harmonizing individual life histories
and collective life forms. Thus, interpretive schemata
susceptible
of
consensus
(or
"valid
knowledge"),
legitimately ordered interpersonal relationships (or
"solidarities"), and capacities for interacting (or
"personal identities") are renewed in these three
processes of reproduction (PDM, p. 343-344).
This can be summarized as follows: the lifeworld serves as a
text

which

is

the

source

pool

for

the

three

linguistic

components that are thematized in speech acts (I will develop
this extensively in chapter V). The first ensures that there
is semantic consistency with respect to objects in the world:
so that when .I say dog you envision a creature with four legs
and a tail instead of one with wings and a beak. The second
provides

for

continuity between spheres

of action through

mutual understanding: we can make the transition from one mode
of collective activity to another. The third ensures that the
concept of .I that

is produced in the contexts of we will
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endure and develop from generation to generation.
Habermas

openly

acknowledges

that

this

is

an

idealization, one that must contend with masses of evidence
indicating that modern societies don't reproduce th ems elves in
this

manner.

The

following,

however,

is

the

important

question: Does this characterization of the modern lifeworld
have an actual correspondent in any form, and if so, how can
it be drawn upon to move in the direction of a society that
coordinates action through consensus?
Habermas argues that formally, everything is in place to
begin conducting social life on the basis of these lifeworld
differentiations.

Modernity

mythologically

legitimated

constituted

knowledge

as

appropriately
scientists).

empowered
There

is

no

longer

knowledge;
hinges

figures
also

personality development,

is

on

rather,

consensus

(such

greater

strapped

as

leeway

a

by

what

is

among

the

community
available

of
for

enabling increased individuality.

Finally, the idea of universal legal and moral structures has
developed,

providing

formal

protection

against

arbitrary

changes based on power shifts. Habermas attributes this to the
realization in lifeworld structures of the inherent qualities
of language which correspond to the essential values of truth,
freedom and justice.
Central to Habermas' argument is the notion that at no
time in the history of the West (or any other civilization)
has

there

been

so

much

potential

for

intersubjective
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communication. Truth, freedom and justice are defined in terms
of

democratic

oriented

equality,

public

hence

sphere

that

providing
could

produce

something similar to the "public will."
discursive will

formation

for

a
in

consensus
practice

"The procedures of

established in the

structurally

differentiated lif eworld are set up to secure the social bond
of all with all precisely through equal consideration of the
interests of each individual" (PDM, p. 346). Stating this in
more linguistic terms: the system of personal pronouns that
provides the referential basis of modern languages finds its
home in the modern lifeworld; insofar as there is potential
for direct interchange between "I" and "I" (ego and alter) the
establishment of a well conceived "we", one that reflects the
social, economic and political concerns of its referent, is
possible.

This

also

contributes

to

the

process

of

secularization as the power of discourse overrides that of
tradition.
The question that

I

would raise in light of this is

whether the power of modernity is located in either tradition
or discursive will formation. Certainly there has been a trend
away from traditional modes of justification (divine rights of
royalty or Papal primacy). But, has this in fact been replaced
with

a

rationally determined,

consensus

oriented

type

of

legitimation? Modern theory clearly moves in this direction;
and there is evidence that these theoretical developments have
been translated into constitutional discourses. My concern is
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whether

these

discourses

in

fact

contribute

to

the

establishment of consensus oriented polity or whether they
merely cloak the dominant modern practices that are justified
in between the

lines.

Do the modern

concepts of

justice,

freedom and truth have a conceptual foundation in democratic
equality or

in the steering media of the modern mode of

production--money and power (force)? If, as I will argue, the
latter is the case, then the normative content of modernity is
an

ambiguous

"pseudo-normativity."

The

dominant

normative

content, that which guides practices and serves implicitly as
the

justification for

those practices,

resides within the

motivational structures of the capitalist mode of production.
To state this explicitly, and in fairly conventional Marxist
terms: the normative foundation of modernity is not freedom,
truth and justice, in any universalistic sense; rather it is
these ideals,

conceived relative to production,

profit and

technical proficiency. The modern Enlightenment concepts of
freedom, justice and truth are simply traditional ideals (and
worthy ones at that) that are tailored to support the systemic
norms that certify modern activities. Further, as Horkheimer
and Adorno, Habermas, and Foucault have carefully detailed,
these activities take on a distinctly negative tone in the
late phases of modernity. 19
19

Since the question that I am addressing focuses on 20th
century capitalism I will concentrate on the problems of that
period. Both Foucault and Habermas (and more importantly Marx)
recognize that the forms of domination which have developed in
the
20th
century have- historical
antecedents.
Recent
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Habermas accounts for this by suggesting that rather than
operating within the boundaries of modern normativity, modern
practices have deviated from the normative standards to which
they are accountable. Consequently, three types of pathologies
develop in late modern societies: loss of meaning (a semantic
pathology), social anomie (an interpersonal pathology) and
personality disorders (a pathology of the individual). These
correspond to the structural differentiations of the modern
lifeworld (objective, social, and subjective). In effect what
Habermas

is

stating is

that

socio-political

developments

(grounded in the modern lifeworld) that distinguish modernity
from previous periods are susceptible to both enlightened or
pathological practices--that the problems of the late modern
period are in fact native to modernity. This, I would argue,
is do to the bi-level normativity of modernity. Rather than
accounting for the above mentioned "pathologies" as deviances,
I would suggest that the are actually in conformity with a
more pronounced, although less visibly expressed, normative
base. I will stress here that my argument rests on the notion
of two levels of normativity and the interplay that exists
between them; it is not my position that there is simply one
exclusively

dominant

level

(this

would

merely

reverse

Habermas' position).
As

I

noted

in

chapter

II,

Habermas'

most

recent

Phenomena, however, take on a distinctly different character
that can be linked to the way that capitalism has developed.
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assessment of late-modern society takes note of a bi-level
societal structure: system and lifeworld. He further notes
that increasingly the system infringes upon the lifeworld,
isolating it as a subsystem and squeezing from it the type of
communicative patterns that meet late-modern economic and
political

needs.

In

doing

so,

the

normative

content

is

marginalized; it is replaced with system imperatives that are
directed via steering media--money and power. By insisting on
a

rigid

system/lifeworld

distinction

(that

recognizes

normative content only in the lifeworld), Habermas can keep
intact his psycho-medicinal model for social change. If the
essence of normalcy is located in some all-but-lost socialpolitical foundation (one constructed under the auspices of an
emerging bourgeois society--see chapter IV), then in fact the
appropriate course of action is to bring this concept of
normalcy to the fore and measure socio-political practices
against it. By doing so, rampant late-modern pathologies can
be diagnosed and "cured."~ If, however, the system/lifeworld
distinction is questioned while the bi-level theory of society
is retained--focusing on the interplay between, rather than
the distinctiveness of the two levels--a new picture emerges
which calls for a different remedial strategy. AS I mentioned
20

I borrow the term "cure" from Bill Martin. See his "The
Enlightenment Talking Cure: Habermas, Legitimation Crisis and
the Recent Political Landscape". This is in fact a crucial
point as Habermas has consistently used medical terminology
(distortion, crisis, pathology) to describe flaws in the
modern system. This protects the much talked about, but rarely
exemplified, modern sense of normativity.
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above, the two levels that I am referring to both factor into
the normativity of modern society:

the explicit, but weak,

ideal dimension corresponds to Habermas' lifeworld while the
implicit, but more powerful dimension corresponds to Habermas'
system. 21

Characterized as

such,

rooting

efforts

to

bring

about social-political change in modern normativity will be
dubious. Doing so stands to solicit the recurrence of existing
problems.

I will now provide a defense of this position and

point to some further repercussions.
To begin,

it is

important to clarify what

I

mean by

normative. I use this term, as does Habermas, to refer to the
standards

against

which

practices are measured.

social,

economic,

and

political

If the bi-level or pseudo-normative

foundations of late-modernity are to be determined, then it is
necessary to consider the practices that are prevalent in late
modern society.

Insofar as Habermas provides an excellent

account of those practices I turn once again to his analysis.
Habermas

develops

his

critique

in

terms

of

the

communication theory that serves as the basis for his entire
system. Summarizing my earlier discussion: the central problem
~ I am using Habermas' language here for the sake of
expediency. I do not accept either the category of system or
lifeworld per se. I am particularly suspicious of Habermas'
notion of the lifeworld. His characterization of the lifeworld
lends itself to the interpretation that it is a pure, but lost
origin of modernity and as such his theory is suggestive of
return to an untainted past. If my position is valid the
entire idea of the isolated lifeworld is put into question. If
all the practices that are supposedly grounded in the modern
lifeworld are hypothetical, then what is left of the
foundation?
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of

late

modern

communication.

society

Human

is

the

interchange

lack
is

of

driven

substantive
by

economic

imperatives that are coordinated through the steering media
money and power. As a result, the system has overtaken almost
every sphere of human life. It has infiltrated the objective,
subjective and intersubjective worlds of modern individuals.
"The deformation of a lifeworld that is regulated, fragmented,
monitored, and looked after are surely more subtle than the
palpable forms of material exploitation and impoverishment;
but internalized social conflicts that have shifted from the
corporeal to the psychic are not therefore less destructive"
(PDM, p. 362--here Habermas exhibits still too much faith in
the welfare state). Habermas goes on to recognize Foucault as
the

master

analyst

of

this

phenomenon.

"The

legal-

administrative means of translating social-welfare programs
into action are not some passive, as it were, property less
medium.

They

are

connected,

rather,

with

a

praxis

that

involves isolation of facts, normalization, and surveillance,
the reifying and subjectivating violence that Foucault has
traced right down into the most delicate capillary tributaries
of

everyday

communication"

(PDM,

p.

362).

Clearly

such

practices are not in line with the principles of freedom,
truth, and justice unless these concepts are defined relative
to some other form of normativity: production, profit, and
technical power.
But are these flaws

the mark of failure or a

rather
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warped form of success? Do they deviate from or refine the
normativity of modernity? Habermas raises this question as
follows: "In the utopias painted in the old romances about the
state,

rational

s~iosis

forms

of

life

entered

into

a

deceptive

with the technological mastery of nature and the

~

ruthless mobilization of social labor power. This equation of
happiness and emancipation with power and production has been
a source of irritation for the self-understanding of modernity
from the start--and it has called forth two centuries of
criticism of modernity" (PDM, p. 366--my emphasis). My point
is this: given Habermas' own analysis of late modern society,
his recognition of the dominant modes of communication and
sociability, the normative content of modernity (as he clearly
points out) becomes questionable. Late modern problems such as
"isolation of facts,

normalization,

and surveillance,

the

reifying and subjectivating violence" may in fact correspond
to, rather than deviate from, the complex bi-level normativity
of the modern period. With these doubts about the modern
program on the table I will turn to my conceptual argument.
Freedom is not a concept that is unique to modernity. It
gains attention in almost every political theory from Plato to
Rawls.

The important questions that surround this concept

include: 1) What does it mean to be free? 2) To what extent
should freedom be limited? And 3), who should be free? In the
modern epoch the focus has been placed on the third question.
The official response has been: everyone. Habermas latches on
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to this aspect of modern freedom--the claim to universality.
This,

for him,

is representative of an implicit consensus

among modern individuals. While I would certainly not want to
deny

that

universal

freedom

has

been

a

focal

point

of

modernity, it is quite clear that universal freedom has not
been the norm. 22 Further,

the most pervasive forms of non-

freedom--the subjection of women, the incarceration of ethnic
minorities in ghettos and housing projects, the exploitation
of wage laborers, etc.--have been justified on the basis of
the formal concept of freedom,
abstraction,

that

is

native

with all its universalistic

to

modernity.

When

forms

of

"enslavement", such as I have mentioned, are pointed out, a
common response is
seems

to

reflect

Habermas'

(and I
the

say common here as common sense

sort

theory aspires) :

of
What

normative

ideals

to

which

prevents

people

in

these

situations from liberating themselves? They are not determined
by

law to

live

under

such

conditions

(this

is

the

more

sophisticated version of the 'Get a Job' argument).
These of course are the obvious cases; ones which I think
can

be

accounted

for

within

the

framework

of

modern

normativity via Habermas' "illness" model. The more difficult

22

An obvious example of this would be the explicit slave
labor of the 17th through 19th centuries in the United States,
What for all practical purposes was slave labor in both Europe
a~d the United States as industry developed, the "apartheid"
like setups that exist in most large urban areas in the United
States, and the type of "enslavement" referred to earlier in
this section that is less explicit--the type that Habermas
acknowledges Foucault as revealing.
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cases are those identified by Habermas only in his later work
(as mentioned above) and which have been the focal point of
Foucault's research since the late 50 's:

the use of power

strategies to permeate all spheres of human life for the sake
of achieving and maintaining a
w:-oductivity.
pedagogy,

This

activity

mental health,

distinctly modern

relies

upon

manufacturing,

form of

institutions

of

administrating and

rehabilitation. And, as Foucault has carefully pointed out,
all of these institutional practices have been justified on
the basis of humanistic values which repeatedly appeal to the
concept of universal freedom that Habermas considers to be
fundamental

to modernity.

points can be made:

In

light of

this

the

following

1) that Habermas is in agreement with

Foucault concerning these modern practices and quite openly
acknowledges that what they amount to is domination; 2) that
the rhetoric of freedom, as defined in the modern period (an
idealistic abstraction),

is deployed in the service of the

aforementioned practices of domination; and 3) that the real
justification for

these practices

(which

is

the way that

Habermas defines normativity) is a distinctly modern form of
productivity: one that produces not only material products but
also the various types of subjects that are needed to maintain
this productive mode. My suggestion is that given Habermas'
recognition of these practices in late modern societies it
becomes increasingly difficult to claim that the solution to
the unique forms of domination that prevail will be found in
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the ambiguous modern notion of freedom. The ideal of freedom
has been shaped to serve the norm of productivity. 23 This is
not to say that freedom isn't a modern norm in any sense;
rather, to the extent that freedom is normative, it is defined
and institutionalized relative to the norm of production.
The norm of productivity has endured during modernity,
and flourished during the late modernity, because the ideal of
freedom which was formulated in the early stages failed to
address explicitly the other two questions that are central to
conceptualizing a notion of freedom: What is the nature of
freedom and what sorts of limitations should be placed on free
activity? These questions were implicitly addressed within the
economic sphere, allowing the quest for productivity to shape
the modern concept of freedom and to use the explicit appeal
to universality in justification of practices that can (and
are by both Habermas and Foucault) be viewed as domination
rather than liberation. This being the case, it seems unlikely
that these problems can be solved on the basis of a clear and
distinct modern normativity, as modern normativity has neither
of these qualities.

Movement toward a

solution cannot be

retrogressive. Rather, in order to begin refiguring the ideal
of freedom, its rootedness in the modern norm of production

23

I want to be clear that I am not renouncing
Productivity per se (as does Bataille in some instances and as
Foucault has been accused of doing). I am opposing in this
context the types of production that are needed to maintain
consumerism: production that is grounded in the normative
concept of profit rather than justice.
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must be carefully analyzed.
The second important component of modern normativity, in
aabermas' account, is justice. This takes form in the modern
legal system. The modern system of law purportedly ascends to
universal standards of action that are rationally determined
(as opposed to being determined by some religious principle).
As was the case with freedom, the feature of the modern system
of law that appeals to Habermas is its universality: it is
supposed to be applicable across the range of individuals-recognizing no special cases or exceptions. By objectifying
these

principles

within

a

durable

legal

structure,

the

contingencies of shifting regimes and arbitrary manipulation
of law and order are eliminated. The central feature of this
system is a stable center of political power--some form of
republic--that

can administer

justice

independent

of

the

interests of particular administrators. Hence, equality before
the law is the slogan of modernity.
As was the case with freedom, modern theorists were not
the first to be interested in the concept of justice. Nor were
they the first to conceive of a universal law; the Romans also
had a notion of universal natural law that was rooted in the
common human capacity to reason. The assumption was that on
the basis of this common capacity, rationally determined law
receives tacit consent from all of humanity. It would not be
generally agreed, however, that Roman society was a paradigm
of

justice. A simple example would be that while in the
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abstract it was considered intolerable to maintain any form of
slavery, in actuality slavery was central to the Roman economy
and was justified by Roman law. As such, it would be safe to
say that this ideal was tenuously applied as a norm.
If

during

the

modern

epoch

the

ideal

principle

of

universal justice has been clearly raised to normative status,
then an analysis of practice should conf irrn this by showing
that deviations are in conflict with, not supported by, the
conception of justice that is distinctly modern. Practices
such as slavery (in the United States), exploitation of child
labor, sexual discrimination and cases of unfair treatment due
to race, gender, or lifestyle preference in courts of law,.can
be accounted for in this manner: as practices in exception to,
rather than legitimated by, the modern concept of justice.
These

are

not

conceptual

problems

but

rather

stern

from

residual biases that can be increasingly filtered out as "we"
become more enlightened.
The harder cases are those that prevail in the late
modern period (not that the others have gone away). These fall
into two general categories. The first concerns sectors of
society that regardless of legal ref orrn--both systemic and
individual--are not dealt with justly. I would include in this
'

category people that are homeless, a high percentage of single
parents, numerous ethnic minorities and the bulk of working
women

(where average salaries are consistently lower than

men's

with comparable training).

These are problems

that
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Habermas

associates

with

the

welfare

state

in

"crisis":

incongruities that persist after legal adjustments have been
made to provide for greater amounts of social and economic
justice. There are no legal reasons why the aforementioned
groups cannot achieve social, economic and political status
equal to those from notably different circumstances. It is the
very fact that formal legal justice is achieved that movement
toward substantive justice is halted. The argument would once
again

be:

'What

is

prohibiting

them

from

changing

their

status? They simply need to show some initiative.' (This is of
course

not

Habermas'

argument. )

My

point

is

that

these

problems cannot be accounted for as deviations from modern
standards

of

justice;

rather,

they

are

supported

by

the

pseudo-norm of justice which is conceptualized relative to the
principle underpinning these practices. I will return to what
I consider this principle to be after discussing the second
category.
The second category concerns those aspects of the law
which provide advantage to sectors of the population that
possess a great deal of power.
laws

that

favor

the

I would include in this tax

affluent

(both

corporately

individually), criminal laws that almost encourage

and

(by virtue

of leniency) white collar crime, laws that allow for unsafe
levels

of

contaminants

to

be

put

into

the

environment

(legitimated on the grounds that it is necessary in order to
remain competitive), as well as putting unsafe additives into
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food products (naming only a few).

The fact that laws have

been enacted to deal with these problems (under the guise of
reform) serves to cloak the abusive practices which ensue. My
point once again is that the rhetoric of equality before the
law (justice)

complies with the principle that undergirds

these practices.
The

normative

principle

that

the

perpetuates

aforementioned practices is profit. From the very beginning of
the

modern

virtually

period
any

consequence.
offensive.

an

ethic

activity

When

stated

is
so

of

profit

has

justified

if

bluntly

this

been
profit
is

of

central:
is

the

course

Hence it is necessary to equate the pursuit of

profit with some principle of justice. This, I would argue, is
the principle of justice that have developed during the course
of modernity. When pressure for legitimation becomes intensive
(for instance during the civil rights movement in the United
States or during the student movements in both the United
States and Europe), adjustments are made that are formally
satisfying and have enough substance to quiet unrest.
don't,

however,

They

lead to the kind of social change that is

needed to eliminate the problem (witness the regressions of
the 80's and 90's). It could be argued that when justice comes
into conflict with the principle of profit,

the powerful

sectors of society that thrive on profit exercise their force
to preserve favored position. Habermas would in fact accept
this argument on the basis of his own analysis of modernity.
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He would contend that this deviates from a more genuine sense
of justice that is distinctly present in the modern lifeworld.

My position is that this "genuine" level of justice is not as
distinct as Habermas claims: that an analysis of late modern
practices reveals a conceptual interrelationship between the
Enlightenment

ideal

of

justice

and

the

profit

oriented

imperatives of capitalism. As such, movement toward a more
substantive form of justice shouldn't be in the direction of
a clear and distinct normativity that is already in place.
Rather, the task of theory is to reconfigure the notion of
justice

such that

it

is

independent of

the

sub-terranean

normative standard of profit.
The third component of modern normativity, in Habermas'
account, is truth. Truth is primarily the product of science
during the

modern period and

there

is

little

doubt

that

science has flourished. The question, however, is whether it
has been the quest for truth, or some other force, that has
driven modern science. Once again it is important to take note
of the fact that the modern sciences emerged at essentially
the same time as the modern economy. As a result, the pursuit
of truth has often been guided by production and profit in the
form of technical prowess. In the realm of the hard sciences,
theoretical research is funded on the basis of potential for
technical application.

The proliferation of truth in this

sphere has brought us to the point where we are dealing with
the greenhouse effect and mutually assured destruction (see
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Habermas' remarks on this in PDM, p. 366-67). In the realms of
the human sciences technologies have been developed to shape
subjects into individuals that are useful in the quest for
production

and

profit.

The

truth

of

social

scientific

discourses is measured in terms of their efficacy; if they do
the job, they are true. As a result we now have layer upon
layer of these discourses reforming the practices of modern
individual. Given this it can be argued that the dominant norm
in question is technique--truth conceptualized relative to
technical efficacy. I am not claiming that science has been
driven exclusively by technical motives. Nor am I claiming
that scientists are not motivated by the pursuit of truth.
Rather, my point is that given the type of truth that feeds
the modern "system", the norm that guides scientific research
(when viewed broadly) is indelibly linked to technique (at the
expense

of

research

that

might

produce

truths

actually more in line with enlightened ideals).
correct,

which

are

If this is

then returning to some untainted modern notion of

truth simply runs the risk of reinscribing the distortions
that are prevalent in modern sciences as currently practiced.
My claim is that the norm of truth

( lifeworld)

cannot be

separated from technical imperatives (system).
The arguments that I have presented are not incompatible
with Habermas' assessment of modernity nor his general theory
that

modern

society has

a

bi-level

structure.

They

are,

however, in opposition to Habermas' claim that the two levels
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of modern society (system and lifeworld) are distinct from one
another and that the lifeworld contains the last remaining
kernels of unperverted modern normativity. My position is that
the two levels of modern society both factor into modern
normativity and that the interplay between the two cloaks the
operational motivation of late modern practices. If Habermas'
view is

accepted,

enlightenment

must

a

theoretical
hark

back

model
to

the

of

a

pure

politics

of

normativity

conceptualized early in the modern period. The desire for an
unperverted primitive origin that can be tapped into and
applied in present conditions is exactly the sort of thing
that he accuses the critics of modernity of yearning for. His
claim is that they long for a pre-rational impulse, Dionysian
in tenor, that will liberate humanity from the oppression of
rationality. My point is that Habermas seems to be making a
similar move, with the exception that the origin he appeals to
is modern rationality prior to its capitalistic corruption: a
form of reason that was originally a product of the modern
lifeworld but which has been twisted into the service of
system imperatives. I have tried to show that the two are
inextricably intertwined and that a contemporary theory of a
politics of enlightenment should not yearn for the originary
pristini ty of enlightened (as opposed to corrupted) modernity.
While my argument here is not definitive, I hope that it
raises serious questions about the normative structure that is
at

the

base

of

Habermas'

model

for

a

politics

of
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enlightenment, or what we can infer concerning a politics of
enlightenment. The strength in his position is his ability to
link

normativity

competence.

This

with

modern

contextualizes

standards
his

of

position

communicative
historically

without succumbing to relativism. The theory of language and
communication, however, also serves as a weak link in that if,
as I have attempted to show, the norms of modernity--rooted in
the

lif eworld--cannot

be

separated
the

sharply

system--than

from

steering

imperatives--rooted

in

neither

can

communicative action.

In chapter IV I will continue to deal

with the first of these issues. In chapter V I will address
the latter.

CHAPTER 4
THE POLITICS OF ENLIGHTENMENT AND
THE AFTERMATH OF MODERNITY
At this ,point I feel it will be helpful to recapitulate
the

main

positions

that

I

have

developed

thus

far.

I

introduced the problem that I am concerned with in terms of
the

modern/postmodern

debate

that

Juergen

Habermas

has

participated in over the past 10 years. The purpose in using
this as my point of departure was to establish that this
debate

is

at

the

crux

of my

concern with a

politics

of

enlightenment. Typically the enlightenment/anti-enlightenment
split

has

located

thinkers

in

one

of

the

camps

of

the

modern/postmodern dichotomy. My suggestion is that this need
not be the case.
In chapter 1 I examined the historical development of the
concept of enlightenment from Kant through Horkheimer and
Adorno, to Foucault, Habermas and Derrida. In doing so I aimed
not so much at drawing particular conclusions, but rather to
suggest

some

of

the

possible

ways

that

the

concept

of

enlightenment could be elaborated.
In chapter II I turned to Habermas' theory of advanced
capitalist

societies.

Contained within

his

critique

is

a

strong defense of modernity: a modernity that he argues has
205
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been deformed by the steering media of advanced capitalism.
From there I

turned to a discussion of postmodernism that

focused on a distinction between normative and descriptive
postmodernism. My objective here was to show that one could
waiver

a

bit

on

the

modern/postmodern

question

without

hesitating with respect to the question of enlightenment. My
suggestion was that we consider referring to the contemporary
condition as the aftermath of modernity: a condition that is
inherently

unstable,

one

yet

that

is

fraught

with

possibilities.
In chapter III I turned to Habermas' theory of language
and communication. My aim here was to show how Habermas has
extracted a normative theory from his analysis of language and
discourse. Further, I showed how deeply tied this analysis is
to his understanding of the normative content of modernity.
Finally,

I

associates

argued
with

that

the

modernity

is

normative
not

as

content

cut

and

which
dry

as

he
he

sometimes holds it to be. This advances the theme that I have
been developing concerning the relationship between modernity
and enlightenment.
In developing the three central points that constitute my
analysis of Habermas--the concept of enlightenment, the status
of advanced capitalist societies, and the normative content
that is basic to the modern condition--within the framework of
the

modern/postmodern

begins

to

take

shape

debate,

an

that

moves

interesting
toward

a

convergence
theoretical
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conception of a politics of enlightenment appropriate to the
aftermath

of

understand

modernity.

these

three

It

is,

strains

I

believe,

in

necessary

to

thought

as

Habermas'

providing the framework for a theoretical conception of a
politics

of

enlightenment.

possibilities

In

concerning

order

to

reflect

emancipation,

upon

the

participatory

government, self determination and community formation, these
three points must converge with one another. What Habermas has
achieved, I would argue, is a social theory that has as its
basic concern the question
possibilities

for

following chapter

a
I

'What lies within the realm of

politics

of

enlightenment?'

will attempt to address

directly and somewhat more concretely.

this

In

the

concern

In order to do so I

will return to the theory/practice problem that has always
been

central

to

critical

social

theory,

as

well

as

to

Habermas' earliest work which I believe suggests clearly what
he could mean by a politics of enlightenment. Further, I will
follow some of the recent literature that has concerned itself
with the political aspects of Habermas'
politically

significant

debates

in

work--focusing on

which

Habermas

has

participated. Finally, I will argue that while the terms of
these

debates

concerning
societal

are

quite

questions

of

transformation

modern

in

nature,

emancipation,
are

less

modernist politics of enlightenment.

other

issues

participation

amenable

to

and

Habermas'

This will provide the

groundwork for my reconceptualization of Habermas' theory of
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the lifeworld and discourse ethics in the concluding chapter.
Critical Theory and the Public Sphere
The recent translation into English of Habermas'

The

§_tructural Transformation of the Public Sphere has revived
interest amongst American critical theorist in the political
use and abuse of the idea of a public sphere of political
discourse

(or,

in

my

terms,

a

modernist

politics

of

enlightenment) that developed in the early modern period. As
Craig Calhoun points out:

"Habermas task ... is to develop a

critique of the category of bourgeois society showing both (1)
its

internal

tensions

and

the

factors

that

led

to

its

transformation and partial degeneration and (2) the element of
truth and emancipatory potential that it contained despite its
ideological misrepresentation and contradictions. " 1 My concern
here

will

be

to

discuss

Habermas'

analysis

in

terms

of

critical theory's focus on concrete political possibilities
and

to

ultimately

argue

that

this

is

unsuitable

for

a

theory/practice model that is legitimately concerned with the
conditions of the aftermath of modernity.
The development of critical social theory has as one of
its constitutive features a close relationship to contexts of
political action. During the early,
Frankfurt School,

the concerns of

formative, days of the
socialist and communist

party movements in Germany were a central issue of theoretical

1

Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 2.
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debate. 2 These concerns came to bear importantly on what might
be called the manifesto of critical theory: Max Horkheimer's
"Traditional and Critical Theory." In this essay Horkheimer
distinguishes between a type of theory that has dominated the
modern scene and an alternative type that breaks from this
mold. 3 "The traditional idea of theory is based on scientific
activity as carried on within the division of labor at a
particular stage in the latter's development. It corresponds
to the activity of the scholar which takes place alongside all
the other activities of a society but in no immediately clear
connection with them"

(TCT, p. 197). In contrast, critical

theory focuses on "a definite individual in his real relation
to other individuals and groups,
particular

class,

and

finally,

in his conflict with a
in

the

resultant

web

of

relationships with the social totality and with nature" (TCT,
p. 211). In other words, Horkheimer's distinction marks the
difference between theories that tacitly prop up the status
quo and those that call it radically into question.
In

is

not

altogether

clear,

however,

whether

this

formative feature of critical theory has had a lasting legacy.
Due to perceived weaknesses in the German leftist parties, a
2

For a useful discussion of this see part I of Helmut
Dubiel, Theory and Politics.
3

I would suggest that this essay looks to a theory of
the aftermath of modernity--a theory that can only develop
through a radical appropriation of modern thinkers such as
Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. The simple fact that
critical theory is so eclectic is in and of itself a sign that
it attempts to move beyond modernism.
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coming to awareness of the logic of Soviet communism, and a
profound experience of the totalizing effects of European
fascism, the work of Horkheimer and Adorno, and to a certain
extent Marcuse, began to move away from the theory-practice
nexus that they inherited from Marxism. 4 While critical theory
did not return to more traditional approaches. the shift in
emphasis indicates a recognition that what it means to be
critical is more ambiguously related to concrete political
struggles than was previously suspected. Adorno, for example,
denied the possibility of an identity relationship between

4

For a general discussion of this see David Held,
Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas, pp.
29-39. Susan Buck-Morss also makes this point, although hers
is directed more at Adorno. She goes so far as to claim that
Adorno never was invested in the proletariat. "Whereas Jay
(Martin) has written of the Frankfurt Institute in general and
Horkheimer in particular that they reluctantly gave up belief
in the revolutionary power of the proletariat only after
Hitler's consolidation of power and still not fully until the
outbreak of World War II, it is impossible to document such a
gradual disillusionment in the case of Adorno. This does not
necessarily prove that Adorno never place his hope in the
proletariat. What it does indicate is that he refused to
incorporate this class within the foundation of his theory, to
allow theory's validity to be in any way dependent upon the
existence of a collective revolutionary subject or the
possibility of its direct application to political praxis"
(The Origin of Negative Dialectics, pp. 24-5). Kathlene
League, in "Adorno: No Sell Out," takes strong exception with
those who claim that Adorno is a cynical quietist. Her
response to this position, which is rooted in a careful
analysis of Aesthetic Theory, is that the emancipation of
oppressed peoples has always been at the heart of Adorno's
work and comes to fruition in his theory of art. My own
position is somewhere between these poles. The question for me
is whether there is emancipatory potential in the later works
of first generation critical theorists. While I want to answer
that question affirmatively I think it is necessary to
establish linkages between there work and that of the more
explicitly emancipation oriented Habermas.
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theory and practice. 5 This is not to say that critical theory
began

to

ignore

altogether

concrete

political

movements;

Marcuse, for example was a major source of inspiration for the
student movement in the 60's. Rather, the point is that this
connection came to be problematized in such a way that theory
seemed to take priority over practice.
Habermas' work developed under the influence of these
important
attempts

considerations.
to

rethink

the

There

is

a

sense

relationship

between

in

which

theory

he
and

practice: not by returning to the original Frankfurt program,
but rather by reconsidering the ideological constraints placed
on science as well as the potential for change in advanced
capitalist

societies. 6

Habermas

frames

between theory and practice as follows:

the

relationship

"On the one hand, it

(theory) investigates the constitutive historical complex of
the constellation of self interests, to which the theory still
belongs across and beyond its acts of insight. On the other
hand, it studies the historical interconnections of action, in

5

For an interesting discussion of this see Fredric
Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or the Persistence of the
Dialectic, pp. 1-12, and pp. 15-24. Adorno dealt with this
problem most directly in Negative Dialectics.
6

If The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
is an example of such an effort--which I think it is--it is
not one that met with the approval of the first generation
Frankfurt School higher ups. Habermas submitted this work to
Horkheimer and Adorno as his Habilitationschrift. They
rejected it on the grounds that it was not critical enough of
the enlightenment tradition of democracy and to radically
attached to the idea of egalitarianism. For a discussion of
this see Calhoun, p. 4.
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which theory, as action-oriented, can intervene" (Theory and
gJ"actice, p. 2). His attempts to comply with this imperative
involve "extended reflections on the nature of cognition, the
structure of social inquiry, the normative basis of social
interaction, and the political, economic, and sociocultural
tendencies of the age"

( TP,

p.

).

Theory must be directly

linked to the aspirations of social actors concerned with
bringing about a world that will enable them to flourish as
autonomous individuals within the spheres of a community that
provides economic stability, cultural cohesiveness and social
solidarity. In other words, the theory/practice problematic is
about the theorizing of a politics of enlightenment.
While critics of Habermas have argued that his work has
back slid in the direction of what Horkheimer referred to as
"traditional theory", 7 there is a strong sense in which he has
brought

critical

theory

back

down

to

earth.

This

is

exemplified in his analyses of the student movement in the
sixties, as well as more recent work on neo-conservatism, the
Historikerstreit, and the collapse of Eastern block communism.

My concern here will focus on whether Habermas' work offer
analytic, as well as practical, insights that illuminate the
problems of contemporary political struggles.

The focus of

this analysis will be The Structural Transformation of the

7

See Nancy Fraser, "What's Critical About Critical
Theory", in Unruly Practices, pp. 113-143; and Michael Ryan,
Politics and Culture, pp. 27-45. Also see Bill Martin, Matrix
and Line, chapter III.
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£.!lblic Sphere.
spheres

are

I will concentrate on the way that public
constituted

and

whether

a

politics

of

enlightenment should work within established public spheres or
attempt to negate these spheres and constitute alternative
forums. This is a particularly important concern when there is
a pervasive 'end of history' sentiment occluding much of what
masquerades as public discourse. This, I will contend, is a
symptom of the aftermath of modernity, and one that must be
mitigated against in an enlightened social theory.
Critical theorists concerned with the theory/practice
issue outlined above have been most interested in Habermas'
work on the public sphere. 8 This interest makes perfect sense,
as a concern with the possibilities for radical democratic
social-political formation entails addressing the problem of
how public discourse comes to be constituted.

It is not

entirely clear whether Habermas' discussion of the public
sphere should be the source of inspiration or the object of
criticism in this context. His analysis has been characterized
as valorizing the liberal conception of democracy without

8

An entire volume of Social Text was devoted to this
topic. Also, a conference was held at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill that resulted in a volume entitled
Habermas and the Public Sphere. Both offer a broad range of
perspectives on Habermas' early work on the public sphere. The
latter includes an article by Habermas titled "Further
Reflections on the Public Sphere," as well as a transcribed
discussion between the conference participants and Habermas.
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being attentive enough to its exclusive character. 9 While this
is true, and will be discussed below, it is also the case that
Habermas attempts to get at what is radical about liberalism
and, in a sense, develop a normative perspective from which
liberal ideals can be used against liberal realities. Clearly
this was the issue at stake in chapter III.
more concrete setting,

I will, in this

take seriously Habermas' aim to pit

liberalism against liberalism while at the same time pointing
out some of the shortcomings of this approach.
While Habermas is,

to a certain extent,

ideologically

allied with liberalism in The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere,

his approach is clearly informed by Marxist

social science. His concern is to provide a careful account of
the economic factors that gave rise to the bourgeois public
sphere. In doing so, Habermas focuses on the way in which the
relative

opening up

·opening up of

forums

of
of

economic
rational

markets

necessitated

discourse

that were

the
in

principle accessible to all members of society. Initially this
impulse was prompted by the need for news that pertained to
expanded market relations. It was also necessary to establish
a vantage point from which attempts by the state to impinge
upon economic activity could be criticized and effectively

9

See in particular Geof Eley, "Nations, Publics and
Political Culture:
Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth
Century", Mary Ryan, "Gender and Public Access: Women's
Politics in Nineteenth-Century America, and Nancy Fraser,
"Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique
of Actually Existing Democracy."
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fended off. The objective was to develop forums within which
critical discussion could unfold with the intent of exerting
indirect

influence over governmental

policy.

These

forums

became informally instituted in the French salons, the German
table

societies,

and

the

English

coffee

houses.

Without

explicitly affirming this development, Habermas clearly feels
that

the

emergence

of

these

democratic

ideals

more

than

compensates for their flawed character in reality. 10
I want to highlight the point that Habermas extracts from
the socio-economic fundaments of liberal society a radical
dimension that has had considerable impact on the arousal of
a democratic consciousness in bourgeois society. While keeping
in mind (to a certain extent) that gender, social status, and
economic class could effectively exclude one from what was in
principle a participatory arena, he illuminates empirically a
dimension
10

of

early

modern

society

that

seems

to

have

In Habermas' recent reflections on the public sphere
he is more sensitive to the exclusionary character of the
ideal type of the bourgeois public sphere. He notes that the
"exclusion of the culturally and politically mobilized lower
strata entails a pluralization of the public sphere in the
very process of the emergence. Next to, and interlocked with,
the hegemonic public sphere, a plebeian one assumes shape"
("Further Reflections on the Public Sphere", p. 426). This, he
contends, has altered his understanding of the normative
theory that he extracts from the bourgeois public sphere,
moving him toward communication theory as the foundation for
modern normativity (FRPS, p. 442). This sort of foundation has
the benefit of being deeper, but it loses some of its critical
potential
in that
it becomes,
to a
certain extent,
dehistoricized. Then the question of how modern it is in fact
becomes more important. My own view is that the theory of
communicative action is a-historical and that modernity become
simply a conceptual, rather than historical, construct in
Habermas' theory.
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considerable normative importance. In other words, regardless
of the actual exclusiveness of the bourgeois public sphere,
"with the emergence of the diffuse public formed in the course
of the commercialization of the cultural production,
social

category arose"

(my

emphasis).

As

such,

a new

Habermas'

appeal to the egalitarian 'spirit' that played a key role in
the development of modern society has radical significance, in
spite of its exclusive constraints.
Habermas'

aim is to show how this democratic spirit,

which flourished in the 18th century, could have issued in a
new era of substantive democracy.

It was a forum in which

protest against government policy could be articulated,

as

well as a medium through which popular opinion could trickle
up. It is important to note that the market economies of the
17th and 18th centuries were not really capitalistic in the
strong

sense.

By

the

19th

century,

however,

full

scale

capitalism, complete with heavy industry and mass production,
began to dominate the urban landscape in most of Europe. This
development,
markedly

and

larger

contradictions

of

the

consequences

working
a

classes,

universal

that

obtained

rendered

sphere

of

for

the

explicit

the

discourse

being

dominated by a single economic class. Further, the economic
trauma experienced by the working classes, which ultimately
was neutralized through welfare state interventions, lead to
a different conception of publicness--one that resonated with
the mandates of post laissez faire capitalism.
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In order to defuse the politically volatile implications
of class conflict, the media through which public opinion is
shaped and disseminated had to be radically altered. On this
score Habermas' analysis is masterful. He demonstrates with
precision a twofold dynamic that effectively annuls public
debate. On the one hand, the bourgeois family is transformed
from

a

private

sphere

for

existential

essentialized domain that serves as a

retreat

to

an

"conduit for social

forces channeled into the conjugal family's inner space by way
of a public sphere that the mass media have transmogrified
into

a

sphere

of

cultural

consumption.

The

despecialized

province of interiority was hollowed out by the mass media; a
pseudo-public

sphere

of

a

no

patched together to create a

longer

literary public

sort of superficial

was

zone of

familiarity" (STP, p. 162) This, Habermas contends, leads to
an

ascetic

aversion

argumentation.

In

for

addition,

both
the

reading
media

and
form

political
is

itself

transformed by the mandates of commodity exchanged. "Today the
conversation itself is administered. Professional dialogues
from the podium, panel discussions, and round table shows--the
rational

debate

of

private

people

becomes

one

of

the

production numbers of the stars in radio and television,

a

salable package ready for the box office; it assumes commodity
form even at
Discussion,

'conferences' where anyone can 'participate.'
now

a

'business',

becomes

formalized;

the

Presentation of positions and counter-positions is bound to
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certain prearranged rules of the game; consensus about the
subject matter is made largely superfluous by that concerning
form" (STP, p. 164). As such, the free debate of the liberal
public sphere is shifted into management complexes which serve
to control critical appraisals of the system and to conform
behavior to the imperatives of welfare state capitalism.
Taking these points into account,
consider whether Habermas'
public

sphere

is

it is important to

interpretation of the bourgeois

acceptable.

Should

we,

with

Habermas,

interpret it radically--taking it seriously as a normative
feature of modern society, if not an empirical reality? Or,
should we view it as part and parcel of bourgeois ideology--a
sphere

that

supportive

was
of

from

a

the

outset

repressive

simply

economic

exclusive

mode?

These

and
are

essentially the questions that I addressed in the previous
chapter,

only

now

from

a

more

historically

informed

perspective. Once again, the primary issue is whether or not
the

normative

developments

that

Habermas

associates

with

modernity are separable from the economic developments that
also

factored

society.

These

prominently
questions

into
are

the

emergence

heightened

by

of

modern

the

direct

relationship that Habermas identifies between economic freedom
and the bourgeois public sphere. If we take the position that
the radical interpretation is correct, the deterioration of
this sphere can be viewed as a deviation from a core value of
modern society: a value which under altered socio-economic and
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political conditions could flourish. If we take the position
that

the

bourgeois

complicity

with

public

sphere

capitalism,

what

always

is

Habermas

already

in

describes

as

deterioration, and implicitly deviation, is nothing less than
the

outcome

of

the

fundamental

logic

of

an

inherently

exclusive public sphere. As should be clear from chapter III,
I lean strongly toward the latter interpretation, and will
attempt to

show how this

pertains

to

constituting public

spheres in atmospheres hostile to opposition. At the same time
I do not want to dismiss too quickly the normative importance
of

the

former

formulating

interpretation.

theories

which

constituting public debate,

If

we

are

illuminate

interested

the

problem

in
of

we need to take seriously the

models that are at our disposal.
This

interpretive

importance.

debate

has

more

than

theoretical

While it is true that the public sphere is a

social-theoretic concept, and its status as a concept doesn't
have

a

great

deal

to

do

with

contemporary

political

situations, it is also part of the world view (web of ideas)
that

underpins

most Western

societies

(this

is

precisely

Habermas' point about the modern lifeworld). Evidence to this
effect is presented in the constant appeal to public debate
when

controversial

issues

arise

concerning

governmental

policies and action. What is important about these appeals is
that their referent is the same idealized conception to which
Habermas appeals. I will later discuss more directly the way
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that the rhetoric of public debate stifles real public debate.
At

present,

however,

interpretation as

I

will

focus

on

the

question

of

it pertains to the specific problem of

constituting oppositional public spheres.

If we can accept

Habermas'

analysis

interpretation

the

following

can

be

developed: the public sphere in late-capitalist societies has
been thoroughly deformed--to the point that what it means to
have public debate has all but evacuated the consciousness of
the general populous or the average citizen. What we have in
place of public debate is media saturation, which is directly
linked to the steering media that Habermas identifies with the
system.

What

instantiated

was

once

a

imperfectly,

vibrant
has

been

living

idea,

undermined

albeit
by

the

imperatives that drive advanced capitalist societies: money
and power. As such, the idea of public debate plays no roll in
the decision making processes that shape institutionally based
political practices.
This seems a plausible enough interpretation.

Yet it

strikes me as one that fails to take seriously the evolution
and transformation of the idea of public debate--not as an
empirical reality but as an idea--an element of a world view-that is malleable enough to be put to ends that run completely
counter to its original intent. Following the more skeptical
interpretation, I will focus on the exclusive character of the
public sphere rather than its principle of openness. Critics
of

Habermas'

interpretation

have

pointed

out

that

this
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idealization of the bourgeois public sphere is shot through
with

the

empirical

exclusions

that

were

instrumental

in

establishing the political hegemony of a specific group of
individuals.

Nancy

Fraser

summarizes

the

work

of

these

"revisionist historians" in her article "Rethinking the Public
sphere. " 11

She

points

out

how

the

work

of

Landes 12

Joan

illuminates the inherent gender biases that infiltrate the
bourgeois ideal of public discourse that Haberrnas privileges.
This

analysis

is

supported

and

arnplif ied

in

Geof

Eley' s

"Nations, Publics, and Political Culture." 13 He shows how the
ideal of public discourse was simply a devise for instituting
a new elite. Rather than a model to which we should appeal for
normative purposes,

"it was the arena, the training ground,

and eventually the power base of a stratum of bourgeois men
who were corning to see themselves as a 'universal class' and
preparing to assert their fitness to govern"
Fraser summarizes the problem as follows:

(RPS, p.

60).

"Now, there is a

remarkable irony here, one that Haberrnas' account of the rise
of the public sphere fails fully to appreciate. A discourse of
publicity

touting

suspension of

rationality,

accessibility,

status

hierarchies

is

strategy of distinction. Of course,

11

and

the

itself deployed as
in and of itself,

a

this

Social Text, 25/26, (pp. 56-80).

12

Joan Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of
.t.he French Revolution, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
13

In Haberrnas and the Public Sphere.
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irony does not fatally compromise the discourse of publicity;
that discourses can be, indeed has been, differently deployed
in different circumstances and contexts. Nevertheless, it does
suggest that the relationship between publicity and status is
more

complex

deliberative

than
arena

Habermas
to

be

intimates,
a

space

that

where

declaring

extant

a

status

distinctions are bracketed and neutralized is not sufficient
to make it so" (RPS, p. 60).
With these observations in mind,

I

would suggest the

following interpretation of the bourgeois ideal of publicity:
Rather than fostering universal participation, the original
idea of the public sphere served to forge a locus of power
that

could be used to

conglomerate

influence and protect

economic interests. 14 The "talk" of publicness was simply a
devise that facilitated the pursuit of these ends. If this be
the case, it is reasonable to project that contemporary "talk"
about public debate is used in a

similar manner.

What is

interesting about this interpretation is that it indicates
that the

ideal

emerging in the
important role

of publicity which Habermas
17th and

18th century

identifies

as

actually plays

an

in contemporary discourse.

While Habermas'

normal/deviant model would suggest that most

contemporary

discussion departs from the bourgeois ideal, my interpretation
suggests that this ideal continues to guide the conglomeration

14

This is essentially the argument that I was presenting
concerning modern normativity in chapter III.
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of influence and protection of economic interest. My point is
that depending on how one reads the development of the idea of
the public sphere, and the uses that it is put to, the role
that

it

plays

significantly.
bearing

upon

debates,
and is

in

current

political

struggles

Rather than saying that the
the

real

with

respect

to

11

changes

ideal

current

11

has no

political

I would suggest that this ideal still has currency
used in manipulative ways that reflect it initial

exclusive character.
With
publicness,

Habermas

I

which

want

to

emerged,

argue
for

that

whatever

the

ideal

reasons,

of
in

conjunction with early modern society, should not be dismissed
out of hand, as seems to be the case with some of his critics.
Contra Habermas, however, I want to assert that rather than
being in need of a normative revival, this malleable ideal
needs to be reformed in such a way that it can be used to
undermine hegemonic public spheres.

I will return to this

later in the present chapter. Before doing so, however, I will
discuss

some of Habermas'

own attempts

important debates. These debates,

to participate in

I believe, illustrate the

sort of politics of enlightenment that his normative theory
gives rise to. My questions will concern whether this sort of
political action,

if

I

can use those terms,

really moves

toward the goal of emancipation that needs to be basic to a
critical social theory.
Juerqen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere
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The point that I have been leading up to in the first
section of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
Habermas'

work to be taken seriously as

a

For

project within

critical theory, there has to be a practical dimension that is
politically oriented, or, stated more strongly, politically
motivated.

If

he

foundation

for

a

is

strictly

critical

interested

theory of

in

providing

society--as

a

could be

inferred from my discussion in chapter III, then his own work
is only a useful tool for critical theorists, not a critical
theory itself.

I think it is quite clear that Habermas has

been, and probably remains, devoted to the idea of developing
a critical theory that stands on its own.

In order to do

justice to this intent, however, it is necessary to interpret
his recent work--such as the collection on discourse ethics-in light of the earlier work on the public sphere. This, at
any rate, is the approach that I would contend his various
projects dictate.
There has recently been several interesting monographs
and collections of essays that support my position.

I have

already discussed Calhoun's collection on the public sphere.
In

addition

to

this

a

volume

of

Habermas'

"political"

writings, The New Conservatism, appeared in 1991. Finally, two
books on Habermas, Robert C. Holub's Juergen Habermas: Critic

in the Public Sphere, 15 and Jane Braaten's Habermas' Critical

15

The title of this section is clearly borrowed from
Holub's book.
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.TJleory of Society, both deal at length with the politically
significant dimensions of Habermas' writings. Holub's book in
particular is relevant because he traces from early on in his
(Habermas')

career what I would call Habermas' politics of

enlightenment.

He

between Habermas'
the

theory

of

begins

by

laying

out

the

relationship

explicitly theoretical work--particularly

communicative

action--and

the

ideal

of

a

distortion free public sphere. Holub then shows how there has
always been a practical side to these ideals which Habermas
himself

has

exemplified

in

various

debates

that

he

has

participated in, including the positivist debate, the Gadamer
debate, debates with members of the new left student movement,
the debate with Niklas Luhmann, the debate over postmodernism,
and finally the debate with revisionist German historians. I
will take up the latter two of these debates in the present
section--discussing

each

in

terms

of

the

strengths

and

weaknesses afforded by the approach that Habermas utilizes in
tacitly propounding a politics of enlightenment.

This will

serve as preparation for my discussion of an important issue
in progressive american politics that Habermas'

approach--

unrnodified--has difficulty contending with.
My primary concern with

respect to the debates

that

Habermas has participated in will be the Historian's debate.
My emphasis on this particular debate is for two specific
reasons:

First,

I

think it

show Habermas--and what

I

am

calling his politics of enlightenment--at his best; second,
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the

case

can

be

made

that

this

debate

involves

a

very

interesting intersection between philosophy and politics that
sheds light on the so called postmodernism debate that I will
discuss

next.

The

texts

that

I

will

focus

on

in

this

discussion first appeared in English in the spring/summer 1988
volume

of

New German

Critique.

The

two

essays

that will

concern me here concentrate on the interpretation of Germany's
Nazi past and the impact it should have on national identity.
While the central aim of Habermas' analysis is to criticize
the neo-conservative political agenda that is in the backdrop
of the historiographical method at issue,

there is also a

subtle connection made between the work of the historians in
question and the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.
Habermas

has

conducted

careful

investigations

Elsewhere
of

the

relationship between Heidegger's affiliation with the National
Socialist movement and his philosophical work. His conclusion
is that the connection is intrinsic, and that those he has
influenced

should

be

viewed

with

suspicion

(hence

the

connection to postmodernism--particularly the philosophy of
Jacques Derrida). That a school of historiography swayed by
Heidegger aims at minimizing the significance of the worst
aspect of Nazism--the holocaust--seems to lend credence to
this view. My aim here will be to provide an analysis of the
relationship

between

Habermas'

critique

of

revisionist

historiography in Germany and his assessment of Heideggerian
philosophy; the two exhibit striking similarities in both form
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and content. This will serve to illustrate the concerns that
motivate Habermas' interventions into public debate as well as
the relationship these debates have to his overall theoretical
project. Once again,

the overall objective is to determine

whether it makes sense to claim that Habermas' theory contains
within it a politics of enlightenment, and if so, to establish
the basic principles and conditions by which it is grounded.
While I am interested in analyzing Habermas' work, not
the Historikerstreit per se, a few words on the latter are
needed to provide a context. According to John Torpey,
fundamental

issue at

Historikerstreit

is

stake in
the way

the debate

in which

the

surrounding the

contemporary German

national identity should be understood with respect to its
past: "The Historikerstreit, which is

in fact more political

than historiographical, is principally concerned with the way
in which the understanding of history shapes
popular discourse"
should

be

political

clear
agenda

(Torpey

from

this

attached

1988,

p.

passage,
to

the

contemporary

6--hereafter

HH).

there

specific

sought

is

a

after

As

self-

understanding--that of the German neo-conservative movement.
The central figures in the Historikerstreit don't attempt to
deny the holocaust; 16 rather, they seek to cast doubt on the
responsibility that Germany, as a nation, should bear for this

16

Most readers will recall such attempts by several
American revisionist historians in the early 1980 's. The
revisionists in Germany are nowhere near the fanatical
positions forwarded by this group.
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aspect of its past. Three basic strategies are employed: l)
questions are raised concerning the degree of atrocity;
efforts

are

made

to

reduce,

or

neutralize

the

2)

relative

significance of specifically German atrocities; and 3) aspects
of the German role in WW II that are more easily interpreted
positively are highlighted

(e.g.

the stand on the Eastern

front which is presented as action against "communism"--the
typical neo-conservative bogeyman). The net result, according
to critics such as Habermas,

is that the negative standard

against which constitutional Germany must continually measure
itself

is

effectively weakened.

This

in

turn

serves

the

interests of the German right wing.
In his contributions to the Historikerstreit, Habermas
suggests that the aim of the revisionists is to provide a
historical backdrop for the reinscription of Germany into
NATO. This takes the form of an abstract subsumption of the
past with the intent of establishing an unambiguous national
id entity.

In order to

achieve

such an

questionable moves have to take place.

objective,

several

Habermas notes the

following:
To start with, the memory of recent periods of history
which is a predominately negative one and which inhibits
identification has to be bulldozed clear; then, under the
sign of freedom or totalitarianism, the always virulent
fear of Bolshevism must be used to keep alive the correct
image of the enemy (Habermas 1988a, p. 27--hereafter
KSD).

As a scholarly exercise, historiographical practices of this
sort would be dubious enough. What concerns Habermas more,
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however, is the way that these positions have been publicly
disseminated.
Whoever has read Ernst Nolte's level-headed contribution
in the last issue of Die Zeit and has not been following
the emotional discussion in the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung must have the impression that the argument we are
involved in is about historical detail. In fact, it is
concerned with a political conversion of the revisionism
which has emerged in modern historiography and which has
been impatiently demanded by politicians of the "Wende"
government ... In the center of his deliberations stands
the question:
in which public consciousness? The
increasing distance in time, he asserts, makes a
"historicization" necessary--one way or another ( Habermas
1988b, p. 40--hereafter CPH).

In light of these observations, Habermas' objection to the
revisionists are directed at three aspects of their work: 1)
their attempt to minimize specifically Nazi war crimes; 2)
their attempt to solicit an uncritical appropriation of the
German past; and 3) their efforts to articulate the first and
second to a political agenda premised on national identity.
The

first

atrocities,

is

of

these,

the

accomplished

attempt
by

to

relativize

adopting

an

Nazi

intimate

hermeneutic perspective. Rather than assessing the events of
WW II in retrospect, the revisionist assumes the position of
participant. By doing so, the historian "wishes to put himself
in the position of the fighters of the period who are not yet
framed

and devalued by our retrospective

point of view of the courageous soldier,

knowledge"--"the
of the desperate

civilian population and also of the 'tried and tested' leading
Nazi functionaries" (KSD, p. 30). This generates empathy for
those who participated in activities which subsequently have
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been

condemned

as

criminal.

In

an

effort

to

reduce

the

significance of Nazi atrocities, and the impact that they have
on German national identity, this period in general, as well
as

the

specific

crimes

associated

with

it,

have

to

be

relativized. Nazism cannot be allowed to stand out as uniquely
abominable. "Its significance has to be leveled out (CPH, p.
46). Habermas' theoretical objection to this procedure notes
that a hermeneutic of empathy is impossible; we always view
the past in light of the present

( KSD,

p.

30) .

His more

concrete objection will be discussed below.
Habermas'

second major concern is the attempt by the

revisionists to encourage the German people to uncritically
appropriate
renewed

their

sense

of

past.

This

national

is

aimed

at

identity--one

establishing a
free

of

guilt.

Habermas finds this on one hand to be absurd and on the other
to be dangerous. Concerning the dangers, he points out that
there is a strong link between tradition and identity. When
tradition includes a period of institutionalized criminality,
then

this

too

has

to

factor

into

identity.

Only

under

conditions of preserving the memory of the victims, and with
that an awareness of the capacity for horrible actions, can
identity formation relate legitimately to tradition in the
Federal Republic. Without the glare of Auschwitz, there can be
no critical appropriation of tradition; any relationship to
the past will be a matter of blind faith (KSD, p. 43-46). It

is at this point that the concrete objections to the more
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abstract

matter

of

historiographical

procedure

become

important. By leveling Nazi atrocities to just another form of
human

revisionist

violence,

historiography

warps

the

relationship between tradition and identity. By encouraging
the public to internalize this perspective,
philosophy"

of

"the scurrilous

"nee-conservative modern historians"

enters

into the political arena. 17
Habermas'
activity

that

third

concern

should

be

is

with

the

restricted

to

politicizing of
the

scientific

reconstruction of the past. The political agenda is clear:
anti-communism

and

pro-NATO.

By

reducing

the

status

of

Auschwitz to that of just another unfortunate incident (and
one that most likely has been "exaggerated"), emphasizing the
anti-communist strain in National Socialism, and disseminating
this view of history publicly, the historian in the Federal
Republic

becomes

an

ideologue.

As

such,

Habermas

claims,

"knowledge" is used as a form of political power (CPH, p. 47).
These are the three main objections that Habermas levels
against the revisionist historians. A fourth, less explicit,
but as I will attempt to demonstrate rather significant, is
the connection drawn between this form of historiography and
Heideggerian philosophy.

17

I will now take up an analysis of

Habermas repeatedly refers to the revisionists as
"modern" historians. My guess would be that such remarks are
tongue in cheek and that what he really wants to convey is a
deviation from modern standards. This would further advance my
view that the Historikerstreit is as much a debate about
postmodernism as is the postmodernism debate itself.
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that connection.
Habermas makes two specific references to Heidegger in
the articles that I have been discussing. The first, in KSD,
pertains to Nolte's "philosophical historiography." Habermas
notes that Nolte is a "former student of Heidegger" and that
his

historiographical

theory

employs

a

"curious

use

of

Heidegger's concept of 'transcendence'" (KSD, 34). This notion
of

ontological

transcendence

provides

the

philosophical

foundation for the leveling effect that is central to the
revisionist project. Under such a schema, Fascism and Marxism
become similar responses to the failure of modernity. Hence,
the pragmatics of modern progress are cast aside and replaced
with a Heideggerian notion of identity. "In this dimension of
profundity

in which

understanding
directed

for

against

all

the
an

cats

are

grey,

anti-modernist

'unreserved

he

then

impulses

affirmation

of

solicits

which

are

practical

transcendence'" (KSD, p. 34-5). The second specific reference
to Heidegger is found in CPH. The concern here is not with
Heidegger's
rather

with

influence
the

on

effect

revisionist
of

historiography,

revisionism

on

the

way

but
that

Heidegger can be read.
As long as the appropriating eye of the late-born
observer is directed towards the ambivalence which
reveals themselves to him through the course of history
without personal merit, it will be impossible to make
even outstanding figures immune to the retroactive power
of corrupted historical reception. After 1945, we read
Carl Schmitt, Heidegger, Hans Freyer, and even Ernst
Juenger in a different way than before 1933 (CPH, p. 46).
At the same time, however, there is an implicit concern with
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the way that a Heideggerian notion of tradition gives rise to
an

historiographical,

rather

than

historical,

reading

of

figures from the Nazi era.
Several less explicit references to Heidegger are made in
the two articles. Habermas notes that the revisionists appeal
to

the

centrality

of

Germany,

both

geographically

and

otherwise, with respect to Europe in general; he labels the
revisionists anti-modernists; and he identifies an element of
nostalgia in their politics. More significant, however, is the
similarity

between

Habermas'

evaluation

of

historiography and his reading of Heidegger.

revisionist
I will argue

below that the former is premised on the latter.
The

same

revisionist
critique

historiography

of

Modernity

leveling tendency

Heidegger

departs.

He

in

is
The

notes

that

the

Habermas

point

from

Philosophical
that

detects
which

Discourse

Heidegger's

in
his
of

post-war

philosophy is rooted in an ontological presupposition: that
Being is the active 'agent' in history. The movement of Being
is reflected in the various metaphysical presentations of
Western

thought.

This

movement

comes

to

its

critical

culmination in the totalitarianism of the 20th century--a
function of subjectively grounded modern metaphysics. As such,
reason,

which

for

Heidegger

is

indelibly

bound

up

in

subjectivity, must be condemned as a form of thinking that is
inattentive to the call of Being. Habermas is concerned with
the way that this assessment reduces all modern cognition to
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what he would prefer to call "strategic rationality."
Heidegger hardly pays any attention to the difference
between reason and understanding, out of which Hegel
still wanted to develop the dialectic of enlightenment.
He can no longer gleam from self-consciousness any
reconciling dimension in addition to its authoritarian
aspect. It is Heidegger himself--and not the narrowminded
Enlightenment--that
levels
reason
to
the
understanding (PDM, p. 133).
no

Hence,

distinction

is

made

between

good

and

bad

rationality. Yet, Habermas claims, Heidegger remains indebted
to an obscure normativity that depends on some form of postmetaphysical reason (PDM, p. 131-134).
The task of the post-metaphysical thinker is to return to
the pre-metaphysical thought of antiquity in search for that
which was concealed by metaphysical bracketing. This involves
Being in its withdrawal: a feature of Being that is utterly
ignored

in

modern

philosophy.

According

to

Habermas,

Heidegger's ontological blinders prevent him from connecting
his

critique of metaphysics with the reality of

existence.

This

modernity,

including modern science. As such, any insights

from

the

follows

social

from

sciences

his

that

wholesale

everyday

might

rejection

supplement

of

his

historiographical critique are swept aside.

"To make this

claim of necessity,

of a special knowledge,

that is,

privileged

to

access

superficially,

Heidegger

truth
has

plausible,
to

level

the

even

if

of a
only

differentiated

developments of the sciences and philosophy after Hegel in
bewildering fashion" (PDM, p. 136).
This

clearly

indicates

that

Habermas'

concern

with
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leveling in revisionist historiography is likewise a point of
contention

with

Heideggerian

philosophy.

More

recently

Habermas has argued that this leveling tendency in Heidegger's
later writings serves as a mechanism for distancing himself
from his Nazi past. Had Heidegger seen fit to comment on the
crimes of Auschwitz, it is claimed, he would most likely have
reduced these events to a particularly unfortunate revealing
of Being in its final metaphysical hours. This in fact is how
he dealt with Nazism in general. The operation that enables
the revisionist historians to characterize the holocaust as
one among numerous manifestations of the current 'will to
power'

is

Heidegger.

already

well

developed

in

the

"That is how it was in 1945,

philosophy

of

and that is how

Heidegger always repeated it: abstraction by essentialization.
Under the leveling gaze of the philosopher of Being even the
extermination of the Jews seems merely an event equivalent to
many others. Annihilation of Jews, expulsion of Germans--they
amount to the same thing" (Habermas, 1989, p. 453--hereafter
WW).

Habermas'

evaluation of Heidegger's appropriation of

tradition is also a central feature of the critique sustained
in PDM. While it is not as obviously linked to his assessment
of the neo-conservative traditionalism of the revisionists, a
connection can definitely be made.

In recalling Habermas'

concerns in this context, two general points are worth noting:
1) that neo-conservatism uncritically embraces tradition in
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its entirety;

and 2)

in doing so

a

uniform tradition

is

created by selectively editing that which doesn't fall neatly
into the conceptual framework and political agenda that is at
stake. In his reading of Heidegger, Habermas identifies these
moves in reverse form: the metaphysical tradition is rejected
in wholesale fashion;

and in doing so,

key elements

that

enable this move are covertly retained. This aspect of his
thought became dominant at about the same time that Fascism
broke out in Germany. Habermas claims that during the early
days of the Nazi period, Heidegger began to mix philosophy and
ideology (WW,

p.

439).

The section of Being and Time that

gives rise to this is number 6 in the introduction: "The Task
of Destroying the History of Ontology."
In Being and Time Heidegger ran up against a dilemma. In
his effort to break with philosophical subjectivity, Habermas
claims, Heidegger merely stood Husserlian phenomenology on its
head. As such, he is saddled with an ego-centric concept of
the world which ignores the networks of intersubjectivity that
are fundamental to being-with-others. In order to preserve the
radical voluntarism that, according to Habermas, lies at the
heart

of

Being

and

Time,

Heidegger

needs

the

very

transcendental ego that the philosophy of Dasein aimed at
overcoming.

Habermas argues that Heidegger recognized this

dilemma and opted for an alternative notion of transcendence
rather

than

a

(constructed more

revised

doctrine

of

intersubjectively).

being-in-the-world
Hence,

the

"turn"--
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prompting a shift in the interpretation of destining from that
of an active Dasein to a quietistic shepherd who, "hanging on

in spite of fate yields to self-surrender to the destining of
Being" (PDM, pp. 149-52). This move finds its impetus in the
destruction of the history of ontology.
self-understanding of Being and Time,

"According to the
it belonged to

the

province of a phenomenological destruction of the history of
ontology to

loosen up rigid traditions and to awaken the

contemporary awareness of problems to the buried experiences
of ancients

thought"

(PDM,

p.

153).

As

such,

Heidegger's

leveling of the history of metaphysics, and his renunciation
of that tradition as a

source pool from which appropriate

responses to present conditions can draw, is rooted in this
section of Being and Time.
The above characterizes Habermas' dispute with Heidegger
concerning his rendering of a diffuse tradition in uniform
fashion

and

judging

generalizations.
historians,

As

was

on

it

the

the
case

basis
with

sweeping

of

the

revisionist

doing so has an ideological function.

It also

requires some selective editing, which in Heidegger's case
takes the form of covert appropriation rather than conspicuous
denial.
Habermas,
attempts
critique

What

he

sneaks

in

from

tradition,

according

to

is the philosophical subjectivity with which he
to
of

break.

Habermas

Heidegger

in

notes
PDM

this
(136)

early
and

on

in

his

attempts

to

substantiate it at a later point in the analysis (PDM, pp.
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15 1-2). As I noted above, Habermas contends that in his later
works, Heidegger, in response to this dilemma, merely inverts
"Ursprungphilosophie." Hence, the later writings are premised
on the same subjectivism that stifled Being and Time.
At the heart of Habermas'

assessment of revisionist

historiography and his critique of Heideggerian philosophy is
an

implicit,

but

deeply

felt,

concern

with

nihilism

(ungrounded or falsely grounded thought and action). Nowhere
in his discussions of Heidegger does he explicitly accuse him
or his thought of being nihilistic. Implicitly, however, this
seems to be his concern (see WW, pp. 448-456, and PDM, pp.
155-160). By rejecting the modern tradition uniformly, while
still

relying

on

one

of

its

most

questionable

features

(subjectivity), Heidegger's thought is rendered inherently
indeterminate. This sets the stage for the turns and denials
that Habermas notes. As it is the ramifications of this for
politics that are most disturbing, I will proceed to discuss
the political agenda with which Habermas associates Heidegger,
and implicitly the revisionist historians.
While the contrast between the political implications of
Heidegger's thought and the work of the revisionist historians
is notable (Heidegger's post-war politics were passive while
the historian's are clearly active), it is the similarities
that are most striking. In both cases, the fundamental problem
is that of the meaning of the constitution of history. "The
more

real

history

disappeared

behind

Heideggerian
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'historicity' the easier it was for Heidegger to adopt a
naive, yet pretentious, appeal to 'diagnosis of the present'
taken up ad hoc" (WW, p. 434). Habermas' criticisms are not
aimed at Heidegger's Nazi alliances.

Rather,

he

condemns

Heidegger for his failure to make amends for this obviously
mistaken association (WW, pp. 435-6, PDM, 155-6). Further,
Habermas

claim~,

his reasons for not doing so are justified by

an appeal to his own philosophical position. The development
of that position is characterized in terms of three key moves.
First, Heidegger the philosopher wrote the monumental Being
and Time. This work, removed from the context of subsequent
historical

events,

could

have

had

a

wide

range

of

philosophical impacts. Second, Heidegger the philosopher/Nazi
propagandist, interpreted the main features of Being and Time
such that they were compatible with National Socialism. This
is most evident in An Introduction to Metaphysics. Finally,
insofar as Heidegger had committed himself both politically
and philosophically to National Socialism, he needed an escape
that didn't threaten the integrity of his thought. This was
the political factor that prompted the turn.

Rather than

address the issue of responsibility directly, Heidegger hid
behind

ontological

generalizations.

This

preserved

his

significance as a philosopher and sidestepped the question of
political accountability. The nihilistic implications of this
should be clear: when responsibility is dismissed through an
appeal to an abstract notion of the history of Being, then
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anything will be permissible and nothing will be learned from
past

errors.

Habermas'

what

precisely

is

implicit

taking

claim

place

is

with

that

this

is

the

activist

Heideggerianism of the revisionist historians.
Rather than draw any substantive conclusions from this
particular
directly

aspect
into

of

a

my

brief

postmodernism debate.

analysis,

I

discussion

would
of

like

the

I want to stress here,

so

to

move

called

however, that

there is a continuity between the seemingly concrete debate
over national identity and the apparently abstract concern
with postmodernism.
attempted

to

show,

philosophically.

The bridge between the two,
is

Habermas'

Heidegger:

both

concern,

then,

as I

politically

have
and

should be clear:

modernity provides us with resources that protect against the
deviations

that

can

lead

to

fascism.

This

is

true

both

practically and theoretically; and it is a strain that I have
tried to show runs through Habermas entire literary corpus. If
enlightenment is the source of continuity, which I believe it
is, and, if the politics of fascism represents the alternative
to a politics of enlightenment, then Habermas' engagement in
debates,

both

philosophical

and

political,

have

to

be

understood as enlightenment informed interventions. If this
isn't true, then it seems impossible to count Habermas as the
most eminent critical theorist of his generation.
As I have been indicating all along, the most important
nexus

in Habermas'

more

recent work

is

that

between

his
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defense

of

the

postmodernism.
closely

It

related

Enlightenment
should be
aims.

clear by

The

his

and

rejection

now that
for

Enlightenment,

these

of
are

Habermas,

represents three basic values: truth, freedom, and justice. As

r noted in chapter III, each is associated with a particular
relationship between a speaker and the world domain that is
thematized in specific types of speech acts. Truth has to do
with our orientation to the objective world; freedom has to do
with our orientation to the social or intersubjective world;
and justice has to do with our orientation to the world of
responsible

individuals

or

the

subjective

world.

It

is

Habermas' aim to show that any possibility for emancipatory
action has to be rooted in these values. Habermas finds these
values grounded in the modern lifeworld,

and figured in a

specifically modern

not

fashions;

were this

the

case

his

theory would amount to an a-historical defense of values that
are,

by

necessity

in

his

analysis,

linked

to

the

Enlightenment.
The crucial point here,
Enlightenment with his

in linking his defense of the

rejection of postmodernism,

is the

rootedness of these values in distinctly modern forms of life.
Claims that we have moved beyond modernity seem to dismiss
this point in rather cavalier fashion.

This amounts

to a

celebration of the impossibility of emancipatory action. Being
party to this, Habermas would claim, involves engaging in a
performative contradiction.

Beyond this rather superficial
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postmodernism,
sophisticated

which is prevalent enough,
theoretical

there is a more

development--neither

modern

nor

postmodern in any conventional sense of the terms--that wants
to engage in a rigorous analysis of the values that Habermas
sees as thoroughly intertwined with modern forms of life, that

is, truth, freedom, and justice.

It is the latter type of

postmodernism that seems to bother Habermas the most; and it

is with these thinkers--spanning from Nietzsche to Derrida-that Habermas has his "debate.

1118

The question that Habermas never really gets around to
asking is whether or not these

"postmodernists "--the more

sophisticated types-- are really postmodernists at all. With
respect to those that celebrate postmodernism--most notably
Lyotard
purposes

and

Baudrillard--Habermas

silent.

The

most

vivid

is

for

example

all
of

intensive

this

is

The

Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Where, for instance, is
the

chapter

on

Lyotard?

Habermas

ignores

him

with

the

exception of the following remark in the preface: "Its theme
(the project of modernity), disputed and multifaceted as it
is,

never lost hold on me.

18

Its philosophical aspects have

It is important to note that the debate to which I, and
other authors are referring, is not really a debate at all. It
has tended to be rather onesided--with Habermas writing
extended polemics against the so called postmodernists, and
with them making brief and merely occasional responses.
Authors such as Holub, and Kellner and Best extend Habermas'
comments on Derrida, Foucault etc. to Lyotard--the only self
proclaimed postmodernist that Habermas even mentions--but in
fact it is with Lyotard that there has been the least
engagement.
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moved even more starkly into public consciousness in the wake
of the reception of French neo-structuralism--as has the key
term 'postmodernity' in connection with a publication by JeanFrancois Lyotard." Beyond this not an explicit word on the
most

activist

of

the

French

thinkers

associated

with

postmodernism. It could be claimed that the entirety of The
Philosophical

Discourse

of

is

Modernity

aimed

at

the

repercussions of the condition that Lyotard assesses. Insofar
as Lyotard has, in a sense, written two books on Habermas (The
Postmodern Condition and even more so The Differend--see my
discussion in chapter II) with only a few veiled references to
the subject of his critique, it is possible that Habermas is
playing a
above

similar game.

this,

he

seems

implications

of

what

But while Habermas isn't entirely
more

he

genuinely

might

call

concerned
the

really

with

the

dangerous

postmodernists: the lineage which leads from Hegel, through
Nietzsche, to Bataille and Foucault on the one hand, and, more
importantly, to Heidegger and Derrida on the other.
Why, then, do these thinkers concern Habermas more than
the

straight

forward

postmodernists?

This

question

is

particularly important in light of the fact that none of them
write about postmodernism, or identify with it. Here is where
the problem of the Enlightenment comes back into play. It is
Habermas' point, I believe, that the work of these theorists
throws into question the validity of values such as truth,
freedom,

and

justice,

without

taking

seriously

the
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implications of doing so or even being aware that this is what
they are doing.

So the fact that these philosophers don't

write about the postmodern condition does not make them less
postmodernists in Habermas' view.

They are,

in one sense,

substantive evidence for the point being made by Lyotard and
the likes.
Kant's rather stern essay (as discussed in chapter I) on
the question of enlightenment seems to serve as a point of
departure in Habermas' analysis of the "postmodernists" in The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. This is most evident in
his polemic against Derrida. He begins by accusing Derrida of
being a unrepentant, or "orthodox" Heideggerian. As he states
in

the

very

first

sentence

of

"Beyond

a

Temporalized

Philosophy of Origins": "Insofar as Heidegger was received in
postwar France as the author of the 'Letter on Humanism',
Derrida is correct in claiming for himself the role of an
authentic disciple who has critically taken up the teaching of
the master and productively advanced it." This remark situates
Derrida

in

two

precarious

positions

vis-a-vis

Heidegger:

first, he is an immature follower of the pied piper of Nazism;
and second, he has mimicked this dimension of the Heidegger
"scene", cultivating his own network of followers. The main
difference

being

that

Heidegger

yearns

for

premodern

simplicity while Derrida strives for postmodern complexity.
Habermas frames this in specifically political terms: "Whereas
Heidegger decks out his history-of-Being fatalism in the style
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of schultze-Naumburg with its sentimental homely pictures of
a preindustrial peasant counter world, Derrida moves about
instead in the subversive world of the partisan struggle--he
would even like to take the house of Being apart and, out in
the open, 'to dance ... the cruel feast of which the Genealogy
of Morals speaks.'" This characterization (and even Habermas
would

probably

admit

characterization)

that

it

more

is

caricature

than

renders Derrida susceptible to an anti-

enlightenment reading:

one which is,

of course,

somewhat

plausible. As Kant put it: "Enlightenment is man's emergence
from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability
to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This
immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of
understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it
without guidance from another." Plugging Habermas' account of
Heidegger and Derrida into this equation, we come up with
Heidegger representing pre-enlightenment authority and Derrida
representing post-enlightenment playfulness. What washes out,
for Habermas,

is a mature concern for those enlightenment

values that, when dispensed with in either direction, turns
into atrocity.
If we forgive Habermas for not really taking seriously
Heidegger's important contributions to contemporary thought,
and for taking a considerable amount of interpretive license
with Derrida,

the

questions

between postmodernism and

that

frame

the

enlightenment

come

relationship
into

focus.
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Taking these caricatures of Heidegger and Derrida as signs
operating within a rather tense economy of meaning (which is,
ironically,

what

I

perceive

Habermas

to

be

doing

in

The

philosophical Discourse of Modernity>, Heidegger's character
represents traditional conservatism while Derrida's represents
young conservatism. Neither, as emblem, has the maturity to
realistically
emancipation

address

questions

the

of

or

value

about

the

democratization,

need

for

much

less

something as hopelessly "metaphysical" as revolution. As such,
the

former

will

nostalgically

yearn

for

a

higher

order

authority structure while the latter will rip away at any type
of

structure

through

an

academically

sedated

version

of

terrorism. What Habermas hopes to show is that there are a lot
more

signs

circulating

in

this

economy

thap

the

"conservatives" would have us believe, and that under certain
conditions these emblems, or values, could possibly be brought
into the forefront of human-being. This leads into the other
side of the

"debate",

one that has been carried out by

"continental" philosophers in the United States and England
for the most part. These "interlocutors" hold up Habermas as
a sign for the sake of protecting against a fearful encounter.
Habermas' sign value, which is set up to a certain extent by
his

own

rhetorical

stylizations,

is

that

of

a

staunchly

traditional rationalist who can't quite keep pace with the
fast

moving

selective,

French

scene.

This

caricature

and often blatantly wrong,

requires

a

reading of Habermas'
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work. As is the case with Habermas' reading of postmodernism,
however, there are strategic gains to be made in doing so. By
writing off Habermas (and I will admit that he invites this on
a certain level), it becomes a whole lot easier to write off
his

concern

with

questions

of

value.

It

is

always

uncomfortable for someone who prefers to wax poetic about "the
political"

to

have to address questions

concerning action

oriented toward political emancipation. By simply dismissing
this as a

"Habermasian",

read metaphysical,

or modern,

or

enlightenment, question, it is easier to pass on into the real
business of praising Heidegger or imitating Derrida.
At the risk of being redundant, I would like to spell out
explicitly

the

connection

between

the

question

of

enlightenment and the view that is presented by the postmodern
side of this debate. Both of these problematics are linked to
what Habermas has termed the completion of the project of
modernity. Two basic approaches are taken when attempting to
philosophically engage the question of

enlightenment.

The

first, which tends to be done in the name of Habermas, and up
to

a

point

by

Habermas,

appeals

to

clear

and

distinct

principles of the Enlightenment that can be construed more or
less independently of actual deviations that have emerged in
the

course

of

their

development.

At

the

center

of

this

analysis is both the ideal, and concrete public sphere as the
cite of

a politics of enlightenment. This approach, which

advocates the Enlightenment,

tends to seek closure on the
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question of enlightenment by theorizing its completion. The
other approach tends to assume that the Enlightenment has been
thoroughly discredited and as such we no longer need to talk
about the question of enlightenment at all. This tact likewise
appeals to a closure of sorts: enlightenment is a problem that
has already been attended to. As I noted, the former approach
tends to operate under the banner of Habermas; the latter,
however,

operates

within

the

mainstream

of

continental

philosophy but needs Habermas--as the objective enemy--just as
much as the former. Both ignore that impulse in Habermas' work
which asserts that we simply cannot relinquish the question of
enlightenment (I believe Habermas himself ignores this himself
at times). Kant has a strong riposte to all of this: "Laziness
and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of
men, long after nature has released them from alien guidance
(naturaliter

maiorennes),

lifelong immaturity,

nonetheless

gladly

remain

in

and why it is so easy for others to

establish themselves as their guardians. It is so easy to be
immature."
Such is the state of the debate between postmodernism and
Habermas. It is somewhat odd that schools of thought that are
known for their intensive self-reflexive critiques (critical
theory),
final

and their rigorous denial of the possibility for
closure

(deconstruction

or,

postmodernism) are so quick to sign,

more

generally,

seal and deliver the

question of enlightenment. This in itself raises questions
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about the

normative status of

the public

sphere from the

perspective of both camps. I would like now to conclude this
section with some general comments about the

relationship

between enlightenment and the public sphere with respect to
these two key debates. This will serve the purpose of moving
in the

direction

of

a

reformulated

notion

of

the

public

sphere.
In this summation I want to stress the importance of
context.

I

began

my

discussion

of

the

politics

of

enlightenment in chapter I by placing at the heart of the
problem Horkheimer's and Adorne's Dialectic of Enlightenment.
This

text,

I

argued,

is

so

important

because

of

its

thematization of the problem of enlightenment in terms of the
rise of fascism in Europe.

I argued further that this text,

and its focus on fascism, offers an interesting interpretive
perspective from which the development of Habermas'

social

theory can be engaged. This is most obvious in his theory of
language and communication which is at the core of his theory
of society. Taking this interpretive perspective, once again,
as our point of departure, a number of interesting theoretical
and political moments begin to converge.
In analyzing the objective of the historians debate, it
seems clear that Habermas is concerned with recidivism. A neoconservative political climate obtained in Germany at that
time which wished to formulate a post-Nazi nationalism that by
necessity had to normalize the period of atrocities so as to

250

factor them unproblematically into a renewed conception of
national

identity.

pointing

out

how

Habermas
the

politically motivated.

intervenes

against

historiographical

this

procedures

by
are

He in turn casts his objections in

political terms: anti-neo-conservative and pro-enlightenment.
The point of engagement, or location of the debate, serves to
enforce this claim. It was conducted within a literary public
sphere which enabled the thematization of issues that resided
at the heart of Germany's collective self understanding. 19 A
similar claim can be made about the other important debates
that Habermas has participated in: the positivism debate, the
Gadamer debate, the debate with Luhmann, and the debate over
the student movement. Each was situated within a context that
enabled either face to face cornmunication--ala'

the coffee

houses or salons--or some form of literary exchange. Likewise,
in

each

of

these

earlier

debates

we

observe

conditions

governed by something like the enlightened discourse which is
central to Habermas' normative theory.
The Historikerstreit, however, is somewhat more complex
than the earlier debates. It is more infiltrated with power
relations

than

potential

for

are

the

others

greater degrees

and

tends

to

contain

the

of distorted communication.

Habermas seems aware of this and notes himself how the debate

19

Habermas' first intervention into the Historikerstreit
took place at the Romereburg Colloquium. His comments here
made
explicit
his
efforts
to
link
revisionism
to
Heideggerianism. See The New Conservatism, pp. 207-211.
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rnore

or

less

dwindled

into

a

series

of

polemics. 20

His

challenge here is that the historians which he contested did
not take up the substantive claims that he was presenting and
that they resorted to politically motivated polemicizing. In
rny discussion of his role in the debate I argued that Habermas
himself had a political axe to grind which lead him to link
this specific sphere of discourse, to another (the "debate"
over postmodernism) via his frequent nemesis Heidegger. This
move,

I

would argue,

brings his enlightened conception of

proper political procedures down to a level that forces him to
accept certain terms of debate which run contrary to his own
normative statutes.
polemic

and

In short,

questionable

Habermas himself indulges in

association

(revisionism

equals

Heideggerianism equals fascism) which is part and parcel of
attempting an enlightened form of discourse in unenlightened
discursive arenas.
This is perpetuated by the association that he makes
between

revisionism and postmodernism.

As

I

noted

above,

Habermas' discussions of the key figures which he attacks in
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity are sometimes little
more than crude caricatures of complex thinkers--regardless of
the political implications of, and motivations behind, their
thought. Habermas feels compelled--I would argue politically
compelled--to

paint

his

"interlocutors"

~ See "Closing Remarks",
241-248.

in

the

most

in The New Conservatism, pp.
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reductionist fashion possible. As I also noted above, there
are good reasons for developing the line of argument that he
pursues in PDM. These are not, however, legitimate excuses for
setting up a discursive forum that sets up straw opponent
simply for the sake of blowing them over. This is a politics
of enlightenment that defies its own leading principles: one
that we might even say involves a performative contradiction.
This

dilemma,

which

results

in

using

enlightenment

politics in unenlightened spheres, leading to doubly distorted
communication, illustrates both the need for a rejuvenated
politics of enlightenment and for a deep concern with the
problem of the aftermath of modernity. Bill Martin refers to
this condition as the impasse of postmodernity. 21 While I take
issue with the designation of the present as postmodernity,
this is primarily a question of terminology. Martin accounts
for

this

impasse

in

terms

of

a

flattening

out

of

consciousness, or loss of the capacity for generating meaning.
This condition is

bound up in the very sorts of things that

I have been associating with the aftermath of modernity: media
saturation,

meta-consumption,

crises

in

identity,

and

a

general feeling of malaise. Another way of putting this might
be that the aftermath of modernity represents a profound sort
of illiteracy. I don't mean this in the sense that less people
are able to read and to write. Rather, my point is that the
critical acuity which is necessary for public discourse has
21

Bill Martin, Matrix and Line, 1992.
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somehow been transformed beyond the point at which it can be
salvaged by a regenerated version of the traditional politics
of enlightenment. This is a structural as well as a normative
question. The normative side of the coin has been dealt with
in chapter III. I will now turn to the structural side, which

r introduced in chapter two, with a case study in failed
enlightenment politics. The interpretive context for this is
Habermas' recession into the polemicizing that he so adamantly
opposes in "postmodernists".
A Case Study in Post-Enlightenment Public Spheres:
The Anti-War Movement of 1991

In August,

1991,

the

government

of

Iraq invaded its

neighboring country Kuwait for the purpose of gaining both
economic

and

military

hegemony

various reasons--primarily,
military

power

in

the

in

the

Persian

Gulf.

For

I would argue, to establish its

Gulf

region--the

United

States

government swiftly moved large numbers of troops and armaments
into the arena.

This prompted an immediate response among

political progressives in the United States which converged
into an anti-war movement.

In spite of the efforts of the

anti-war movement, however, a very destructive war came about
that temporarily elevated the United States to the status of
international protection force.

A primary objective of the

movement had been to bring into forums of public debate issues
that are crucial to the determination of what the war was
about and whether the American people should have supported
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it. Unfortunately, access to existing forums, such as the mass
media, was all but impossible to obtain and the constitution
of alternative forums was met with systematic opposition. In
effect,

the

anti-war

movement

confronted

a

carefully

constructed and controlled public sphere, and was unable to
gain an adequate hearing, either within the existing sphere or
through the construction of alternative spheres. As such, the
movement, in spite of being large and well organized, failed
to have an appreciable impact on any of the policy decisions
related to the war:

decisions to send troops,

to increase

troop strength, to start the war, and to go to a ground war.
This is not to say that the movement went al together
unnoticed. On the one hand, the movement was unable to break
into the public

sphere

constructed and

engineered by the

government in support of the war; nor was it able to construct
an

effective

movement

alternative

represented

a

public.

On

the

other

potential

to

bring

hand,

radically

the
into

question the status quo, a potential which conditioned the
nexus in which all the decisions relating to the war were
made. My analysis here will focus on the role played by the
media or what might be referred to as the contemporary version
of a literary public.
It is helpful to begin an analysis of the role played by
the media in the Gulf war through a

consideration of the

media's role during the Vietnam era and the changes that have
taken place in the intervening years. A commonly held view of
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the anti-war movement of the Vietnam era claims that the war
was lost by the media.

However,

analyses of the anti-war

rnovernent of the Vietnam era must first consider that the
popular recollections of the movement today are mediated by
the same forces whose effects need to be analyzed, i.e. the
rnedia influenced and controlled by governmental and economic
interests (money and power in Habermas' analysis). In other
words,

the standard view of the protest movements of the

Vietnam era itself needs to be called into question. While the
popular recollection of this era has the media playing a roll
fiercely critical of government policy, a closer look reveals
that it took the media a considerable amount of time to
achieve this position of independence. It was not until after
the January 1968 Tet offensive, many years into the war, that
they began to present

something other than the

official

version of the war's progress and, in order to back their side
of the story, bring into the living room pictures and stories
relating the full extent of the war and its destruction. When
senior correspondents,

and even anchors,

found themselves

reporting, from bunkers under siege in the middle of the Tet
offensive, that American victory was close at hand, the media
was confronted with the enormous distance between the official
version and reality. The media faced a decision: to continue
reporting the official version of the war and risk losing all
credibility, or to adopt a critical stance. This was prompted
by a critical attitude that was already relatively widespread

256

amongst the American public:
peace movements

reasoned

an attitude bolstered by the

analyses

of

the

conditions

that

obtained in Vietnam, a growing revulsion for the carnage of
the war, reports from returning soldiers, and openings that
occurred in the media. These factors, along with the general
state of social unrest prompted largely by the civil rights
movement, effectively forced the media to become critical.
While it would be a mistake to discount the positive
effect of the media, once it turned critical, it is equally
important to disregard claims that it is the media which
subdued the war effort.

The media was

only responding to

social pressures that would other wise have resulted in it
becoming marginalized. In effect, the media had no choice but
to become critical. Given this analysis, the Gulf war anti-war
movement

was

naive

in

its

surprise

at

coverage

conducted

by

the

mainstream

the

enthusiastic

media;

there

was

relatively little pressure to behave otherwise. One of the
lessons

of Vietnam is

that

the media,

when

covering the

government, is a docile creature until forced by the public to
take a critical stand; the subsequent development of the media
makes this all the more true today. In one sense I think we
could say that the Vietnam era anti-war movement represented
an expression of the classical politics of enlightenment.
Operating against the grain of the structurally transformed
public sphere, opposition movements which formed within the
textures of a re-politicized civil society gained a certain
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amount of control over information media--the 20th century's
version of a literary public. Dramatic changes, however, have
taken place in the media since then. These changes correspond,
I would argue, to the increasing forces that have moved us in
the direction of the aftermath of modernity.
During

the

inter-war

years,

the

various

media,

as

businesses, did for the most part what other businesses did:
they grew enormously. Through fiercely competitive times, a
long series of mergers and acquisitions has resulted in fewer
people owning a much larger share of the media. 22 It has
become far more likely "that the American citizen who turns to
any medium--newspapers,

magazines,

cassettes--will receive

information ... controlled by the same handful of corporations,
whether it is daily news. . . or a text book.

1123

Newspapers,

radio and television stations are no longer, for the most
part, individually owned and operated but rather part of a
conglomerate. These larger units are more appreciative of the
perspective of the forces of money and power because they
themselves

operate within

the

spheres

of

these

steering

mechanisms (or, using more telling terminology, "media"). In
other words, the media's critical stance has been undermined
to the extent that it has become more of an interested player

22

See Ben Bagdikian, "The Lords of the Global Village",
The Nation, Vol 248, No. 23, 12 June 1989, pp. 805-820. See
also his The Media Monopoly 3rd edition, Boston: Beacon Press,
1990.
23

Bagdikian, 1990, p. ix.
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in what

it

was

previously

criticizing;

their

ability

to

threaten the system was diffused by pulling them into the
system. I don' want to present this as some sort of conspiracy
theory as it strikingly non-conspiratorial. Rather, the shifts
that I am noting seem to be on a continuum with the structural
transformation

of

the

public

sphere,

albeit

in

more

contemporary forms.
The growth of the media was facilitated by governmental
deregulation, the same factor acting in other sectors of the
economy. But in addition to the changes in investment laws
that permitted any large accumulation of wealth to grow all
the more rapidly, the media were the beneficiaries of changes
in

a

different

body

of

laws--laws

that

had

previously

regulated who could own how much of the media. These laws had
taken seriously the intentions of the Communication Act of
1934 which had declared the media a public good to be watched
over by government regulators. 24 Such laws have since been
considerably weakened.
Finally,

beyond

the

economic

and

legal

changes

that

brought about a fundamentally different point of view on the
part

of

the

media,

there

has

been

one

very

specific

development relating to the ability of the media to cover a
particular type of story:

the advent of pool reporting to

cover actions of the U.S. military. Pool reporting was the

24

Douglas Kellner,
Television and the
Democracy, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, p. 34.

Crisis

of
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arrangement

put

forth

by

the

Pentagon

after

the

press

protested being left out of the Grenada invasion. Field tested
during the invasion of Panama, by the time the war in the Gulf
was launched the restrictions placed upon the press had been
highly refined. 25 Sydney Schanberg sums up the restrictions as
follows:
The only way a reporter can visit a front-line unit is by
qualifying for the "pool" system ... Only a fraction of the
reporters, mostly from the largest news organizations,
can qualify ... The rest are permitted to forage on their
own but the rules ... warn that if they make the attempt
(to go to the forward areas) they will be "excluded"-taken into custody and shipped back. By February 12, as
this article went to press, at least two dozen
journalists had been detained ... ~
Once assembled in a pool, typically six reporters and a camera
operator, reporters could go only where the military escorts
( Schanberg calls them "baby sitters") took them, and interview
only those people chosen by the escorts while the escorts
listened in. And then, the finished story had to be presented
to military authorities where it was held, sometimes for days,
for final "editing" before its transmission to the U.S.
25

The New York Times had a number of articles dealing
with pool reporting in the first three weeks of January 1991,
none of them complete and none of them publishing the actual
regulations. Once the war began, there was a small notice in
each edition of the paper, buried in the middle pages of the
war coverage, titled "Censors Screen Pooled Reports." however,
in stating that the "system" was "worked out beforehand", the
notice leads readers to believe that 1) the media participated
in drawing up the guidelines (which is false); 2) that a paper
as respected as the Times does not object to the arrangement
(which may well be true); and 3) that, therefore, the
arrangement is not problematic.
26

Sydney Schanberg, "A Muzzle for the Press", collected
in M. Sifry and C. Cerf Eds. The Gulf War Reader, p. 369.

260

The restrictions governing where reporters can be and to
whom they can speak amount to prior restraint; the requirement
to submit all stories to military authorities for editing
amounts

to

censorship.

Why

didn't

the

media

react

more

strenuously than they did against these infringements on the
first

amendment?

One

can

only

imagine

how quickly

these

regulations would have disappeared in the following scenario.
A relatively small number of players (e.g. the three major
networks, the New York Times, Washington Post, and L.A. Times)
simply announce, on the first day of the war, that they will
use no pooled sources and, instead, will leave large sections
of their papers and programs blank or, better fill them with
stories about the requirements of the pool system--presented

in a critical fashion.
against

the

alternative
infringement

There in fact was a

government's
news
of

pool

organizations
the

first

knowledge of this suit,

service
and

five

amendment.

lawsuit filed

by

eleven

writers

In

spite

small

charging
of

their

none of the major networks either

joined it or lent it their support. 27 This further illustrates
the

extent

systematic

to

which

the

imperatives

perspectives on the war.

public

which

sphere

convened

was

occluded

against

When conventional

11

by

critical

enlightenment

11

type oppositions were undertaken--such as appealing to rights
or attempting to open up dialogue--these were thwarted by
powerful political and economic structures which denied them

v Schanberg, p. 373.
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access to potentially critical spheres of discourse. This, I
would contend, represents a further structural shift from the
already transformed, but nonetheless latent, bourgeois public
sphere that Habermas discusses and which still might have been
somewhat intact during the Vietnam era. Further economic and
political conglomeration,
psychical

shifts,

combined with technological and

rendered

the

classic

politics

of

enlightenment employed by the anti-war movement more or less
ineffective.
The Future of the Public Sphere?

I would now like to tie together some of the strains of
thought that run through this chapter.

I

began by discussing

Habermas' analysis of the bourgeois public sphere which I
argued serves as his model for a politics of enlightenment.
This,

I

suggested is a double edged sword: on the one hand, we

can't really get along, either theoretically or politically,
without the ideal of publicity that he holds in such high
regard; on the other, these ideals were used strategically
from

the

outset

and

contemporary contexts.

continue
I

to

be

used

as

such

further discussed Habermas'

in
own

application of his version of the politics of enlightenment
around two key issues which illustrate both the strengths and
weaknesses of this approach. My conclusion in this context was
that as we move further into the aftermath of modernity, the
classical politics of enlightenment becomes less effective and
more compromised. In the next section I showed further how
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very recent changes in the "literary public" have rendered the
classical politics of enlightenment rather ineffective.

I

selected what I consider to be a watershed political event,
where progressive opposition was systematically shunted away
from the mainstream, as a case study. As has been the case, to
greater or lesser degrees,

throughout the history of the

bourgeois public sphere, who was able to "speak" was largely
determined by positional status, economic power, and media
access.
Habermas' analysis of the rise and fall of the early
modern public sphere showed quite nicely what happens when the
revolutionary class becomes the hegemonic class; the sphere of
publicity that they have created becomes an arena that they
dominate. As I have attempted to show, this was precisely the
case with the Gulf war. My position has been that this is part
of the logic of the early modern ideal of publicness: a logic
that uses the rhetoric of publicness to constitute,

even

determine, actual public opinion. Yet, this does not seem to
be a totally coherent logic. There are gaps--such as those
that Habermas' himself has exploited and those that occurred
during the Vietnam war--which shed light on the possibility
for uncontrollable, or unmediatable publics to emerge. I will
now suggest some ways that these gaps can be expanded in the
aftermath

of

the

gulf war,

and,

more

generally,

in

the

aftermath of modernity.
The Gulf war was fought with the threat of

"another
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Vietnam" influencing military strategy in very important ways.
In this particular situation, the centers of power clearly had
the upper hand. The system seemed to learn a great deal more
from Vietnam than did the opposition. Even this formulation
seems

symptomatic

of

the

problem.

In

the

60's,

it

was

considerably easier to define the system and to constitute
opposition. In the 90's, the system is both more diffuse and
more consolidated: diffuse in the sense that it has branched
out,

into the world,

in ways that are difficult to track

quickly; consolidated in the sense that internal pressure has
been all but annulled. Given these systematic changes, it is
not at all

surprising that today's version of

60 's style

opposition was ineffective; it was neither very diffuse or
very

consolidated.

As

such,

this

suggests

that

the

system/opposition dichotomy is inappropriate to contemporary
progressive politics. It assumes that both poles are operating
in the same public sphere. This seems to be the assumption of
theorists
suggest,

such as Habermas as well.
however,

this

assumption

As his

breaks

later debates

down

under

the

pressure of the distorted world that it finds itself in. If
this is the case, then opposition must, in one sense, stay out
of the official public domain.

This would require that a

politics of enlightenment be formulated that would extend
outward into the margins of society. Now the question is, can
this

be

accomplished

through

something more radical needed?

reformist

measures,

or

is
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The reformist,

Habermasian,

approach would require a

government truly representative of all the people, not just
the

constituencies

of

money

and

power,

that

would

then

maintain the public sphere. However, there is a chicken and an
egg problem here: to reform the government we need access to
the

public

sphere.

Hence,

the

need

for

a

more

radical

approach, one that takes advantage of the gaps in the existing
public sphere,
expanding it.

aiming to re-invigorate the possibility of
Such an approach would employ a

strategy of

disruption in order to create enlightenment possibilities in
the aftermath of modernity.

It must be guided by the same

ideals that direct the reformist approach but with a different
understanding of the communicative possibilities afforded by
the lifeworld and with a more flexible approach to normative
structures. To theorize this would be to theorize a politics
of enlightenment suited to the aftermath of modernity. In the
final chapter of this work I will attempt to initiate such a
theory,

focusing

supplants
action.

a

on

a

version

of

discourse

ethics

that

radically egalitarian theory of communicative

CHAPTER 5
ETHICAL DISCOURSE AND RADICAL EGALITARIANISM
TOWARD A TEXTUALIZATION OF THE LIFEWORLD
During the past fifteen years a number of important
rifts have developed within continental philosophy that can be
loosely organized under the general debate between modernism
and postmodernism.

I

provided

book

by

this

have spent a great deal of the space
discussing

these

rifts.

My

claim

throughout has been that there is potential for more fruitful
intersections between thinkers such as Derrida and Habermas
than has taken place. In this final chapter I will attempt to
demonstrate

this

within

the

thematic

boundaries

of

the

politics of enlightenment. I will begin with a discussion of
the ethical theories of Habermas and Emmanuel Levinas. The
purpose in doing so is to develop the ethical content that is
necessary for a politics of enlightenment. Habermas clearly
sees the need for this, but his discourse ethics are overly
influenced by the modernist tradition.

I will use Levinas'

theory of alterity to flesh out some of the implications of
discourse

ethics

that

are

suited

to

the

aftermath

of

modernity. From these I will turn to lifeworld theory, which
serves as the basis for a politics of enlightenment. I will
argue that Derrida's notion of textuality serves the purpose
265
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of fleshing out the more radical implications of Habermas'
lifeworld theory.

Finally,

I

will conclude with a

general

discussion of the relationship between politics and ethics in
the aftermath of modernity.
Communicative Ethics in the Face of Alterity
Habermas
relationship

has

expounded

between

discourse

at

great

and

the

length

on

establishment

the
of

ethical norms. It is his contention that the inherent telos of
ethical discourse is to establish norms of action that attain
universal status.

The deep ground of this theory is located

in what I would describe as a linguistif ied or textualized
theory of the lifeworld: a theory which in my estimation does
not

compliment

the

formalistic

aspirations

of

his

communicative ethics. It does, however, establish a framework
within which the question of alterity can be problematized.
Levinas, on the other hand, develops a relational view of
ethical conduct that is located in the ineradicable difference
between "I" and "another."

The ethical relation is one in

which the other is passively granted his/her alterity.

The

language of this relationship is pre-systematic, pre-rational,
and operates solely on the basis of response-ability. I am in
an ethical relation when I respond to the other qua his/her
alterity.
These are radically different ethical notions. The former
starts with the assumption that alterity can be subsumed in
forums

of

discourse--producing

consensus

based

ethical
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standards. The latter denies that subsumption of this sort can
be characterized as ethical in any sense. While in general I
am more

sympathetic to Habermas'

agenda,

factoring radical alterity into a

the prospect of

communicative theory of

ethics is intriguing. I will attempt here to use Levinas and
Habermas

in

conjunction

with

one

another

and

begin

to

formulate some of the tenets of a post-conventional discourse
ethics.

I

will

thematize

this

project

in

terms

of

the

relationship between alterity and authority, and legitimacy
and authority. My aim is to sketch consensual legitimacy and
incommensurability into an ethical network that is radically
post-conventional. Or, in the terms I have been developing: a
notion of discourse ethics that is suited to the aftermath of
modernity.
The

place

of

ethics

and

the

place

of

language

in

Habermas' social theory can be situated in terms of the two
key

essays

Distorted

discussed

in

Communication"

Chapter
and

III:

"On

"Towards

Systematically
a

Theory

of

Communicative Competence." I will briefly review these essays
in order to provide a context for the ensuing discussion.
Habermas'

objective is to show how irregular communicative

patterns can develop into dangerous norms of conduct.

The

problem lurking in the background of these essays (one dealt
with more explicitly by Adorno and Horkheimer)

is that of

manipulative propaganda. Habermas' aim is to show how language
can be abusively employed in discourse such that unethical
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standards of action follow.
The key development in SDC is the connection that is
drawn between modes of discourse, the language of discourse,
and norms of action (which are in fact ethical norms). It is
Habermas'

objective

to

demonstrate

that

the

language

of

discourse is not only commensurate with, but naturally suited
for, establishing ethical norms. Further, insofar as the mode
of discourse is determined to be the source of communication
distortions that translate into normative distortions, it is
necessary to develop a

theory of discourse that enables

language to operate in accordance with its design. As we saw
in Chapter I I I, Habermas begins this work in
of Communicative Competence:

11

11

Towards a Theory

an es say in which Chomsky's

theory of generative linguistics 1 and Austin's speech act
theory is employed. 2 From Chomsky he adopts the view that
linguistic

experience

is

disproportionate

to

linguistic

knowledge; we know more about how to use language than can be
accounted for by our experiences, indicating the existence of
an a priori language faculty. 3 From Austin he borrows the

1

See Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1968.
2 See

Austin, How
Clarendon Press, 1962.
3

To

Do

Things

With

Words,

Oxford:

Habermas criticizes Chomsky's monological conception of
intersubjectivity and proposes a modification of generative
linguistics that accounts for both a priori and a posteriori
universals. A priori universals provide the foundation for
communicative
and
interpretive
schemes;
a
posteriori
universals are contingent but apply trans-culturally.
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analysis

of

performative

verbs,

which

is

based

on

a

distinction between locutionary and illocutionary meaning.
Locutionary meaning is solely a function of the propositional
content

of

an

expression;

illocutionary

meaning

is

a

combination of propositional content and the general notion of
a

speech

situation.

This

draws

together

universality

(Chomsky), the language of discourse, and modes of discourse
(Austin) under one heading: universal pragmatics. The theory
of

communicative

competence,

and

as

such,

the

theory

of

ethical normativity, must be premised on a theory of universal
pragmatics. This will reveal that linguistic utterances are
rooted in intersubjective a priori semantic structures which
are,

in a

sense,

linguistically determined.

As

such,

the

foundation of communicative ethics is the hypothetical ideal
speech situation (TTCC, 365-370).
Habermas

realizes

that

the

ideal

speech

situation--a

forum of discourse which provides for pure intersubjectivity-cannot

be

established.

Nevertheless,

the

analysis

of

communicative competence does indicate the presence of ideal
structures in the rational deployment of speech acts.

The

model of ideal speech establishes a standard against which
asymmetries that distort communication can be measured. With
this

addition

communication,

to

the

theory

of

systematically

distorted

Habermas provides a tool for rehabilitating
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communicative abnormalities. 4
The formal work in the essays that I have discussed is
put to normative work in Legitimation Crisis and The Theory of
communicative Action. Habermas' aim is to develop a theory of
action in terms of the semantic structures of language and an
ideal speech situation. If universal validity is built into
the structures of language, and can be realized in certain
discursive situations, then normative claims concerned with
truth,

freedom and

justice can be universalized.

takes it upon himself to argue for this in vol.
Theory of Communicative Action.

Habermas
1 of The

His primary concern is to

formulate a theory of action synchronization that hinges on
clear,

unrestrained

This

communication.

requires

the

development of a schema for distinguishing between strategic
and communicative action. Rather than depending on an analysis
of psychological states, this schema relies on knowledge of
the

structural

Reaching

foundations

understanding

argumentation
interlocutors.

that

of

involves
culminates

"reaching
a

understanding." 5

rational
in

process

consensus

of

among

Habermas stresses that this process must be

4

For a good summary of "On Systematically Distorted
Communication" and Towards a
"Theory of Communicative
Competence" see Fred Dallmayr, Language and Politics, Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984, pp. 123-125.
5

This is an extremely important move as he does not want
to root his theory in subjectivity. In spite of this his
theory of intersubjectivity seems to rely on an unproblematic,
almost Kantian, view of the subject. As such, he still has an
idealized subject as the basic unit in his theory of
communicative action.
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free of coercion; understanding has to be arrived at through
free and open discussion. For him this is "the inherent telos
of human speech." 6
In order for action coordination to be communicatively
orchestrated two conditions have to be met: first, there must
be a speech act uttered by a speaker; and, second, that speech
act must be received and affirmed by a hearer. This roots the
speech act in a
assumes

the

relationship between rational agents that

truth

of

the

propositional

content

of

the

utterance, the authenticity of the speakers intentions, and an
obligation on the part of the receiver to respond with the
appropriate action. Insofar as semantic content is a function
of the process of understanding--the utterances meaning is
partially determined in the discursive arena--the speech act
is

now

formulated

domination free

in

such

action.

a

way

In chapter

that
III

it
I

can

coordinate

pursued this by

investigating precisely what Habermas means by a

validity

claim and what criteria determine whether that claim should be
accepted or rejected.

6

In the present context,

however,

it

Juergen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action
Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Thomas
McCarthy trans. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984, pp. 284-288
(hereafter TCA:l). Certain types of strategic action are of
course necessary. It is when strategic reasoning factors into
normative discourse that problems
arise.
Here
again,
considering the use of propaganda by various political regimes
is useful. In such cases language is used coercively to bring
about a certain desired end. It is such political mythology
that Habermas seeks to avoid. It would seem that for Habermas,
any mythos
within
the
political
or moral
logos
is
illegitimate.
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suffices

to

note

that

the

overarching

concern

is

with

categorizing various types of social action such that whether
or not those actions are legitimate can be determined. 7
It is on this theoretical platform that Habermas develops
the more specific tenets of discourse ethics. 8 This project
bears

certain

resemblances

to

Kantian

ethics

and

social

contract theory in that ethical determinations are internally
formulated

and

subject

to

validation

by

a

group

of

participants that will be affected by those determinations. It
breaks with both of these traditions,
moral

subject

is

not

presupposed;

however,
she

or

he

in that the
is

always

conceived relative to a linguistic community. Seyla Benhabib
sums this up as follows: "Instead of asking what an individual
moral agent could or would will, without self-contradiction,
to be a universal norm, one asks: What norms or institutions
would the members of an ideal or real communication community
agree to as representing their common interests after engaging
in a special kind of argumentation or conversation." 9
7

For a detailed discussion of the relationship between
the theory of communicative action and Habermas' theory of
communicative competency see David Ingram, Habermas and the
Dialectic of Reason, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987,
PP 32-42.
8 Habermas lays out the historical background for and
basic tenets of discourse ethics in "Diskursethik, Notizen zu
einen Begrundungsprogramm," Moralbewusstein und kommunikati ves
Handeln, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983.
9

Seyla Benhabib, "In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel:
Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical
Philosophy," The Philosophical Forum, Vol. xxi. No. 1-2 (FallWinter 1989-90), page 1.

273
The participant in ethical discourse is embedded within the
communicative framework provided by a

common language.

As

such, the subject is both shaped by the common denominators
established by a shared language and affirmed as an individual
located in the networks of reciprocity which develop within
ethical communities. 10

Habermas situates this in terms of

the relationship between justice (autonomy) and solidarity. He
contends

that

in

order

for

the

principles

of

autonomous

morality to obtain, they must be undergirded with a cohesive
sense

of

purposes

communal
of

solidarity.

justice

(moral

Under

such

autonomy)

conditions

are

to

the

preserve

inviolable respect for socialized individuals and to protect
the

structures

of

intersubjectivity

that

provide

the

foundation for solidarity. "Justice concerns the equal freedom
of unique and self-determining individuals, while solidarity
concerns the welfare of consociates who are intimately linked
in an intersubjectively shared form of life--and thus also to
the maintenance of the integrity of this form of life itself"
(JS, 47). Benhabib calls this "the principle of egalitarian
reciprocity"
universal

which

moral

necessarily

respect." 11

attends

Discourse

"the
ethics

principle
presents

of
a

10

Juergen Habermas, "Justice and Solidarity: On the
Shierry Weber Nicholson
Discussion Concerning Stage Six,
trans. The Philosophical Forum, Vol. xxi. No. 1-2 (Fall-Winter
1989-90) pp. 46-51 (hereafter JS).
11

11 In

"Toward a Discourse Ethic of Solidarity,
Praxis
International, Vol. 8, No. 4 (January 1986) pp. 425-429, Nancy
Fraser criticizes Benhabib's earlier attempt to square
discourse ethics with Carol Gilligan's ethic of care. It is
11
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solution

to

the

problem

of

preserving

autonomy

under

conditions of communal solidarity by claiming that language is
the

source

of

both.

As

Habermas

summarizes:

"Thus,

the

procedure of discursive will formation takes account of the
inner connection of the two aspects: the autonomy of unique
individuals and their prior embeddedness in intersubjectively
shared forms of life" (JS, 49).
While this discussion is a bit too compressed, it should
provide the basis for a preliminary investigation of the
relationship between Habermas' work and Levinas' reflections
on ethics. The most obvious point of contact is the centrality
of language for each;

although as soon will be apparent,

Habermas and Levinas have radically different views concerning
language. Another point of contact is contact itself. Both
Habermas and Levinas insist that the substance of ethics is to
be found in a certain form of relationality, of contact with
another. Further, both are at great pains to characterize this
interaction as one that is by necessity free of domination.
Finally, both place a great deal of weight upon conditions of
response and responsibility. I will return to these common,

her position that this results in autonomy being privileged
over solidarity. Her call is for an ethical discourse that is
more attentive to
existing
"socio-cultural means
of
interpretation." From this she develops a more intersubjective
concept of autonomy. I think that this problem exists in both
Benhabib' s and Habermas' most recent formulations. Habermas in
particular attempts to deal with this problem but seems to be
reluctant to go far enough. My suspicion is that the modes of
alterity that would have to be contended with in a radically
embedded discourse ethic are what hold him back.
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although minimally so as stated, denominators in short order.
At this point, however, it is necessary to move into some of
Levinas'

work

in

order

to

further

establish

basis

for

comparison.
My discussion of Levinas will attempt to do one of the
things that Levinas seems to resist. That is,

I will try to

map his work onto the framework provided by Habermas. While
this might not be entirely fair to Levinas, I think that it is
a philosophically valuable project.

If, as seems to be the

case, Levinas' work is concerned with problems of domination,
industrialization and the use of systematization to coerce
"beings," then it should be useful to read his work in the
light

of

others with

similar

concerns. 12

I

will

begin by

discussing Levinas' notion of the face to face relation. From
there I will consider the connection between this relationship
and ethics. Finally, I will situate this in terms of Levinas'
view of language and the ethics of proximity.
Levinas
relationship:

states

the

"The

face

following about the
is

present

in

its

face

to face

refusal

to

be

contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is,
encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched--for in visual or
12

One hint that this is what Levinas is really concerned
with is the stunning dedication that sets off Otherwise Than
Being: "To the memory of those who were closest among the six
million assassinated by the National Socialists and of the
millions on millions of all confessions and all nations,
victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same antisemitism." Also, see "Ideology and Idealism," "Difficult
Freedom," and "Ethics and Politics" in The Levinas Reader,
Sean Hand ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
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accomplishes a relation between terms that breaks up the unity
of a genus." It is this interlocutionary relationship, prior
to thematic unity,
structure

of

language

inviolability of
'numinous, '

that annotates the ethical.

his

the

thereby

Other

and,

'holiness. '"

announces
without

In

any

other words,

"The formal
the

ethical

odor of
the

the

ethical

relationship is one that is utterly independent of any active
force. As such, ethics is situated in terms of domination free
speech (TI, 194-198).
This of course bears certain resemblances to Habermas'
ideal speech situation. Further, I think that Levinas would
want to

say that,

in a

sense,

this

is an idealization. 14

Nevertheless, on the specific content of the ideal the two
part

company.

For

intersubjectivity.

Habermas
For

the

ideal

Levinas,

is
the

intersubjectivity is already a violation.
Levinas'

'ideal speech situation'

domination

free

"inter"

of

Interlocution in

is always concerned with

inter-rupting that in subjectivity which permits the "inter"-the bringing together of I and Other under a single conceptual
rubric. 15 When I faces Other, I is called into question. This
14

See Levinas' discussion in "Ideology and Idealism" in
The Levinas Reader.
15

My
reference
here
is
Maurice
Blanchet' s
"Interruptions," The Sin of the Book, Edmond Jabes ed. Here
Blanchet identifies four types of communication. The first
three, as he puts it, "tend toward unity." The fourth,
however, involves "no unifying effort." In this mode of
communication there is no attempt to establish common ground.
"Now, what is at stake is the strangeness between us, and not
only that obscure part which escapes our mutual knowledge and
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questioning,
gesture.

Levinas

The

call

maintains,
of

the

is

Other

the
is

original

not

an

ethical

attack

on

subjectivity but rather a mandate to which I must respond.
"The 'resistance' of the other does not do violence to me,
does

not

act

negatively;

it

has

a

positive

structure:

Ethical." Given this, the question that Levinas must address
concerns the status of the ethical structure (TI, 196-197).
The face to face encounter involves two surfaces coming
into

contact

with

one

another.

This

coming

into

contact

establishes a relationship--one without depth or content. As
such, it has only form; and this form is ethical. For Levinas,
the form of the face to face relationship is ethical in the
sense that it represents a resistance to power.

"The face

resists possession, resists my power." This, however, is not
resistance which requires action in opposition to that which
seeks to dominate: an annulment of power through the exercise
of

power.

category

Rather,
of

power.

it
For

is

a

the

resistance
other

to

which

resists

resist my power

the
by

is nothing but the obscurity of being within the 'I"--a
strangeness which is still relative (an 'I' is always close to
another 'I,' even in difference, competition, desire, and
need). What is at stake now and has to be accounted for is all
that separates me from the other, that is to say, the other
insofar as i am infinitely separate from him: separation,
cleft, gap which leaves him infinitely outside me, but also
claims to found my relation with him on this very interruption
which is an interruption of being--of otherness through which
he is, I must repeat, for me neither I, nor another existence,
nor a modality of universal existence, nor a superexistence
(god or non-god), but the unknown in its infinite distance"
(48). This seems to nicely summarize Levinas' ethical
relationship.
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exercising her/his power would be to accept the terms of a
power

relationship.

This

in

usurpation or subordination;
total

or

through

turn

involves

an

inevitable

conceptual unification--either

compromise--always

falls

from

a

power

relationship. The other calls to me, requests my response, in
a

space

that

is

outside

of

any

totality

or

ontological

fabrication. Here my power is inoperative; I just 'am,' in the
proximity of the other (TI, 197-199).
For

Levinas

relationship

the

serves

ethical
to

form

neutralize

of

the

power.

face

to

face

This

in

turn

establishes a sphere of discourse. "But thus the
infinity

is

expression

and

discourse."

Here

epiphan~

again,

of

some

similarities with Habermas' ideal speech situation emerge. For
both, the domain of ethical discourse lies within a formal
sphere that is free of power relations. But the status of both
formal and power is quite different. For Habermas, the formal
aspect of the ideal speech situation is a construct which uses
the resources that are available in natural language.

For

Levinas, ideal discourse precedes natural language. It is not
concerned with the content of speech acts as it is necessarily
prior to the possibility of speech acts. As such, his appeal
is

to

a

peculiar

transcendental

sort

of

philosophical

transcendence:
a

priori,

but

not
rather

to

a

to

a

transcendence that is intricately intertwined with immanence.
"The absolutely other,
philosophy of

whose alterity is

overcome

in the

immanence on the allegedly common plane of
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history,

maintains

his

transcendence

history ... Transcendence designates a
infinitely distant

from my own

in

the

midst

of

relation with reality

reality,

yet without

this

distance destroying this relation and without this relation
destroying

this

distance,

as

would

happen with

relations

within the same; this relation does not become an implantation

in the other and a confusion with him, does not effect the
very identity of the same, its ipseity, does not silence the
apology, does not become apostasy and exstasy" (TI, 40-42).
There

are

actually

some

very

interesting resonances

here

between Levinas' view of transcendence and what Habermas often
refers to as the quasi-transcendental character of ordinary
language.

With

respect

to

the

operational

features

of

discourse, however, the similarities drop out. This situates
the difference between the two concerning power as well. For
Habermas, power involves the use of unreasonable tactics for
gaining an advantage in negotiation. For Levinas, relations of
reason

and

vocabulary

negotiation
of

are

relations

such discourses

structures of domination

is

of

power,

and

the

inherently tainted with

(conceptualization). As such,

the

formal character of the ideal speech situation and the face to
face relation represent two poles of formality: form prior to
the possibility of content and form that rarefies content (TI,
200-201). (This polarity will be important in my discussion of
Authority, Legitimacy and Alterity in the following section.)
Given this polarity,

and what has already been noted
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about the role of language in Habermas'

formal discursive

arena, what sort of language operates within Levinas' formal
structure? Levinas states the following:
expression

and

responsibility,

this

"This bond between

ethical

condition

or

essence of language prior to all disclosure of being and its
cold splendor, permits us to extract language from subjection
to a preeminent thought, where it would have but the servile
function

of

translating

that

preexistent

thought

on

the

outside or of universalizing its interior movements" (TI, 200201). This states negatively the role of language in the face
to face relationship.

It is not, as for Habermas, a medium

through which content is expressed, a way to fill in the space
created by an empty formality; nor is it matter that can be
formed

into

universal

norms.

Rather,

as

Levinas

states

positively in "Language and Proximity," the language of the
face to face relationship, the language of ethical discourse,

is

an-archical;

relation

of

it

is

proximity,

proximity without
this

noetico-noematic structure,

contact

cognition.

"This

unconvertible

into

in which every transmission of

messages, whatever be those messages, is already established,
is

the

original

language,

a

language

without

words

or

propositions, pure communication. " 16 This is the language of
ethical

discourse--the

pre-systematic

array

of

material

signifiers that originate in the "human face and skin."
16

Emmanuel Levinas, "Language and Proximity," Collected
Philosophical Papers, Alphonso Ling is trans. Boston: Martin us,
Nijhof Publishers, 1987, page 119.
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These

last

remarks

seem

completely

outside

of

the

framework provided by Habermas' universal pragmatic schema. In
fact,

they call into question the possibility of situating

ethical discourse in terms of any type of schema. 17 Yet

I

think that an interesting connection can be drawn. Habermas
situates his schematic theory of communication and discourse
in terms of a historical theory of language that is associated
with the development of
sense,

frames

lifeworld structures.

in a

the ideal features of language which ground

communicative ethics

in terms of a material

Habermas

within

notes

This,

that

this

substructure

substructure.
there

is

a

considerable amount of shifting and disruption which results
in semantic ambiguity. At the same time, however, there is a
considerable amount of continuity and evolutionary refinement.
The universal pragmatic analysis attempts to demonstrate how
these structures of continuity and refinement can be drawn
upon in formal spheres of ethical decision making.
What Habermas seems to ignore is that the language needed
to construct a universal pragmatic schema is always already
laced with the disruptive movement that operates within the
lifeworld spheres. This is where Levinas' notion of alterity
becomes extremely interesting. If the disruptive movement that
Habermas

17

detects

in

lifeworld

structures,

from which

the

Levinas was already developing a discourse on the
impossibility of critical discourses on discourse in the
1950's. See in particular "The Ego and Totality" in Collected
Philosophical Papers.
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language of ethical discourse must be drawn, is traceable to
the radical alterity of the face to face relation,
constructive
susceptible
exchange.

theory
to

Or,

the
in

of

ethical

disruptive
other

discourse
features

words,

the

then a

will

always

be

its

medium

of

marked

by

of

material,

alterity, will always break up the unity of the ideal. This
claim depends upon the sense in which, for both Habermas and
Levinas, Transcendence and immanence are historically related.
I would like to advance this claim, although with certain
reservations. I support Levinas' view that the materiality of
the face to face relationship has ethical significance. And,
with Levinas, I would claim that the importance lies in the
way that alterity--as a structural feature of language--annuls
conceptual hegemony. Contra Levinas, however,

I would argue

that

the

this

does

not

begin

to

manifestations of ethical discourse.

exhaust
In fact,

possible

I think that

there is much to be said for the procedural-schematic model of
discourse that Habermas has developed in great detail. What is
most interesting, and for the purposes of a post-conventional
critical

theory

Levinas'

11

analysis

behind discourse,
such

as

of
11

ethical

most

is the way that it,

useful,

in a

sense,

about
gets

identifying a problem area that a theory

Habermas'

Nevertheless,

discourse

Levinas

has

difficulty

doesn't

develop

contending
this

analysis

with.
in

a

manner that is particularly useful to critical theory. In much
the same way that Habermas develops an ethical theory that
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attempts to eliminate the problem of radical alterity, Levinas
gestures away from concrete situations in which alterity can
actually

play

domination.

For

a

role
both,

in

the

the

role

disruption
of

of

power and

structural
ideality

in

ethical discourse is characterized in an extremely limited
way. In the remainder of this essay I will attempt to define
these established limits and consider the ethical space that
lies between them.
Earlier I alluded to poles of formality that distinguish
between the modes of ideal discourse that are central to
Habermas' and Levinas' respective views on the ethical. As is
the case with any polar opposition, there is an interesting
terrain

lying

between

these

two

extremities.

I

would

characterize this terrain as a field of power. Both Habermas
and Levinas attempt to exclude power from the domain of ideal
speech;

but

in

my

estimation,

neither

thinks

power

very

carefully. In general, for Habermas, power is anything that
falls outside of rationality. This is not entirely true as he
recognizes that in institutional contexts rational forms of
power have to be used for the sake of expedient operations.
But this

type of rationality is

fundamentally strategic--

rather than communicative--and as such does not pertain to the
domain of

ethical

decision making.

For Levinas,

power

is

anything that attempts to circumscribe alterity. I would like
to

advance

the

position

that

power

should

be

used

as

a

heuristic term: that there are various forms of power, some of
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which are ethically useful and others which are ethically
neutral or destructive. Further, excluding power from arenas
of ethical discourse necessitates the strategic deployment of
a specific mode of power. The mode of power deployed by both
Habermas

and Levinas,

authority.

In

establish

this

the

albeit

in quite different ways,

following

by

drawing

section
upon

I

will

Habermas'

attempt

and

is
to

Levinas'

respective analyses of power, and turning them against one
another

in

order

to

identify

the

act

of

authoritarian

theory of

communicative

exclusion.
As

I

noted above,

Habermas'

normativity ultimately takes recourse in his theory of the
lifeworld. 18 He describes the lifeworld as the historically
developed

condition

that

allows

for

various

forms

of

communication. It transcends particular discursive situations
yet provides the linguistic patterns that enable communicative
exchange. Likewise, it is composed of shifting structures that
are in a constant process of transformation which is rooted in
the

historical

resources
18

and

relationship between
specific

contexts

of

a

pool

of

discourse.

discursive
Hence,

the

It is well beyond the limits of this paper to go into
the details of Habermas' lifeworld theory. I think that it can
be established that this theory is not completely compatible
with the schematic theory that it supports. The lifeworld has
a textured, multi-dimensional quality that the universal
pragmatic analysis seems to try to iron smooth. For Habermas'
discussion of the lifeworld see Vol. 2 of The Theory of
Communicative Action, Thomas McCarthy trans. Boston: Beacon
Press,
1987,
pp.119-153
(hereafter
TCA:2),
and
The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Frederick Lawrence
trans. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 294-327.
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lifeworld serves as a pre-conceptual,

pre-thematic mesh of

communicative possibilities, a reserve that can be drawn upon

in a manner tailored to specific discursive situations. "The
background of a

communicative utterance is thus

formed by

situation definition that, as measured against the actual need
for mutual understanding,
extent"

have to overlap to a

sufficient

(TCA:2, 121). As such, the communicative reserve is

always overdetermined;

it exceeds the specific determinate

situation in which ethical norms are established.
It is this

overdeterrninedness

that Haberrnas needs to

contend with if he is to successfully defend the claim that in
ideal forums of discourse, universal norms can be established.
In other words, it is necessary to provide an analysis of the
conditions

that

generate

surplus

and

to

demonstrate

how,

within rational discourse, what is excessive in language can
be filtered out.

Habermas seems unconcerned with the first

problem and as such does not provide a satisfactory response
to the second. His attempt at a solution involves an appeal to
stable structures in language that are easily transferred from
the linguistic pool to specific discursive situations. "From
a perspective turned toward the situation, the lifeworld is a
reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of unshaken convictions that
participants

in

communication

draw

upon

in

cooperative

processes of interpretation. Single elements, specific takenfor-granteds,

are,

however,

mobilized

in

the

form

of

consensual and yet problematizable knowledge only when they
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become relevant to a situation"

(TCA:2,

124). The question

that Habermas ignores, the difficult question, concerns the
linguistic material that lies behind the taken-for-granteds
which

become

reified

in

historical

languages.

disruptive movement within language that always

Is

there

stands in

opposition to the unshaken? I will develop this in greater
detail

in the

emphasize

in

section that follows.
the

present

context

What

are

is important to

the

problems

that

Habermas has in accounting for the_relationship between the
"transcendental" (loosely speaking) character of language and
the immanent situations in which language is employed in moral
decision

making.

transcendental
suspect

that

is

If,

as

somewhat

his

analysis

indeterminate,

indeterminacies

would

show

suggests,
then
up

one
in

the
would

ethical

determinations. My suggestion is that this has a bearing on
the normative status of such determinations.
This is where I would argue that Levinas' concern with
the an-archical disruptiveness of the language of alterity
upsets

Habermas'

determinate

situations

of discourse.

The

materiality of the face to face relation--unthematizable, preconceptual

dif f erentiation--overdetermines

the

ethical

relation in such a way that unity, consensus, can only be an
aberration.

As

such,

disturbances will be etched into the

normative accord produced under the conceptual rubric of ideal
speech.

In order to neutralize the effects of this etching,

tactics of exclusion have to be deployed. In Habermas' case
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this involves an appeal to the authority of coercion free
argument. But here, Levinas would claim, a power strategy is
enacted.

By

introducing

content

into

the

discursive

relationship between I and the other, and by formulating that
content in such a way that it can be shared,

the alterity

which originally situated the relationship is excluded. By
appealing to the authority of "we," the other to whom I am
responsible becomes mine.
Stating

the

Levinasian

objection

quite

explicitly:

Habermas' normative accord involves a political subsumption of
alterity into rational agreement. It is the absolute authority
of reason that is of concern.
close

off,

conceptually,

Rational consensus seems to

the

possibility

of

dissent,

resistance, alterity. In Habermas' own terms, the determinate
conditions of a discursive situation eliminate the possibility
of

radical

difference.

Further,

the

intrinsic

connection

between rational agreement and legitimacy strategically roots
legitimacy within a power structure:

that of authority.

order to preserve the pure domination free

In

aura of ideal

speech, Habermas has to exclude the play of alterity which is
situated within the language of discourse. This is achieved by
appealing to the unmitigated authority of reason. As such, his
attempt to exclude power from communicative ethics is itself
premised on a power move. 19
19

The political element in Habermas' communicative ethics
is what would strike Levinas as being most problematic.
Political decisions always, for him, involve exclusionary
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While

this

anti-authoritarian

strain

in

Levinas'

conception of the ethical is a very useful critical tool, it
only applies to one end of the pole of formality. Further, it
rests on another type of authority which strike? me as being
even more problematic than that upon which Habermas relies. My
critique of Habermas' rational discourse ethic is not directed
so much

at

rational

discourse

per

se

but

rather

at

the

authoritative application of the concept of universality (the
power move that lends dominion to consensus) with which it is
attended. In fact rational discourse, conceived in a certain
way, seems to be one situation in which alterity can have its
say. For Levinas, however, there is no place for having a say.
There is only obligation to the other--regardless of what the

other demands. Insofar as the other cannot be known, cannot be
negotiated with,

cannot be

spoken

to

in

the

language

of

concepts and consent, I can only respond passively. In a word,
the

other always

already has

authority.

Levinas

seems

to

justify this position by claiming that there is something
about otherness which is absolutely unspeakable;
back,

or

engage

in

discussion,

is

to

annul

to speak

alterity.

As

Lyotard puts it: "The irony of the commentator goes as far as
persecution; the less I understand you, he or she says to the
Levinasian (or divine) text, the more I will obey you by that

unity (see in particular "Ethics and Politics"). This is a
point upon which I disagree adamantly with Levinas. The
political sphere, I would argue, under certain conditions, is
where alterity can be most effectively expressed.

290

fact;

for,

if I want to understand you (in your turn) as a

request, then I should not understand you as sense."~
The authority at work in Levinas' text is more absolute
than that operating in Habermas.' In the same manner, although
by

implication

subject,

within

discourse,
subject,

more

problematically,

the

mediating

context

is hegemonic for Habermas,
the

subject

hegemony for Levinas.
determines,

of

the

that
of

the

rational

intersubjective

it is the aboriginal

an-arche,

that

establishes

The I which cannot articulate itself

through passive self negation,

a

structure of

relational alterity. And since the other can't be known in any
sense (and particularly not as another subject)

I can only

respond.

It is this ineffability that is authoritative in

Levinas'

ethics

of

proximity.

In

order

to

maintain

the

ineffable status of the other, the possibility of a mediated
subject--constituted in a
compared to Habermas'

network of forces

that might be

lifeworld--has to be excluded.

It is

this gesture, which I would characterize as a power strategy,
that is necessary if the powerless authority of the ineffable
other is to be preserved.
In between these two poles of authority, both of which
stand in opposition to power but which are formed through the
deployment of power, is a terrain that I stated above could be
viewed
20

as

a

field

of power.

The power

in

this

field

is

Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend, George Van Den
Abbeele trans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1986, page 116.
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generated

through

the

exclusionary

strategies

that

instantiated the powerless authority which reigns at either
pole. Each of these poles, I would contend, contains certain
elements of both conventional and postconventional 21 notions
of the ethical. The conventional in each is represented in
terms of the authority structures that I have identified; for
Habermas

this

involves

an

appeal

to

a

mediated

Kantian

subjective rationality while for Levinas it involves a gesture
toward the absolute transcendence of an otherwise than being.
The post-conventional is represented in each as the space in
which alterity can be freely expressed. While free expression
takes on a considerably different meaning for Habermas and
Levinas, this difference constitutes a field of power that is
the terrain of post-conventional discourse. I will now advance
some tentative comments concerning the characteristics of this
ethical space, before turning to analysis of its conditions of
possibility in the next section.
The

post-conventional

condition,

and

the

role

of

universal moral norms, is in a sense the primary concern of
Habermas'

systematic

social

theory.

With

the

term

post-

conventional, Habermas refers to the modern epoch in general
and the ongoing project of Enlightenment in particular. With
the rise of rationality and science,
21

and the decline of

The term postconventional is one Habermas borrows from
Kohlberg. He uses it to define foundational devices that do
not appeal to some form of metaphysical authority. I will use
the term in a somewhat similar fashion, but will alter it
slightly.
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traditional

religion,

an entirely new problematic

emerged

concerning the foundation of ethical norms. No longer could an
appeal be made to the authority of a metaphysical being that
possesses the power of life and death. Either morality had to
be grounded in something universal that was other than God, or
the

very

concept of morality would

have

to

be

radically

altered.
The most

important

ethical

theory that

developed

in

coincidence with the post-conventional problematic was Kant's.
Kant opted to ground morality in a non-divine universality:
human reason. This is the project taken up by Habermas. Quite
aware

of

the

developed

in

radical
the

critiques

wake

of

of

the

rationality that

Enlightenment,

have

Habermas'

objective is to develop a theory of rationality that avoids
the pitfalls
Hence,

he

noted by Nietzsche,
developed

the

Heidegger and the

like.

cornrnunicative-intersubjective

rationality that I discussed above. In this final sub-section
I

would

like

to

consider whether

Habermas'

communicative

ethics are as post-conventional as he claims. This will once
again

involve

the

problem

of

authority,

legitimacy

and

alterity.
The convention that dominates Habermas' post-conventional
ethics is that of modernity. Modernity for Habermas is not
simply an historical epoch; it is also a conceptual schema. As
I

noted in chapter

III,

the

element of this

appeals to Habermas is its universality.

schema that

Modern ideals of

293
scientific truth, political solidarity and individual autonomy
all

aspire to universality.

conventional

or

a

But

is

reformulation

approaches to these questions.

this
of

aspiration post-

more

conventional

My position is that the latter

is, to a certain extent, the case.
The trace or surplus that carries over from the premodern to the modern In Habermas' discourse ethic is reflected
in his interest in providing a philosophically cogent defence
of ethical closure or totality.
enough;

This in itself seems neutral

there are certainly good reasons

for pursuing the

possibilities available for a universal ethic.
project

becomes

economy

of

excessively

modernity,

and

bound
the

way

up

with

the

But when this
the

way

political

its

ethical

codifications shape various spheres of life, it brings with it
problematic elements of the conventional. This would include
the "ethics" of profit, production and aggregated power that
I discussed in chapter III. The point is that while modern
ethics,

and

direction

modernity
of

in

general,

move

post-conventionality,

initially
the

in

the

logic

of

conventionality resurfaces and draws the sequence back into a
metaphysics of authority which, as I have been arguing,
rooted
22

in

the

capitalist

mode

of

production.~

For

is

this

Benhabib criticizes the view that the telos of ethical
discourse should be consensus. "If I am correct that our goal
is the process of such dialogue, conversation, and mutual
understanding, and not consensus, discourse theory can
represent the moral point of view without having to invoke the
fiction of the homo economicus or homo politicus" (22-23. Her
call is for "ongoing moral conversation" (12-13).
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reason

the

accommodate
resistance

terrain
the
that

of

post-conventional

movement
defies

of

the

alterity:

tendency

the

to

however,

mistake

the

valorize

alterity

at

must

disruptive

lapse

conventionality. At the same time,
to

ethics

back

into

it would be a

utter

expense

of

rationality and conceptual thought. The role of alterity in
post-conventional
speak,

the

ethics

is

procedural.

authoritarian tendencies

It

which

checks,
operate

so
at

to
the

formal pole of rationality. Construed as such, the terrain of
post-conventional ethics is a field of power in which the
poles of authority contest one another for hegemony. In this
process

of

struggle,

determinations

competing forces

which

reconstitute

the

hammer

out

field,

ethical

alter

the

circuitry of power, and fall themselves into the economy of
reason and alterity.

As

such,

the universal

authority of

reason and the an-archical authority of alterity operate upon
one another in an indeterminate field that produces tentative
ethical determinations.
An example of the operations that take place within this
field would have to take into consideration the various social
movements that have responded to specific concerns related to
what

some

have

called

the

postmodern

condition.

Groups

composed of feminists, African-Americans, gays and lesbians
and other marginalized sectors of this political-economy have
thematized their alterity
spheres of rationality)

(which is of course outside the

in terms of rational strategies of
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action.

In deference to both Habermas and Levinas, however,

their struggles have been conducted from localities on the
post-conventional terrain that allow them to exercise power.
When

one

positional

strategy

is

exhausted,

another

is

thematized and deployed. Ethical norms are tentatively formed
in a field of political contestation,

and are in turn re-

formed

assumes

as

the

terrain

of

that

field

a

different

contour. Hence, the aftermath of modernity demands an ethical
discourse that works both within and around the problematic of
universality:

a

politics

of

relationality

that

has

the

fortitude to face up to alterity.
Textualizing the Lifeworld

As is indicated by the closing remark in the previous
section,

my conception of

a

politics

of

enlightenment

is

rooted in the convergence between universalistic normative
ethics--in the tradition of Kant--and a notion of politics
that is appropriate to the concrete conditions that face late
20th,

and even early 21st,

century actors with progressive

agendas. While it is certainly beyond the scope of this work,
and quite possibly beyond the scope of social philosophy, to
lay out specific strategies that can be taken up by said
actors, it is unquestionably within the domain of a critical
social philosophy to outline the conditions of possibility
that enable such strategies to take shape. I will be dealing
with this problem on a rather abstract level.

In doing so,

however, I hope to situate further discussions that can become
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more concrete: those dealing with the nature of public debate
and societal transformation. My assumption is that Habermas is
correct

to

approach

these

questions

with

language

and

communication as his starting point.
As I indicated in chapter one, this concluding section
will utilize the work of Jacques Derrida. Critical theorists
up to this point have not been particularly sympathetic to
Derrrida's work; one might even say they have been generally
quite hostile. This has always seemed to me an attitude that
runs

counter

to

the

spirit

of

critical

theory.

First

generation critical theorists appropriated Nietzsche, Freud,
and a whole gamut of other controversial thinkers, in such a
way that their most important insights were incorporated into
radical analyses of the contemporary condition. Derrida, while
not a social philosopher per se, seems a likely candidate to
be appropriated in similar fashion.

Before turning to the

primary issue of this section I would like to briefly respond
to

several

critical

theorist

who

have

take

a

somewhat

forefront

of these

dismissive view of Derrida.
Habermas
attacks.

At

himself
the

has

core of

been at
his

the

concern with

Derrida is

the

omnipresent Heidegger controversy. Derrida, being under the
inf 1 uence of Heidegger, is viewed with considerable suspicion.
This suspicion seems to be prompted by early Frankfurt school
attacks on Heidegger. Both Adorno and Herbert Marcuse put a
great deal of energy into more or less successful efforts to
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link Heidegger's philosophical work with his participation in
the National Socialist movement. 23 As I discussed in chapter
IV, Habermas has followed up on these critiques and extended
them to Derrida, who he considers to be an unreconstructed
Heideggerian: "Derrida is correct in claiming for himself the
role of an authentic disciple" (PDM, p. 161). Habermas' main
concern with Derrida in particular and those that are located
under the banner of postmodernism in general, is the way in
which

their

anti-foundational

tactics

and

critiques

of

humanism disavow the possibility for political projects with
emancipatory aspirations. "In his opinion, the worst of these
implications is their rejection of freedom,

individuality,

communal solidarity, and democratic self-determination. For
him,

these are the very values underwriting opposition to

totalitarianism."~

Habermas'
one.

His

critique is,

concern

is

to

in many respects,

show how a

approach to questions of truth,

an important

flippantly

postmodern

emancipation and rights is

irresponsible and dangerous. As I noted in Chapter IV,

his

general strategy is to locate key thinkers that he identifies
with postmodernism in a generalized discourse that is about
the

business

Derrida,

of

undermining

according to Habermas,

Enlightenment

rationality.

is representative of this

23

See Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, and Marcuse
Negations: Essays in Critical Theory.
24

David Ingram, Critical Theory and Philosophy, p. 204.
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trend.

While these concerns are very important,

clear

that

discourse. 25

Derrida
In

fact,

fits
he

unambiguously

finds

it

it is not

within

necessary

to

this
give

a

caricatured account of Derrida in order to make his point.
While the point is of considerable value, the representation
of Derrida is misdirected and has contributed to an unduly
negative

perception

of

his

work

in

political

and

social

theory.
Habermas has not been the only, nor was he the first,
critical theorist to attack the political implications of
Derrida's work.

Nancy Fraser,

for

example,

in an article

published first in 1984, 26 offers a report on the 'Ends of
Man'

conference held in Paris in 1981,

which attempts to

undermine the social theoretic value of Derrida's work, as
well

as

the

research

of

those

that

operate

within

the

framework of his central concerns. 27 She establishes the tone
of her analysis with this series of rhetorical questions:
Does deconstruction have any political implications? Does
it have any political significance beyond the byzantine
~
See
Christopher
Postmodernism, Chapter.
26

27

Norris,

What's

Wrong

With

Reprinted in Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices.

While I don't want to accept the implication that
Derrida's work can only be put to spurious use in social
theory, I do agree with Fraser that the participants at this
conference have generally produced what I consider to be
useless "interventions" into "the political." So up to that
point I agree with Fraser. It strikes me as a bit reductive,
however, to take the position that this is the only route that
one can go in using Derrida within the framework of social
theory.
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and incestuous struggles it has provoked in American lit
crit departments? Is it possible--and desirable--to
articulate a deconstructive politics? Why, despite the
revolutionary rhetoric of his writings circa 1968 and
despite the widespread assumption that he is "of the
left" has Derrida so consistently, deliberately and
dexterously avoided the topic of politics? Why, for
example, has he danced so nimbly around the tenacious
efforts of interviewers to establish where he stands visa-vis
Marxism?
Why
has
he
continued
"to
defer
indefinitely" the encounter of deconstruction with "the
text of Marx" that he has on occasion promised? (Fraser,
p. 69).
Fraser suggests that two predictable "gestures" emerge out of
this

set

of

problematics:

the

marxist

gesture,

which

is

represented by Gayatri Spivak, and the Hegelian gesture, which
is represented by Jacob Rogozinski.
revolutionary

and

The former is radical,

anti-establishment;

the

latter

is

conservative, individualistic, and suspicious of fundamental
ruptures
according

of
to

any sort.
Fraser, 28

Derrida himself,
couldn't

accept

characteristically
either

of

these

positions and as such "deferred" taking any position at all.
Fraser proceeds by tracing this lack of positioning, as
she might call it, through the rise and fall of the Center for
Philosophical Research on the Political. 29 She focuses

her

analysis on the way that Heidegger and Arendt came to play an
increasingly

important

role

in

the

work

of

the

center's

members and how this lead to an a-political neoliberalism
28

Here again, I agree with Fraser for the most part. The
fact, however, that Derrida has ignored a good deal of the
more important political implications of his work doesn't
render them any less important.
29

An organization that formed as a result of the 'Ends
of Man' conference.
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which ultimately undermined the centers aims and aspirations.
The

following

remark

summarizes

telling that ... they do

her

critique:

" ... it

not debate their opponents

is

on the

latter's own--political--terms. Rather, they refuse the very
genre of political debate and in this way, too, maintain the
ethos of deconstruction. For there is one sort of difference
that deconstruction cannot tolerate:

namely,

difference as

dispute, as good old-fashioned political fight" (Fraser, pp.
81-82). A leap in logic is made by Fraser in this poignant but
questionable
Derridean

assertion.

intellectuals

Her

point

(Nancy

is

and

that

certain quasi-

Lacoue-Labarthe)

are

unwilling to go to bat for their political leanings does not
warrant the claim that deconstruction is anti-discursive or
that a

Derridean orientation is non-argumentative

(one of

Habermas' main complaints) . As is the case with Habermas, 30
Fraser uses polemic and rhetorical gestures to undermine what
she considers to be a critical approach that is dangerous
because of its retreat into polemic and rhetorical gestures.
As

such,

she employs the very strategy that she seeks to

discredit, utilizing what she considers to be suspect tactics.
In the words

of Habermas,

this

amounts

to a

performati ve

contradiction.
More
theorist,

recently

another

Thomas McCarthy,

important

American

critical

has entered into the act.

~ See George Trey,
"The Philosophical
Modernity: Habermas' Postmodern Adventure."

This

Discourse

of
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began with a debate between Derrida and himself in which he
clearly represented

the

absent

Habermas. 31

Later

this

was

developed into a more detailed analysis in an article titled:
"The

Politics

Deconstructionism.

of
1132

the

McCarthy

Derrida's

Ineffable:
takes

great

pains

to

quote

frequently from remarks perrida has made in interviews as well
as from his various writings. In doing so he hopes to protect
himself from the claim that he is misunderstanding Derrida. 33
McCarthy

reprimands

Derrida

for

not

having

a

systematic

analysis of social institutions, law, or rights. Likewise, he
points out that when Derrida does comment on political issues
he appeals to the very concept that his "deconstructionism"
leads him to undermine. Finally, McCarthy makes every effort
to

identify

Derrida

with

Heidegger

(as

do

Habermas

and

Fraser). These points lead him to the following conclusion:
I have found nothing in Derrida's writings to persuade me
that his quasi-apocalyptic, near prophetic mode of
discourse about politics should displace the more prosaic
modes available or constructible in our tradition. Even
if his heart is in the right place and even if his
"anarchy" is meant to be "responsible," we know from
experience that the devaluations of these modes opens a
space, or rather creates a vacuum that can be filled in
quite different ways, for instance by Heidegger's call
31

This took place at the eastern division meeting of the
American Philosophical Association in 1989.
32
33

In Thomas McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions.

This is a typical charge made by Derrideans against
people who disagree with Derrida. The upshot is if you are not
a zealous follower of Derrida, it must be because you are
incapable of understanding his work. Such charges usually do
nothing more than to encourage a less than serious reading of
Derrida's books and articles.
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for submission to some indeterminate authority (McCarthy,
p. 118).
Putting aside the questionable attempt to make a Nazi out
of Derrida, McCarthy's arguments hinge on two assumptions: (1)
That in order to have pertinence to political and social
theory,

one's work must be that of doing systematic social

theory. While clearly systematic social theory, such as the
type

that

Habermas

does,

is

very

important

and

highly

commendable, it doesn't follow that this is the only way in
which ethical and political questions can be broached.

(2)

That Derrida's critique of Western rationality is totalistic;
Derrida

can't

legitimately

undermine,

or

even

question,

certain aspects of reason without demolishing it altogether.
It seems that even a cursory reading of Derrida's work would
notice that this is not the case; yet when Derrida indicates
as much quite straight forwardly,

McCarthy accuses him of

contradicting himself. In addition to these two fundamental
problems, the same point that I made with respect to Fraser
applies to McCarthy. At the very moment that he lauds rational
discourse,

he relies on rhetorical operators,

such as the

appeals to Heidegger and the loaded claims about totalistic
(read totalitarian) critique. As is the case with Habermas and
Fraser, these comments are far less the product of serious
criticism than the mark of those who either have an axe to
grind or a cross to bear.
While Habermas obviously has a highly developed theory of
communication,

and

has

shown

carefully,

if

not

utterly
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convincingly, that there are important ethical implications to
be drawn from this theory, it is not at all clear that the
concept of language to which he continually appeals is fleshed
out in a theoretically satisfactory manner. Jonathan Culler
makes this point in Framing the Sign where he develops a
I

succinct analysis of Habermas'
states that Habermas

"norms of language." Culler

constructs,

rather than derives,

the

normative features that he claims are rooted in the structures
of language. It is his contention that Habermas begins with
norms that serve his project and proceeds to systematically
bracket off exceptions, labeling them parasitic deviances. The
most notable of these, Culler suggests, is literature, which
by Habermas'

own standards is communicative,

yet does not

aspire to mutual understanding. By excluding modes of language
usage

that

escape

his

normative

framework,

Habermas

presupposes and applies norms in the course of his analysis
that are supposed to be derivatives of the analysis. While
Habermas chooses "norms that we all would admire," his method
of legitimating them is exclusive and ultimately circular. 34
Culler argues that at the heart of Habermas' account is
a

universalistic

ideology,

not

an

analysis

of

language.

"Discussion of these matters does not belong in an account of
presupposed norms, as Habermas conceives it, but perhaps to
say this is to indicate that what he is analyzing is not

34

Jonathan
(hereafter FS).

Culler,

Framing

the

Sign,

chapter

11
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language

so

much

as

ideologically

restricted

notions

of

understanding, communication, rationality, or more generously,
a philosophical conception of communication that goes with the
value

choice

he wishes

to make

normative"

(FS,

p.

199).

Habermas, in a sense, naturalizes a specific mode of discourse
and

assigns

the

norms

that

are

fundamental

to

this

mode

universal status.
Culler is quite correct in his assertion that Habermas'
norms are implausibly derived from natural language and that
mutual

understanding is

not

a

constant

presupposition

of

participants in communication situations. At the same time,
however,

he

provides

understanding

little

which

is

defense

premised

of
on

his
the

own

view

of

"frequently

counterfactual assumption of the possibility that the reader
can see and grasp what the speaker failed to see and even what
the author failed to see" (FS,p. 193). Culler makes a sweeping
reversal

of

Habermas'

privileged

category

assigns universal status to his own choice.

(symmetry)

and

"Communication,

one might say, is structurally asymmetrical, and symmetry is
an accident and a myth of moralists, not a norm" ( FS, p. 193) .
Culler's bracketing and marginalizing of features of language
that are at odds with his theory bears striking resemblances
to

Habermas'.

theorists

This

steeped

reflects
in

a

tendency

deconstruction

on
to

the

part

ignore

of
the

communicative possibilities that are afforded by language. As
was the case with Habermas, Culler sidesteps issues that pose
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serious threats to the universality of his central thesis.
This

view

of

communication,

as

structurally

fixed

(whether symmetrical or asymmetrical), denies the force of the
theory language that Culler is tacitly defending:
structures
movement

of

language are always

disrupts

the

structures

that the

shifting and that this
of

various

modes

of

discourse. 35 It is not incompatible with this view to hold
that symmetry is just as possible as asymmetry when language
structures and discursive contexts adhere, although it does
problematize the possibility of arranging universal mutual
understandings in these contexts.
In

contrast

to

Culler,

Derrida,

no

champion

of

the

inherent transparency of language, notes that under certain
conditions a normatively moderated symmetrical discourse is
quite realizable.

In an afterward to Limited Inc.

Derrida

states the following: "And within interpretive contexts (that
is, within relations of force that are always differential-for example,

socio-political institutions--but even beyond

~Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction, chapt 2. "And what
is true of a word is true of language in general: the
structure of
a
language,
its
systems
of
norms
and
regularities, is a product of events, the product of prior
speech acts. However, when we take this argument seriously and
begin to look at the events which are said to determine the
structures, we find that every event is itself already
determined and made possible by prior structures. The
possibility of meaning something by an utterance is already
inscribed in the structure of language. The structures
themselves are always products, but however far back we try to
push, even when we try to imagine the "birth" of language and
describe an originary event that might have produced the first
structure, we discover that we must assume prior organization,
and prior differentiation" (p. 95-6).
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these determinations) that are relatively stable, sometimes
apparently unshakable, it would be possible to invoke rules of
criteria of discussion and of

competence,
faith,
this

lucidity,
confirms

certain

rigor,

my

normative

point

criticism,
that

and

is

not

good

1136

While

discourse

under

pedagogy.

symmetrical

standards

consensus,

precluded

by

a

deconstructive theory of language, it is nevertheless a far
cry from Habermas' teleological universalism.
premised on the following:

11

In the analysis

In fact it is
of so

called

normal cases, one neither can nor ought, in all theoretical

rigor, to exclude the possibility of transgression.
provisionally or out of methodological

Not even

considerations.

It

would be a poor method, since the possibility of transgression
tells us immediately and indispensably about the structure of
law in general 11 (LI, 133). This point applies to both Habermas
and

Culler.

Once

the

contextually

desirable

case

is

normatively naturalized, incipient and ensuing transgression
is denied--leaving only obscure, irrelevant deviances in the
margins.
While Habermas argues convincingly that under certain
conditions

symmetrical

communication

is

possible,

argues with equal persuasiveness that the

Culler

rules governing

these conditions don't translate into universal norms. Culler,
however, falls back on a normal/deviant distinction that is
every bit as
36

problematic as

Habermas'.

I

have

introduced

Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., p. 146 (hereafter LI).
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Derrida to indicate why mutual understanding in symmetrical
discourse is neither a

"myth of moralists",

nor "intuitive

knowledge of participants themselves." As I noted in Section
(A), Habermas elsewhere develops the framework for a theory of
language that is more sensitive to these problems. At the base
of this
stands,

framework
this

In

his

theory

deconstructive
theory.

is

theory of the

both

impulse that

the

following

includes
I

lifeworld.
and

denies

think can serve

subsection

Derridean "textualizing" of Habermas'

I

will

As

his

argue

it
the

social
that

a

lifeworld provides a

more acceptable bas.is for a theory of communicative action.
The first step in this portion of my discussion is to
argue for a linguistic interpretation of the lifeworld. As I
noted above,

Habermas'

participant-world
subjective,

semantic theory is rooted in three

relations.

objective

and

These

three

"worlds "--the

intersubjective--intersect

intermingle to constitute the lifeworld.

and

Habermas seems to

have recognized that the criticisms of the sort discussed
above

would

be

addressed

communicative competence.

to

his

abstract

analysis

of

In particular he is sensitive to

Culler's point that an adequate theory of language is missing.
In response, Habermas develops a theory of the lifeworld that
attempts to meet this deficiency. Insofar as the lifeworld is
constituted by the intersecting components of speech acts, it,
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like language, is foundational for communication. 37
Habermas establishes the connection between language and
the lifeworld as follows:
It is not my intention to carry further our formalpragrnatic examination of speech acts and of communicative
action; rather, I want to build upon these concepts so
far as they have already been analyzed, and take up the
question of how the lifeworld--as the horizon within
which communicative actions are "always already" moving-is in turn limited and changed by the structural
transformation of society as a whole (TCA:2, p. 119).
Characterized as

such,

the

lifeworld

is

the

historically

established precondition for any form of language usage; it is
the trans-situational compilation of syntactic, semantic and
grammatic structures that enable communication. Likewise it is
an ever shifting, ever moving, dynamic of transformations that
reflect

the

historical

relationship

between

the

"always

already" and the immediate.
By taking this position, Habermas invalidates the type of
universality that he wishes to attribute to redeemed validity
claims.

Insofar as validity claims are ultimately language

dependent,

and

linguistic

configurations

are

framed

by

shifting horizons of meaning, the only grounds for claiming
universality would be to establish that the residual meaning
which

sustains

content.
mechanisms

This

horizon
is

which

or

boundary

tantamount
produce

to

semantic

shifts

saying

has

that

fluidity

are

universal
linguistic
the

only

universal features of language. Clearly Habermas does not want
37

Culler pays little attention to the role played by the
lifeworld in the theory of communicative action.
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to accept this.

It nevertheless

seems to

follow from his

theory of language. In order to make this case I will focus on
the shifting horizons of the lifeworld and trans-situational
differences which inevitably factor into specific lifeworld
structures that ground contingent speech situations.
It is first necessary to specify with as much precision
as possible what I mean by

11

language.

11

At a very primary level

language is that which enables communication of various sorts
and modes. For this to take place language must have certain
consistent features but at the same time must be malleable
enough to accommodate changing communicative demands. These
demands are constituted by the material, political,
cultural

and

moral

reproduction

of

the

legal,

conditions

which

preserve and transform communities of language users. As is
evidenced by

history,

both

in

the broadest

sense

and

in

numerous contemporary instances, there is a tremendous amount
of

tension

between

preservation

and

transformation.

The

fundamental medium by which and within which these tensions
are played out is language; it gives rise to and limits the
range of solvent activities. Likewise, these activities, which
take the form of the above mentioned modes of reproduction,
feed

back

into

language--disrupting

and

transforming

its

structural makeup. One can assume that since these tensions do
not lead to final resolution, that history doesn't really ever
end, tension itself is a constitutive feature of language. As
such,

I

will

define

language

as

a

dynamic

network

of
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constellations

and

transgression

which

reflect

socio-

historical conflicts, partial resolutions, further conflicts
and so forth.
With this in mind, the connection between language and
Habermas'

lifeworld can be neatly drawn.

The reproductive

matrix that I identified above as being both dependent upon
and constitutive for language reproduction,

encompasses the

actor-world relations that Habermas claims are dependent upon
and constitutive for the lifeworld. As a mesh of overlapping
communicative possibilities, this matrix serves as a source
pool that can be drawn upon in particular situations.
background of a

communicative utterance is thus

"The

formed by

situation definition that, as measured against the actual need
for mutual understanding,

have to overlap to a

extent"

Situations

(TCA:2,

p.

121).

geared

sufficient

toward mutual

understanding cannot be sharply delineated; there is always a
certain

amount

of

shifting

that

accompanies

situation

definition, depending on the complexity of the theme that is
explicated. "A situation is a segment of lifeworld contexts of
relevance that is thrown into relief by themes and articulated
through

goals

and

plans

of

action;

these

contexts

are

concentrically ordered and become increasingly anonymous and
diffused as
( TCA: 2,

p.

the spatiotemporal and social distance grows"
122-23).

This seem like a

correct description,

although the metaphor of concentric circles could be replaced
with a more appropriate one such as intersecting threads.
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Habermas proceeds to describe the degree to which lif eworld
horizons shift relative to the thematic complexity of the
particular situation and how as the linguistic demands placed
on lifeworld resources intensify, the effect of shifting, both
immediate

and

embedded,

is

felt.

This

reflects

the

constellational-transgressional dynamic that I attributed to
language. In order to accept such an implication, however,
Habermas would have to abandon his truth-productive semantic
theory: meaning would be subject to degrees of indeterminacy
that run along a spectrum ranging from something close to
semantic transparency to a fairly radical polysemia.
In an attempt to avoid the repercussions that this would
have on his normative theory, Habermas suggests that lifeworld
(language) appropriation be carefully tailored to the specific
communication situation.
From a perspective turned toward the situation, the
lifeworld as a reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of
unshaken convictions that participants in communication
draw upon in cooperative processes of interpretation.
Single elements,
specific taken-for-granteds, are,
however, mobilized in the form of consensual and yet
problematizable knowledge only when they become relevant
to a situation (TCA:2, p. 124).
As such, the "problem" of semantic indeterminacy is overruled
by a political decision: that of defining the situation. This
move fails to take into consideration the flexible-reflexive
character of language, a significant feature of Habermas' own
semantic theory. While political moves of this nature are
appropriate

in

some

situations,

perpetually - forcing

determinacy on fluid semantic structures will build up tension
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in the linguistic networks of the lifeworld. Insofar as these
networks serve as the source pool from which the resources for
further political decisions are drawn,
neutralized

transgression

will

built up tension or

resurface

with

greater

intensity. This, in brief, is the problem with a conventional
appropriation of the politics of enlightenment. Traditional
understandings of key enlightenment categories lead to their
ossification rather than dynamic reproduction. I will return
to this with respect to the concept--democracy--that covers
heuristically

Habermas'

categories

of

truth,

freedom

and

justice.
Habermas insists that this tension is not a problem.
Appealing to his view that the natural end of language usage
is mutual understanding, he states the following:
So long as participants maintain their perf ormati ve
attitudes the language actually in use remains at their
backs.
Speakers
cannot
take
up
an
extramundane
positioning relation to it. The same is true of culture-of those patterns of interpretation transmitted in
language. From a semantic point of view, language does
have a peculiar affinity to linguistically articulated
worldviews. Natural languages conserve the contents of
tradition, which persist only in symbolic forms, for the
most part in linguistic embodiment. For the semantic
capacity of a language has to be adequate to the
complexity of the stored-up cultural contents, the
patterns of interpretation, variations, and expressions
( TCA : 2 , p . 12 5 ) .
Every

situation

either

comes

preinterpreted

or

with

an

unproblematic negotiable interpretation ready at hand. Insofar
as language is essentially geared toward mutual understanding,
it

is

this

negotiation

stable
and

medium

that

interpretation.

undergirds
Language

processes

always

of

provides
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common ground: "Communicative actions can no more take up an
extramundane position in relation to their lifeworld than they
can in relation to language as the medium of processes of
reaching understanding through which their lifeworld maintains
itself. In drawing upon a cultural tradition they continue it"
(TCA:2, p. 125). In other words, the movement of language is
always

coherent

with

respect

to

its

determinate

end:

continuous

and

transparent communication.
Language-lif eworld

is

development

unproblematic in that it adheres to a teleological principle-that of rational speech. In order to sidestep the implications
of his own lifeworld theory, Habermas has to take refuge in
the

most

problematic

aspect

of

his

semantic

theory:

the

natural primacy of mutual understanding. As I pointed out via
Culler,

this

questions

view is

highly dubious.

Hence,

can be raised concerning Habermas'

a

number

of

linguistif ied

lifeworld. What are the adaptive mechanisms that facilitate
horizon movement? Is there within language a provision for the
transgression of
evolution

and

established boundaries?

linguistic

paradigm

How can

shifts

be

semantic

explained?

Habermas' response to all of these questions would involve an
appeal to a continuous intersubjective development that has
refined

language to the

point that all changes

can occur

smoothly and unproblematically. While this concurs with his
theory of communication, I think that it is at odds with the
theory of language which is embedded in his conception of the
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lifeworld, not to mention his analysis of late-capitalism's
systematic destruction of social communication.
think

that

fleshing

altering this

out

the

conception

implications

of

the

of

the

Further,

lifeworld

implicit

theory

r
by
of

language will markedly improve the theory of communicative
action as a theory of a politics of enlightenment. In order to
establish this I will now turn to Derrida for some suggestions
as to how Habermas' lifeworld could be "textualized."
Derrida's
observation

theory

that

of

language

language
is

draws

upon

fundamentally

Saussure's
composed

of

arbitrarily established differences. These differences, for
example between signifier and signified, create spaces or gaps
within the fabric of language:

areas that shift and move,

rendering meaning and truths ultimately undecidable. Derrida
characterizes this as a textual or intertextual phenomenon.
Texts, or textual "situations", provide evidence of this as
they reflect the intertextual networks that operate under,
above, around, and within the apparent boundaries that suggest
distinctions between text and context. This intermingling of
text and context brings into textual situations the spatial
gaps in language that generate play or indeterminacy. As such,
any concrete, definite, manifestation of language is rife with
its own de-formation. 38
As
38

was

the

case with Habermas'

lifeworld,

Derrida's

Derrida develops this theory in a number of his
writings. For a useful discussion of text and textual
situations see Rudolph Gasche, "Joining the Text."
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"text" is a loosely woven, historically structured matrix of
overlapping linguistic components. Likewise, the text and the
lifeworld are both fluid: shifting in compositional form with
respect

to

factors

that

contribute

to

their

fabrication.

Further, both remain in the background--a quasi-transcendental
foundation, although not solid ground--serving as the reserve
from

which

defined

communicative

situations are drawn. 39 They diverge sharply,

however, with

respect

to

textual

the

instances

relationship

or

between

the

reserve

and

the

situation or instance. Habermas, as I noted above, contends
that the shifting within the reserve does not effect properly
defined situations. Derrida, on the contrary, claims that the
"differance"--" 'active' moving discord of different forces and
of differences of forces"--of the intertextual reserve factors
into every textual situation, leaving traces which seed that
structures

disassembly.~

Hence,

the

excluded

other,

or

marginalized, that which has to be politically neutralized in

39

Habermas notes this transcendental character of
language in several places. By transcendental he does not mean
something metaphysical; rather, language is transcendental
insofar as it survives or transcends the immediate, contingent
forms that it takes in discourse. It is somewhat more
controversial to claim that Derrida has a transcendental
theory of language. Nonetheless, I would hold that he does--in
the same sense as Habermas. I am confirmed in this view by
Gasche in "Joining the Text." I would formulate this as a
temporal, rather than spatial, type of transcendence.
~ I hesitate to use the term "differance" as it is rather
silly and has been appropriated by Derrideans in sickening
ways. I prefer to call what Derrida labels "differance"
intertextual differentiation. I think that such a term is more
descriptive and less subject to ontological hyperbole.
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a defined or textual situation, is never quite flushed out, as
the text and its situations are inseparable. 41
Critics of Derrida have suggested that this theory of
textuality-language reduces all of reality to the status of a
big,

self-animating book--denying real conflict, historical

changes
refutes

and

concrete

this

deconstruction,

by

social-political

indicating

that

relations. 42

the

catch

Derrida

phrase

of

"there is nothing outside the text," means

simply that "there is nothing outside context" and that this
"concept of the text ... does not exclude the world, reality,
history" (LI, pp. 136-7).
Derrida summarizes as follows:
Once again (and this probably makes a thousand times I
have had to repeat this, but when will it finally be
heard, and why this resistance?): as I understand
it ... the text is not the book, it is not confined in a
volume itself confined to the library. It does not
suspend reference--to history, of the world, reality,
that they always appear in an experience, hence in a
movement of interpretation which contextualizes them
according to a network of differences and hence of
referral to the other, is surely to recall that alterity
(difference) is irreducible. Differance is a reference
and vice versa (LI, 137).
As

such,

the text,

like the

lifeworld,

is

always

in

the

backdrop of the subject matter that is central to critical
theory. It is within this text (language), albeit in a "highly
unstable and dangerous" fashion, "that responsibilities jell,
political responsibilities in particular" (LI, pp. 136-37).
41
42

Jacques Derrida, "Differance", pp. 20-25 (hereafter D).

McCarthy serves as a primary example of this line of
critique. See also Habermas' analysis in PDM.
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Given that the material of the text and the lifeworld is
essentially the same, the importance of the difference between
Habermas' and Derrida's respective views on the relationship
between the general and the specific comes into focus. Here

I

think Derrida has a decided advantage. Habermas argues that
the situations defined in specific instances of communicative
action are the natural product of a language designed with
this

purpose

conditions,
claims.

in mind.

As

such,

the

right

definite

itself in universal validity

language fulfills

Derrida,

under

on the other hand,

claims that

"there is

always something political 'in the very project of attempting
to

fix

the

contexts

of

utterances'"

(LI,

p.

136).

Such

political actions attempt to bracket off spheres of meaning or
truth production, marginalizing the intertextual movement that
threatens them with disruption. It is not Derrida's point that
attempting to contextualize spheres of discourse is wrong; he
in fact notes that doing so is necessary if there is to be
political

action

(my

term,

not

Derrida's).

Rather,

his

contention is that the borders which define these contexts are
never impervious to intertextual movement or differentiation.
"Hence, no context is saturable any more. No one inflection
enjoys any absolute privilege,

no meaning can be fixed or

decided upon. No border is guaranteed, inside or out"~ It is
not clear that Derrida does not want to deny the possibility
of

political

decision

~ Jacques Derrida,

making;

his

point

"Living On" p. 78.

is

that

these
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decisions are never final due to contextual instability. What
marks the difference between Derrida and Habermas in terms of
the

questions

that

I

am

pursuing

revolves

around

the

difference between thinking in terms of modernity and thinking
in terms of the aftermath of modernity.

For Habermas,

the

contextual boundaries of a politics of enlightenment are fixed
insofar as they are exclusively modern. In terms of the type
of politics of enlightenment that I am concerned with, Derrida
is more appropriate as his theory doesn't limit the meaning of
the term enlightenment, nor the type of values that are its
spinoff,

to

a

fixed

historical

epoch.

As

such,

this

textualized version of the lifeworld is more in line with a
politics of enlightenment in the aftermath of modernity.
In

order

communicative

for

Habermas

action,

to maintain

redeemed

the

validity

view that

claims

in

achieve

universal status--in the modern sense of the word--his thesis
on

the

"telos

of

speech"

or

the

natural

propensity

for

communication to be transparent would have to be grounded in
his

theory

of

language.

But

as

I

have

attempted

to

demonstrate, his theory of language or lifeworld acknowledges
the same tensions and movements as does Derrida's theory of
intertextuality. It seems implausible to move from a general
condition of instability to specific instances of universal
stability.

As

such,

Derrida's

conception

of

ultimately

unstable textual situations is the more viable theoretical
derivative.
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In

my

estimation

implications

of

his

Habermas

linguistified

carefully
lifeworld

avoids
in

the

order

to

preserve the contextual stability provided by the normative
structures

of

modernity.

Instability,

in

this

situation,

translates into tragic loss. This position has a long history
in both political theory and practice; and on the surface it
seems correct. In other words, it makes sense to stick with
the values that seem unambiguously worth retaining. Yet as I
have argued, the values of modernity are not as unambiguous as
Habermas suggests. Sticking with them in an unmodified fashion
could quite plausible lead to problems that far outreach the
already

near

crisis

conditions

that

Habermas

has

shown

permeate modern societies. The sorts of pressures that build
up

in

communities

that

are

undermined

by

the

cynical

appropriation of modern values (and I am not implying in any
way that Habermas' appropriation is a cynical one) are more
likely

to

recognize

come

chaotically

their

ultimately

unglued

than

undecidable,

are
read

those

that

infinitely

redefinable, status. A sanguine example of this is the riots
which broke out as a result of the cynical appeals to justice
in the Rodney King case in may of 1992. The pressure that
builds up when such cynical notions of justice, or truth or
freedom,

are

reactionarily

perpetuated

will

disrupt

the

borders of the political context in violent fashion. This, in
fact,

seems to be the most appropriate response under such

conditions: conditions under which discursive asymmetries are
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so vast that radically different modes of communication become
necessary.
the

form

In other words, intertextual differentiation, in
of

the

politically

marginalized,

will

respond

forcefully to domination in situations defined by manipulated
values portrayed as achieved absolutes.
For both Derrida and Habermas, language qua language is
that which transcends any particular linguistic establishment.
Similarly, they both recognize that language, whether as text
or lifeworld, is constantly shifting, bending, and contracting
the horizons which establish its limits. Where they diverge
pertains to the degree that movement within the transcendental
impacts the concrete. Habermas believes that this movement can
and should be politically neutralized while for Derrida the
politics

of

speaking or

writing

internalize

the

play

of

differences native to language. I have argued that Habermas'
view that the meaning of truth,
determined

within

theoretically

the

untenable

freedom and justice can be

horizon
and

of

modernity

politically

is

both

undesirable.

My

suggestion is that a textualized theory of the lifeworld,
complete with the extensional properties of intertextuality,
would

provide

the

basis

for

a

more

vibrant

theory

of

communicative action.
Politics, Ethics, and the Aftermath of Modernity
In order for this to begin taking form, it is necessary
to flesh out what can be meant by the ter.m "theory" as well as
the modifier "vibrant." A critical theory, by definition one
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might say, can never be detached from contexts of political
action.

That is not to say that anything like an identity

relationship

between

theory

and

practice

is

sought;

but

rather, that theory must be sensitive to the possibilities and
limits

presented

by

situations

which

define

political

movement. The modifier "vibrant" serves as an indicator which
seeks to identify the most radical possibilities that are
availed by such situations. In my estimation this indicator
points in the direction of radical egalitarianism rather than
disciplined formal democracy.
It can be argued that Habermas has been driven throughout
his

career

by

egalitarianism

the
and

tensions
formal

that

exist

democracy.

From

between
The

radical

Structural

Transformation of the Public Sphere to Legitimation Crisis,
and beyond that in The Theory of Communicative Action and in
his recent work on discourse ethics, Habermas has struggled
with

what

can

simply

be

characterized

as

a

form/content

distinction. Another way to put this is that there is tension
between Habermas the radical and Habermas the liberal. That
tension is captured in the following remark: "The challenges
of the twenty-first century will be of an order and magnitude
that demand answers from Western societies which cannot be
arrived at, nor put into practice, without radical-democratic
universalization of interests through institutions for the
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formation of public opinion and political will." 44 On the one
hand

radical

democracy

is

deemed

necessary

if

the

revolutionary potential that has been brought about by the
breakdown of bureaucratic communism in Eastern Europe is to be
fulfilled;

on the other, the radicality of this democratic

thrust has to be checked by an institutional framework. One
might surmise that this is simply an acknowledgement of the
need

(a

need

I

would

neither

deny

nor

institutionalized decision making procedures
political body.

As will be argued below,

bemoan)
in any

however,

for
large

I

think

there is more at stake than just that.
In order to determine what is at stake it is necessary to
consider democracy as a fundamental modern political value.
One

of

the

key

developments

that

marks

the

shift

from

premodern to modern forms of political life is the linkage
established between legitimation and democratization.

In a

very unusual sense this imperative was first formulated, on a
theoretical level,

in Hobbes' proclamation that all rights

must be sacrificed to the sovereign.

This move,

and here

again, in a very unusual sort of way, paves the way for models
of

political

legitimation

that

are

not

attached

to

an

explicitly metaphysical conception of sovereignty. Habermas
would

identify this

as

movement

in

a

"post-conventional"

direction. In short, political authority is legitimate only
44

Juergen Habermas, "What Does Socialism Mean Today? The
Rectifying Revolution and the Need for New Thinking on the
Left," p. 21.
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insofar as in some way it can be traced to a point of public
consent.
wonder

One can of course find better
how

much

better)

theoretical

(although

models

for

I

often

this

in

Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel. The point in any case is that it
became necessary in early modern political theory, as well as
in the constitutional democracies that emerged in Europe and
America, to sustain some type of claim to being democratic.
Whether anything like substantive democracy, or what I
prefer to call political egalitarianism, has ever existed in
modern societies is another question. If the modern conception
of democracy is salvageable in any form, it is necessary to
demonstrate that at some point it either operated effectively,
or at

least

Habermas,

seemed to

who

is

contain

egalitarian possibilities.

currently the most

renowned defender

of

modernity, while at the same time a rigorous critic of the way
that in late-modern societies the possibilities for democracy
have been leveled, is keenly aware of this need. In some of
his more recent work he has attempted to defend modernity on
the

grounds

that

the

universal

normative

ideals--truth,

freedom, and justice--which distinguish modernity as a postconventional epoch, reflect a substantive shift that can be
viewed as fundamentally egalitarian.
estimation,

This analysis,

has as its reference point Habermas'

in my

empirical

work on the operatives of the early modern public sphere. As
I

discussed in chapter

IV,

whether this

defense works

is

contingent upon the separability of those normative ideals,
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and

that

public

imperatives which

sphere,

from

the

colonize the

economic

lifeworld,

and

political

eliminating the

possibility for substantive democracy. I have argued in both
chapter III and IV that this separation cannot be sustained.
As such, the tension that I noted above, that between
radical egalitarianism and formal democracy, expresses itself
as a dilemma:

the dilemma of modernity.

Insofar as we are

dealing with an historical period (and while recognizing the
problems with periodizations

I

still think there are good

reasons for speaking of periods, not to mention commas, semi
colons

and

other

types

of

grammatical

apparatuses

which

delimit and structure) that can be legitimately characterized
as

forcing

us

to

confront

democracy

(often

in

spite

of

itself), while at the same time systematically, in the systems
theory

sense,

preventing the

realization

of

democracy,

a

contradiction emerges. This internal contradiction is likewise
reflected in Habermas' formulation of communicative action,
severely limiting its political impact. For these reasons I
have suggested that communicative action would take on a new
vibrancy if given a Derridean, "post" modern, twist.
I would like to draw this analysis together by discussing
the conditions for solidarity, the possibility for discourse,
and the framework provided by political struggle. With respect
to each of these important elements of any critical social
theory

I

think that Habermas

is

correct to

focus

on the

lifeworld. But here again, the tensions in his work, which I
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would now like to formulate as the tension between political
movement and interpretive work which is shaped by modernity
versus that which is shaped by the aftermath of modernity,
presents difficulties. As I have argued, Habermas is leery of
the more

radical

implication of

his

linguistic

turn with

respect to lifeworld theory. While he implicitly acknowledges
the

heterogenous

character

of

the

lifeworld's

linguistic

substrata, he denies that this will have a significant effect
on the discursive arrangements that are lifeworld derivatives.
In other words, he wants to derive relative homogeneity with
respect to speech situations from a language medium that is
differential and in a constant state of transformation. That
enables him to view the discourse situation as prior to, and
constitutive of, political solidarity: "Owing to the fact that
communication

oriented

to

reaching

understanding

has

a

validity basis, a speaker can persuade a hearer to accept a
speech-act

off er

criticizable

by

guaranteeing

validity

claim.

In

that
doing

he

will

so,

he

redeem

a

creates

a

binding/bonding effect between speaker and hearer that makes
the

continuation of

argument

that

character of

I
the

their

have

interaction possible.

presented

lifeworld is

concerning

accepted,

this

1145

the

If

the

textual

priority is

necessarily placed in question.
For Habermas the only kind of struggle that factors into

45

Juergen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Cornrnunicati ve
Action, p. 59.
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solidarity formation is that found in argumentative discourse.
This, once again, hinges upon a relatively homogeneous view of
discursive situations. But if one takes seriously Habermas'
recognition of the heterogenous character of language, as well
as the fractured state of public discourse which results from
systematic colonization of the lifeworld, it would seem that
a prior form of struggle is necessary if solidarity is to be
achieved. In other words, when conditions are such that shared
meaning cannot be accounted for either linguistically or in
terms

of

existing

social

unity,

the

establishment

of

discursive situations would necessarily involve struggling
within

and

against

those

conditions.

Hence,

solidarity,

established in the context of oppositional struggle,

must

precede situations in which reciprocal discourse is possible.
The direction in which I would like to push this analysis
is

toward

thinking

egalitarianism in

about

the

the

possibilities

aftermath

of

modernity

for

radical

rather

than

accepting the limits of modern democracy. My claim is that the
lifeworld,

even in its heterogeneity,

can be thematized in

relation to specific political objectives which disclose a
certain set of possibilities. As even Habermas has recently
acknowledged,

it

is

this world disclosing feature

of

the

lifeworld that provides alternatives to established forms of
life. In this manner the lifeworld provides a matrix within
which

struggles

can

emerge

that

attempt

to

overcome

the

impoverishment of modes of disclosure which are systematically
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restrained by imperatives that are external to those situated
in positions of subordination. Through such struggles, which
are initially aimed at negating existing forms of hegemony,
solidarity can develop in such a way that new egalitarian
possibilities emerge.
My suggestion is that the lifeworld in the aftermath of
modernity is textured in such a way that articulations of
possible new configurations are delimited by the framework
within which opposition is conducted.

The instantiation of

these possibilities needs to resonate with the concerns of
those

engaged

in

opposition.

Through

this,

discursive

configurations will emerge that must be measured against their
capacity to empower those that intervene into established
discursive regimes. The term "configuration" is useful in that
it acknowledges the need for solidarity without assuming that
the

conditions

within

which

it

can

be

established

are

fundamentally in tact. The objective must be to develop out of
an existing lifeworld matrix discursive situations in which
radical

democracy can operate.

empowerment,

checked

by

the

As
need

such,
to

the

criterion of

resonate

with

the

objectives of oppositional politics, situates the possibility
for egalitarian community. In the final analysis I think this
is only possible if we give up on the modern ideal (which in
some

ways

analysis

Habermas
or

an

embraces)

end

of

that

history.

there

can

Hence,

be
the

a

final

radical

egalitarianism, which can be shaped out of the textualized

328

understanding of the lifeworld that I have been putting forth,
would be construed in terms of a politics of enlightenment
geared toward the aftermath of modernity.
Having

laid

out,

in

the

most

political dimension of this theory,

basic

of

terms,

the

it is necessary now to

return to the discussion of ethics that serves as its point of
departure.

I

relationship

began

this

between

book

Kantian

with
ethics

a

discussion
and

a

of

theory

the
of

enlightenment.

I have attempted to keep the spirit of this

discussion

the

in

forefront

of

the

analyses

that

have

followed. My position, as articulated in the first section of
this chapter, is that Habermas' discourse ethic is the version
of Kantian ethics most relevant to the project that I have
elaborated. By way of the modified version that I have put
forth,

I

have argued that there are important social

and

political implications of this ethic. I don't, however, want
to subordinate ethics to politics. This has proven in numerous
instances to be detrimental to the aims and aspirations of
political movements that have laudable goals but loose sight
of those ends in the process of the means that I referred to
immediately above as political struggle. In other words, the
question that remains pertains to the ethical backdrop that
must be firmly in place if the politics of enlightenment is
not to deteriorate into an unenlightened form of solidarity.
While I am not prepared to spell this out at length, I will
conclude with some remarks which will serve as points for
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further discussion.
First,

I will restate what I mean by the aftermath of

modernity. This formulation, as I noted in chapter II, is an
attempt to move beyond postmodernists such as Lyotard and Jean
Baudrillard--those
postmodernists.

whom

I

According to

would
their

call

the

cynical

characterizations,

the

emancipatory content of the Enlightenment has been thoroughly
depleted. This leaves us in a vacuum of sorts, insofar as the
great thinkers of emancipation--Kant, Hegel, Marx, etc.--were
all products of this tradition. While accepting that we are in
a

vacuum of

sorts,

I

want to

resist the

conclusion that

cynical postmodernists draw from this: that the best we can
hope for politically is an aestheticized liberalism which
celebrates incompatibility, meaninglessness and, in a sense,
confused enslavement to the mediations

of post-industrial

capitalism. From this perspective, the vacuum of postmodernity
is not a temporally specific stage that is open to an array of
possibilities;

it is an a-temporal

state of ontologically

determined despair. I don't want to belittle the observations
that have contributed to this conclusion--only the conclusion
itself. It stalls at the point of giving consideration to what
it might take to bring an end to the end of history. As such,
my

terminological

break

with

postmodernism

is

first

and

foremost a break with cynicism.
My characterization of the aftermath of modernity begins
with,

and

stays

with,

the

conditions

of

anomie

and
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helplessness

that

lead to

communicative breakdown

at

the

societal level. Such a breakdown eliminates the possibilities
for a radical egalitarianism. In summary of points that I have
developed

throughout

this

work,

there

are

a

number

of

imperatives that operate vis-a-vis the late-modern lifeworld
which indicate that things can't be other than what they are.
Habermas

himself

is

at

times

vulnerable

to

this

sort

of

conclusion. What this amounts to is the recognition that the
human condition suffers from an

energy crisis,

11

11

and as a

result of being de-energized, it is difficult to conceive of
alternative

fuels.

I

attribute

this

to

a

communicative

breakdown in that due to the massiveness of societal problems
(as

analyzed

commitment,

by

Habermas

achieving

fragmentation

have

and

others)

solidarity,

been all

but

and

our

resources

resisting

depleted.

As

I

for

violent
noted

in

chapter IV, Bill Martin describes this as the flattening of
consciousness which results in the impasse of postmodernity.
But he also looks at the possible conditions of moving beyond
that impasse--an aftermath of postmodernity or a resumption of
history.
vision,

While
I

I

want to stick with the

wish to depart from the

spirit of this

terminological

letter.

Rather than trying to breathe new life into what I consider to
be

a

devalued

term--postmodernity--I

prefer,

rather,

to

attempt to broaden the terminological and descriptive horizons
with the hope of stretching our capacity to think in terms of
future possibilities.
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If communicative breakdown is, as I have suggested, at
the heart of the problem, then fostering solidarity needs to
be at the heart of the solution. My suggestion for pursuing
this

involves

thinking of

ethically based discourse

as

a

resource for recovering those elements of the lif eworld that
have been distorted by postmodern malaise. I would argue for
this

being an

recovery

could

ethics
not

be

on

the

grounds

that

a

readily distinguished

politics
from

of

cynical

postmodernism. I would argue for this being a recovery on the
grounds that ( 1) the communicative breakdown is something that
political consciousness needs quite literally to recover from,
and (2) that insofar as we are in the aftermath of modernity-in a vacuum, but one with far reaching horizons--our best bet
is to reclaim values and traditions that have been devalued
and disintegrated due to the colonization of the lifeworld and
the imperatives of steering media.
Reclaiming
renaming.
forms

involves

revaluing,

and

possibly

even

In order to recover the various devalued ideals and

of life that will help us move in the direction of

radical egalitarianism we must reconfigure, reconceptualize
and reevaluate the key enlightenment ideals that serve as our
most important resources. As I have argued against Habermas,
however, this cannot be achieved by defending a set of values
that are more or less in place.
substituting

terms

such

as

It also requires more than

radical

egalitarianism

for

democracy. It is necessary to go beyond putting a new handle
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on a battered old cup; the cup must also be filled with new
meaning which displaces its previous semantic content. In the
case of ethically grounded solidarity it would require that
invaluable
textures

of

important,

enlightenment
a
and

reinflated

ideals

be

reinscribed

lifeworld.

probably most

Of

devalued,

into

these,
is

the

the

most

democracy.

My

suggestion is that we consider radical egalitarianism as an
alternative to the ideals of formally democratic society. How
this

would

differ

from

democracy

would

depend

on

its

institutional base and the forms of consciousness that it
allowed and nurtured. In other words, for such a model to be
formulated it would by necessity take into account the radical
differences that would have to come into contact in order for
solidarity to congeal. For this reason, a communicative ethic
that is sensitive to the question of alterity can contribute
to the recovery of communicative possibilities necessary to
the achievement of radical egalitarianism.
The danger of operating politically within the vacuum
characteristic of the aftermath of modernity should be quite
clear. When meaning has been seriously deformed, any positive
articulation runs the risk of being strategically assimilated.
I

take this to be one of Habermas'

uphold

his

hesitancy

to

break

foremost concerns and

with

values

that

are

indispensable to the emancipatory thrust of critical theory.
Yet if reforming these values is what it takes to move beyond
the

disaffection

that

is

endemic

in

the

societies

that
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Habermas

concerns

himself with,

than the

risks

that

this

entails must be explored. I would be the first to admit that
there is no ethical principle that can protect against this
completely. But rather than acquiescing to the conservative
tendency in Habermas, I urge for the exploration of a revalued
notion of enlightenment that has the potential to generate
possibilities in the aftermath of modernity. The most concrete
way to pursue this

is initiated by my attempt to rethink

democracy under the rubric of radical egalitarianism. If we
are

to

develop

survive
such

a

the

impasse

model

that

of

postmodernity,

is

rooted

in

we

need

to

ethically based

solidarity and sensitive to radical difference. This, I have
argued requires a politics of enlightenment in the aftermath
of modernity.
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